









New York Chichester, West Sussex
Copyright <D 1997 Columbia University Press
All rights reserved
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Bayat, Asef.
Street politics : poor people's movements in Iran / Asef Bayat.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-231-10858-3 (cloth : alk. paper). — ISBN 0-231-10859-1
(paper)
i . Squatter settlements—Iran. 2. Squatters—Iran. 3. Vending






Casebound editions of Columbia University Press books are printed on
permanent and durable acid-free paper.
Printed in the United States of America
c 1 0 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
p IQ 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
To my mother and father
Contents
P R E F A C E XI
A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S X V I I
C H R O N O L O G Y O F PRE- A N D P O S T R E V O L U T I O N E V E N T S X I X
PHOTO I N S E R T F O L L O W S PAGE 86
ONE The Quiet Encroachment of the Ordinary
A Few Minor Events?




The Making of the Quiet Encroachment
TWO Mapping Out the "New Poor"
The New Poor
In Slums and Squatter Settlements
THREE The Disfranchised and the Islamic Revolution:
"Our Revolution and Theirs"
The Revolution













VÜi C O N T E N T S
The Parallel Struggles 4 4
The Poor, the State, and the Revolution 48
Mobilization in the Popular Neighborhoods 5 I
Islamic Consumer Cooperatives 5 2.
The Neighborhood Councils (Shuraha-ye Mahallat) 5 3
FOUR The Housing Rebels: The Occupation of Homes
and Hotels, 1979-1981 59
Taking over Homes and Hotels 60
Life in the Occupied Dwellings 6 5
Being Evicted 67
FIVE Back-Street Politics: Squatters and the State 75
Usual Business 76
Why So Much Expansion? 8 i
Shaping the Communities 8 3
Associational Life 89
Working Within the System 9 5
Squatters and the State 9 8
SIX Workless Revolutionaries: The Movement
of the Unemployed 109
The Onset i 11
Campaigns in Tehran I i 2.
The Escalation of Collective Actions 115
The Variety of Street Protests 119
Getting Organized i 2,1
The Demise i 2,6
SEVEN Street Rebels: The Politics of Street Vending 13 3
Spreading Out in the Streets 135
Poli t ical Vending 137
Ordinary Vendors 138
Why So Much Growth? i 4 i
Consequences and Contradictions 143
Confrontations i 4 6
Resisting the Eviction Policy 149
Incorporation, Diffusion, and Back to the Streets? 153
COBTEHTS ix
EIGHT Grassroots and State Power: The Promise
and Perils of Quiet Encroachment 157
Significance 157
Shortcomings and Costs I 61
NOTES 167
B I B L I O G R A P H Y 2 O I
G L O S S A R Y 217
I N D E X 22.1
Preface
An exhibit of New York Times photographs, "Pictures of the Times,"
documenting major world events in the past hundred years, was held
in the New York Museum of Modern Art in July 1996. The exhibit
devoted only one photograph to the Iranian Revolution of 1979: that
of a "fanatical crowd" tearing the shroud off the dead Ayatullah's cof-
fin during his spectacular funeral. And this was displayed next to two
"related" photographs. The first showed a jubilant crowd of New
Yorkers welcoming home the American hostages from Iran in a
parade; the other, bodies strewn across an airport lounge after the
bomb attack on Rome's airport by the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine (PFLP) in 1985. The exhibitors made sure that the neces-
sary link—from Iranian Revolution to fanaticism and Islam to inter-
national terrorism—was established in the mind of the viewers.
This book is in part a reaction to such misrepresentations of a major
social and political event of our time, the revolution of 1979.1 attempt
to show that the Iranian Revolution and its aftermath were much more
profound and complex than these and many similar images suggest. As
such this book is not a history of the Iranian Revolution; those unfa-
miliar with its events may consult the chronology of the revolution
before they begin to read. Rather, the book is about the movements of
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ordinary people, the poor, during these turbulent years in Iranian his-
tory. The narratives aim at transcending the much-written-about pub-
lic dimensions of elite politics, the clergy, and the "Great Satan." This
study attempts to reveal instead what was happening under the sur-
faces of the revolution, in the back streets and alleyways of the cities,
not only on the main boulevards.
At the same time, by narrating the poor peoples' movements in Iran
in a comparative context, I will attempt to contribute to an examina-
tion of informal politics in Third World settings. I have analyzed this
in terms of the "quiet encroachment of the ordinary." This book there-
fore explores the politics of the ordinary people, the individuals and
families without institutional power of disruption, the "informal peo-
ple"—squatters, street subsistent workers, the unemployed, and mem-
bers of the underworld.
The analyses contained in this book are based upon multiple source
materials ranging from published interviews and scholarly research
conducted in Iran before and after the Islamic Revolution, newspaper
reports, primary documents (such as tracts, posters, leaflets, pamphlets,
and the like), personal interviews, and, finally, direct observation.
I have reviewed a massive number of dailies, weeklies, and month-
lies, both official and opposition papers focusing on the period
between 1977 to '99°; I have also included reports and analyses as
recent as the early 19905 where they have been relevant. In addition, I
have conducted more than a dozen in-depth interviews with key par-
ticipants and observers in the movements under investigation in this
book. The publication of my previous work on the Iranian Revolution
(Workers and Revolution in Iran] encouraged some involved respon-
dents—labor activists, organizers, reporters, and eyewitnesses—to vol-
untarily share their experiences with me. This work draws consider-
ably on these narratives.
During 1980 and 1981 I conducted a survey of the housing condi-
tions of the working class as part of the field work for a project on fac-
tory workers and the revolution. My visits to these poor residential
areas have contributed to the analysis undertaken in the present study.
During this same period and before 1979, I was witness to the activi-
ties of the unemployed and the street vendors, their organizations,
mobilization, and confrontations with the authorities. I have used
many of my memories of these and earlier relevant events, including
visits to a number of sites in Tehran Pars (an area east of the capital
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city) during the waves of shantytown demolition in autumn 1977.
Finally, during the summer of 1995 I returned to Tehran to update my
data, collect further information, and fill the data gaps in the first draft
of the manuscript. This resulted in further interviews with fifty squat-
ters and street vendors.
These materials aside, I consider my own life experience to be the
single most important source of my insights and data. By this, I mean
my direct involvement, and intense interaction, in other words, my
membership for a significant part of my childhood through early adult-
hood with the people who make up this study: the migrant poor.
Although 1 now write as an academic, with all the requisite qualifica-
tions, I count the years I lived, struggled, and matured within this com-
munity in Tehran as among my richest resources.
I was born in the mid-1950s, in a small village located some sixty
miles west of Tehran, which had no more than fif ty mostly Azari-
speaking households. I was one of six children born into a khush-
nishin, a rural nonagricultural family. My grandfather, having lost two
teenage sons to dehydration and a daughter to complications during
childbirth, decided that my father, the only surviving son, should pur-
sue a life more frui tful than that of a peasant. He thus became a shop-
keeper in the village, selling goods that ranged from heating oil and
sweets to Russian shoes. When, in the early 19605, the Land Reform
allocated plots of a dozen hectares each to our villagers, my father,
being a khushmshin, remained a landless rural dweller, moving from
one job to the next and remaining unemployed in between. At one
point he was a petty-trader, then a bus driver, truck owner, mechanic,
and driving instructor; he vacillated between the countryside and the
city, bringing many modern things to our village life.
My father was one of the three men in the village who learned to
read and write in my grandfather's Quranic sessions, succeeding, later,
in completing primary school. My mother, however, like so many oth-
ers in the village remained illiterate. By the time I was growing up, we
were fortunate enough to have teaching classes in the village— first, in
the warehouse of the absentee feudal lord, and then, with the arrival
of the first Literacy Corps (sepahi-ye danesh), in a proper school. The
village schools only went up to fifth grade; and my father, wanting us
to get an education, found no choice but to take the entire family of
nine to the city. We emigrated to Tehran in 1967.
I therefore left my village, venturing on a journey of which I had so
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often dreamed—dreams of bright lights and bus rides, morning-fresh
bread, walking along the streets in the busy evenings, not to mention
the Indian movies that our village school farrash's son, who was from
Tehran, used to relate to the village boys with commendable patience
and in perfect Persian.
In Tehran we first settled in a lower-class neighborhood close to
Ghazvin Street in south Tehran where the neighbors consisted mostly
of rural migrants like ourselves. The area was surrounded by slums
and the growing squatter areas that were filled with many colorful lit-
tle shops and chanting street vendors, and in which I, like so many of
my friends, learned to spend a good part of the daytime in the streets.
Our one-story house was located in a narrow alleyway in the middle
of which ran the sewage duct, a jouy. The house had a toilet, a small
kitchen, and five separate rooms, two of which were rented to two sep-
arate families (a migrant worker and a pasban, a member of the low-
status street police). Later we moved into a new house in the same
vicinity but with more rooms; our migrant relatives, on the other hand,
remained in the nearby slums of Javadieh and Mehrabad, to which we
would pay regular visits. Our long-term trips, however, were to the vil-
lage with which we maintained strong ties—ties we still retain even to
this day.
My first experience of schooling in the city was with an Islamic
institution. It taught the regular curriculum but placed special empha-
sis on extracurricular activities including dai ly collective prayers,
Quran reciting, and Islamic entertainment. The teachers were mostly
committed young Islamists, i nc lud ing clergymen. Indeed, at some
point my grandfather, himself being a rural mulla, expressed delight at
the possibility of seeing me one day a Qum-educated akhund. I later
realized that my school represented an instance of Islamist civil
activism during the late 19605, a reaction to the secular education and
the growing foreign schools that the children of the elites attended.
A few years later, in 1970, we moved to Cheezar, the remnant of an
old urban village in the northern part of Tehran, where my father
worked in a driving school. In the years that we resided in the first
neighborhood, in South Tehran, a great deal happened. I became a true
young Muslim, learning to recite Quran in public events, taking part
in the local hey'ats and mosques, vis i t ing the shrines of Qum, Mashad,
and our local imamzadehs, and being perhaps the only serious listener
to my grandfather's religious hikayat—a grandfather who in this new
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setting seemed to have lost his village constituency and be unable to
gain the respect of city dwellers, as the tide of modern education and
secularization began to conquer even lower-class families. But, by the
time we left that first neighborhood, I began to sense the pressure of
the institutional indoctrination of my Islamic school.
The early 19705, a period of an unprecedented oil boom, coincided
with a period of relative prosperity for my family. We experienced
some degree of upward mobility, acquiring a lower-middle-class
lifestyle. My father's income rose, my brothers were accepted into col-
lege, my sister became a school teacher, and I obtained my diploma in
a government high school that catered to students of lower-class and
lower-middle class backgrounds. The school was located in Gholhak,
close to the Husseinieh Ershad, where many of Ali Shariati's followers
were gathered and where their study teams flourished later. In my last
years of high school, I attended Shariati's popular lectures on radical
Islam in the Husseinieh Ershad. However, by the time I began my uni-
versity years, I had become an entirely secular teenager, moving into
leftist campus politics that I maintained throughout my higher educa-
tion in the United Kingdom. Despite these tremendous changes in my
personal life, there was also some continuity. My family and I never
suspended our strong ties with our village—with kin members, neigh-
bors, and friends who remained in the village, as well as with those
who left it and began to search for a better life in the city but mostly
ended up in the "slums of hope." These pages have benefited much
from the memories of these people—their struggle for survival, their
values and mode of life, their hopes and despair.
The chapters of this book chronicle the struggles of similar ordinary
men and women to survive and to secure a dignified life. They explore
the dynamics of the poor's quiet encroachment and collective mobiliza-
tion and discuss the intricate relationships of the poor with outside
mobilizers, local leaders, and the state, as well as the dialectic of silent-
individualistic and audible-collective struggles. I will examine in detail
four instances of grassroots activities in revolutionary Iran, whose par-
ticipants possibly overlap. These activities range from those relating to
the occupation of homes and hotels—urban land squatting—to those of
the unemployed and the street vendors. While each activity constitutes a
distinct piece of social history, together they provide empirical narratives
for my theoretical propositions on the "politics of the informais" and
"street politics" that I present in the following introductory chapter.
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In chapter i I offer a sociological background to the lives of the
urban new poor in Iran, with a special focus on the city of Tehran. I
trace the quiet encroachment of Iran's poor from the 19505 until the
Islamic Revolution of 1979. In chapter 3 I argue that, despite many
claims as to the active participation of the disenfranchised in the revo-
lution, the urban poor largely remained on the margin of revolution-
ary events. The poor, although on the margin, were involved in their
own quiet revolution in the back streets of their communities. They
came under the banner of the Islamic Revolution only at its last stage,
when the leadership adopted a strong pro-mustaz'afin (downtrodden)
discourse, and continued under that banner through the first few
months after the revolution when they were intensely wooed by both
Islamic leaders and secular groups. Utilizing this favorable opportu-
nity, the poor engaged in widespread collective mobilization. Chapter
4 tells the story of one of these mobilizations—the occupation of
homes and apartments.
The convergence between the perspectives of the poor and the
power-holders did not last long however. The disenfranchised were
polarized. One segment was integrated into the new state structure,
and the other, facing political constraints, returned to the strategy of
individual and quiet encroachment. Chapter 4 explores the dynamics
of this rupture by examining the squatters' movement in postrevolu-
tionary Iran and tracing its history from the days of the Islamic
Revolution to the squatters riots of the early 19905.
In addition to discussing the actions of the poor in everyday life, in
the communities (chapters 4 and 5), I attempt also to consider them in
the domain of working life. Chapter 6, therefore, examines in detail
the remarkable movement of the unemployed, a movement that is
unique in the context of the developing countries. Chapter 7 analyzes
the mobilization of the street vendors in large Iranian cities in an
attempt to establish and maintain their subsistence-level activities in
the street corners; this mobilization altered at the local level the power
relations that ultimately emanated from the control of public space
and business opportunity.
Finally, in the concluding chapter, I offer an overall evaluation of
these types of grassroots activism. I discuss their merits and shortcom-
ings, as well as exploring their implications both with reference to the
spécifie case of Iran and, more generally, in relation to a number of the-
oretical issues.
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March i y s ' :
June 1953:
1950S:
Iran is ruled by the Qajar dynasty.
Iran's const i tut ional revolution establishes rule of
law; the first Parliament is set up.
Reza Shah, the father of the late Muhammad Reza
Shah, ends the reign of Qajar dynasty; the Pahlavi
dynasty is established. Re/a Shah begins an ambi-
tious program of economic, social, and educational
modernization through a secular autocratic state.
Reza Shah is forced to abdicate by the All ied forces
in favor of his son, Muhammad Reza.
A period of democratic experience, when national-
ist and Communist movements experience unprece-
dented growth.
The campaigns of the na t iona l i s t leader, Muhammad
Mosaddeq, lead to the nationalization of oil indus-
try; Britain threatens to invade Iran.
A CIA-engineered coup overthrows the secular
n a t i o n a l i s t government of Mosaddeq; the Shah,
who had fled the country, returns to Iran. The
democratic experience terminates. Iran becomes the
most crucial a l ly of the West, notably the U.S., in
the region.
Independent p o l i t i c a l parties, associations, and
movements are systematically suppressed. Pro-
grams of modernization, industrialization, and


















The Shah inaugurates his White Revolution, com-
posed of some significant reform measures, includ-
ing land reform, the nationalization of forests, the
enfranchisement of women, the literacy corps, and
profit-sharing schemes.
A series of large-scale riots break out in Tehran and
some other cities. Ayatollah Khomeini emerges as a
religious opposition leader and is sent to exile in
Iraq.
Oil income increases, supporting economic devel-
opment and social change. The new middle class
and the industrial working class expand, together
with the number of "modern" youths and women
active in public. The old classes—feudal, traditional
petty bourgeoisie, and the clergy—shrink or feel
threatened. The regime remains autocratic.
The protest of the intelligentsia surfaces in the form
of open letters to the Court.
A violent confrontation erupts between theology
students and police in the holy city of Qum.
A mass demonstration and riot occurs in Tabriz, the
capital of Azerbaijan.
M.iss demonstrations spread to other urban areas.
Martial Law is declared in Tehran and eleven other
major cities.
Hundreds of protesters are killed in Tehran on
Black Friday.
Industrial strikes spread nationwide.
The Shah appoints a military government; General
Azhari's cabinet is formed.
Millions of people demonstrate against the regime.
Soldiers in many places join the marchers.
General Azhari's cabinet collapses as Shahpour
Bakhtiar, a leader of opposition National Front,
agrees to form a new civilian government. This is
followed by a general strike that brings the whole
economy to a halt. Neighborhood counci ls emerge
in the popular districts. Land takeovers are effected.
The Shah leaves the country.
Ayatollah Khomeini returns to Tehran from Paris.
Khomeini appoints Mehdi Bazargan as prime min-
ister of his provisional government.
The Javidan Guard (Imperial Guard) attacks the
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io June 198 i:
20 June 1981:
barracks of the mutinous air force technicians in
Tehran.
There are two days of insurrection.
The Monarchy is overthrown; Bakhtiar escapes;
jub i l an t armed youths take over control of the
streets. The radio declares the victory of the Islamic
Revolution.
Mass demonstrations of military personnel, Kurdish
people, Turkoman people, and women for democra-
tic rights. The unemployed are mobilized. Outset of
home and hotel squatting.
After a referendum Iran becomes an Islamic
Republic.
There is an attack against the left, as well as against
Kurdish and other ethnic minorities. Political ven-
dors are assaulted.
The U.S. Embassy is seized; the hostage crisis brings
down the Bazargan government. Meanwhile, fol-
lowing the embassy seizure, a new wave of labor
unrest escalates.
Following a referendum, the Islamic Constitution is
ratified.
Abul-Hassan Bani-Sadr is elected as Iran's first pres-
ident.
A "cultural revolution" begins: the Islamization of
education, cultural institutions, and industr ial
workplaces. Meanwhile a new crackdown on labor
and unemployed movement is waged.
An American rescue mission to free the hostages
fails.
The deposed Shah dies in exile in Egypt.
Muhammad Ali Rajaii, an Islamist prime minister,
forms a cabinet .
Iraqi forces invade Iran. An eight-year war begins.
The American hostages are freed.
Conflicts between Bani-Sadr and the ruling Islamic
Republican Party (IRP) surface violently when a
rally organized by the president is attacked by sup-
porters of the IRP.
Bani-Sadr is dismissed as commander-in-chief, and
goes underground. Ayatollah Khomeini officially
removes him from office on June 11.
Massive demonstrations in Tehran, organi/.ed by
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31 October 1981 :
A p r i l 1981:
July 1981:
4 January 198 }:
i i January 198 v
4 May 1983:
Mujahedin, against the rul ing clergy turn into a
bloody confrontation with Pasdaran. Twenty-four
people are killed and more than two hundred
injured in clashes. Widespread guerrilla warfare
against the Islamic regime begins.
The headquarters of the Islamic Republican Party is
blown up; seventy-four leaders of the Party are
killed, including Ayatollah Beheshti. More than two
hundred members or supporters of Mujahedin are
reportedly executed dur ing the following few
months.
Bani-Sadr and the Mujahedin leader Masoud
Rajavi escape to France, where they set up the
National Council of Resistance.
Prime Minister R a j a i i becomes president, and
Education Minister Bahonar is named as his new
prime minister the next day.
President Rajaii, Prime Minister Bahonar, and sev-
eral others are killed in a bomb blast. Mahdavi-
Kani is elected as prime minister on September i.
The Iran-Iraq war intensifies. The liquidation of
opposition, labor, and neighborhood councils esca-
lates. Factional fighting between the "Imam line"
and I lo||atiye begins.
Khameneii is sworn in as new president.
Hussein Mousavi is appointed as the new pr ime
minister.
More than a thousand people are arrested in con-
nection with the Sadeq Qutbzadeh (former foreign
m i n i s t e r ) group's plan to assassinate Aya to l l ah
Khomeini. On April 10 Ayatollah Shariatmadari is
ousted from the ranks of the religious leaders and
placed under house arrest for his alleged link to the
plot.
Heavy fighting continues at the war front.
( l i isohne r a t i on ing ends.
Par l iament decides to confiscate the property of
Iranians who do not r e t u r n from exile within two
months .
The government dissolves the Tudeh party. Some
one thousand Tudeh supporters are detained in the
following days. Meanwhile the debate between











February and April 1988
ii April 1988:
i June 1988:





free-marketers and etatists within the government
comes to the surface.
The government clamps down on bazaar mer-
chants.
Iraq begins the "war of the cities." In the meantime,
opposition groups in exile continue their campaign
against the Islamic government.
The "war of the cities" escalates; civilian targets are
attacked.
President Khameneii is reelected. Candidates of
Bazargan's Freedom Movement were excluded
from the campaigns.
Ayatollah Montazeri is elected by the Assembly of
Experts as Khomeini's successor.
Ayatollah Shariatmadari dies of cancer while under
house arrest.
The "Irangate" scandal begins to surface.
In the "war of the cities," Tehran is bombed. Iran
responds by attacking Baghdad.
A polarized IRP is dissolved on the order of
Ayatol lah Khomeini,
The leader of Mujahedm, in Baghdad, declares the
formation of the Iranian National Liberation Army
to fight against the Islamic Republic.
Another round of the "war of the cities" erupts.
The election of the third Maj l i s is held.
Rafsanjani, the speaker of the Majlis, is appointed
commander-in-chief of the army by K h o m e i n i .
Mehdi Bazargan criticizes the war policy in an open
letter.
Iran accepts UN Resolution 598 to end the war.
Mujahedin forces attack an Iranian city from Ir.iqi
soil.
A postwar reconstruction plan is launched.
Ayatollah Khomeini dies.
Major debates, r e th ink ing , and revision around the
experience of the Islamic government emerge within
the society. In the meantime, conflict between the
"pragmatists" and "fundamentalists" continues.
STREET POLITICS
One
The Quiet Encroachment of the Ordinary
Between 1976 and the early 19905 a series of popular activities took
place in Iran's large cities that did not receive sufficient attention from
scholars, primarily because they were drowned out by the extraordi-
nary big bang of the revolution. Their importance was dismissed in
part because they seemed insignificant when compared with the revo-
lution, that universal image of social change par excellence, and in part
because they seemed to be ordinary practices of everyday life. Indeed,
the origin of these activities goes back decades earlier, but it is only in
the late 19805 and early 19905 that their political consequences began
to surface.
This book is devoted to recovering such ordinary practices, preva-
lent in most developing countries, and making sense of their dynamics.
By discussing these events, I attempt to construct a theory of informal
politics.
A Few Minor Events?
Since the 19505 hundreds of thousands of poor families have been part
of a long and steady migration from Iran's villages and small towns to
its big cities, some seeking to improve their lives, some simply trying to
survive. Many of them settled quietly, either individually or more often
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with their kin members, on unused urban lands or/and cheap pur-
chased plots largely on the margin of urban centers. To escape from
dealing with private landlords, unaffordable rents, and overcrowding,
they put up their shelters with their own hands or with the help of rel-
atives in illegally established sites. Then they began to consolidate their
informal settlements by bribing bureaucrats and bringing in urban
amenities. By the eve of the Islamic Revolution the number of these
communities in Tehran alone had reached fifty. The actors had become
a counterforce, without intending to be so.
The advent of the Islamic Revolution offered the disenfranchised
the opportunity to make further advances. As the revolutionaries were
marching in the streets of big cities, the very poor were busy extending
their hold over their communities by bringing more urban land under
(mal-)development. And immediately after the revolution, many poor
families took advantage of the collapse of police control to take over
hundreds of vacant homes and half-finished apartment blocks, refur-
bishing them as their own properties.
As the option of home-squatting was limited, land takeover and ille-
gal construction accelerated, despite the police crackdown. This con-
tributed to a spectacular growth of both large and small cities in the
years following the revolution. What made these men and women a
collective force was a way of life that engendered common interests
and the need to defend them. The squatters got together and
demanded electricity and running water; when they were refused or
encountered delays, they resorted to do-it-yourself mechanisms of
acquiring them illegally. They established roads, opened clinics and
stores, constructed mosques and libraries, and organized refuse collec-
tion. They further set up associations and community networks, as
well as participating in local consumer cooperatives. A new and a
more autonomous way of living, functioning, and organizing the com-
munity was in the making.
The domain of work was subject to the same kind of silent
encroachment. The unemployed poor, alongside the middle-class job-
less, resorted ini t ia l ly to an impressive collective action to demand
work, maintenance, and compensation. They were involved in a move-
ment unique in the context of Third World politics. Although the
unemployed movement benefited a number of factory and office work-
ers, a large majority remained jobless. Having exhausted collective
action, the unemployed poor turned to family, kin, and friends for sup-
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port. But many more poured into the streets of the big cities to estab-
lish autonomous subsistance activities, engaging in street-vending,
peddling, and street services and industries. They put up stalls, drove
pushcarts, set up kiosks. Business sites were lit by connecting wires to
the main electrical poles. Their collective operation converted the
street sidewalks into vibrant and colorful shopping places. However,
the authorities could hardly tolerate such a cheerful and secular coun-
terculture, such an active use of urban space and thus waged a pro-
tracted war of attrition against the street vendors. Many shopkeepers
whose favorable business environment had been appropriated by the
sidewalk vendors joined the authorities in their clampdown. This con-
frontation between the vendors and the state/shopkeepers exemplifies
a protracted instance of street politics in the Islamic Republic, which I
will discuss in more detail later.
These kinds of practices are not extraordinary. They occur on a
daily basis in many urban centers of the developing world. In the
Middle East, for example, Cairo contains well over one hundred
"spontaneous" communities, or manatiq al-ashwa'yya, housing over
seven million people who have quietly claimed cemeteries, rooftops,
and the state/public land on the outskirts of the city; these rural
migrants and slum dwellers have also subdivided the formerly agricul-
tural land surrounding the city and put up their shelters there unlaw-
fully. By their sheer perseverance, millions of slum dwellers have forced
the authorities to extend amenities to their neighborhoods2 by other-
wise tapping into them illegally. For instance, illegal use of running
water alone in the Egyptian city of Alexandria costs the city an aver-
age of three million dollars each year.1 The street vendors have taken
over many public thoroughfares in order to conduct their business.
Thousands of the city's poor subsist on tips from parking private cars
in the streets, which they control and organize in such a way as to cre-
ate maximum parking space. In the eyes of the authorities, such prac-
tices have caused major urban disorder in the country. The government
policy of halting these practices has largely failed4 as the poor have
tended to respond by on-the-spot resistance, legal battles, or simply by
quiet noncompliance. The accounts of Maidan El-'Ataba, Sayyeda
Zeynab, Boulaq El-Dakrour, Suq El-Gom'a in Imbaba, and the force-
ful relocation of the El-Ezbakia book-sellers attest to only a few of the
many instances of street politics in Cairo/
The same phenomenon occurs in Asia as well. In South Korean
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cities, for example, almost anyone can easily set up pushcart on a
vacant street area, "but once a spot is taken and business established,
it is virtually owned by the vendors." In these settings, "tax collec-
tions are nil, and regulating business practices is almost impossible.
Louis Vuitton's Pusan Outlet could only stop a pushcart vendor from
selling counterfeits of its bags in front of the shop by purchasing the
spot. Nike International and Ralph Lauren have had similar prob-
lems."*
Latin American cases are quite well documented.7 In the Chilean
city of Santiago during the mid-19805, for example, as many as
100,000 poor families were using "clandestine installations" of elec-
tricity and running water in the mid-1980s. Police and military vehi-
cles drove through popular neighborhoods to catch the offenders. In
response the residents had to "unhook at dawn and hook up again
after the last patrol," as one settler put it." Of those who had legal
installations, some 100,000 had not paid for electricity and 170,000
had not paid for water.1* "Bastsmo" is the term that signifies the recent
upsurge of such grassroots activities in Latin America—with thei r
emphasis on community and local democracy, and their distrust of for-
mal and large-scale bureaucracies.10 In a similar vein, more than 10
percent of South Africa's urban population lives in shacks and shanty-
towns. Many poor families have refused to pay for urban services.
"Masakhane," or the "culture-of-paying" campaign organized by the
government and business community after the first multiracial election
in March 1994, represents an attempt to recover these massive public
appropnations by the poor."
Far from destructive behavior on the part of the "lumpen prole-
tariat" or the "dangerous classes,"'2 these practices represent the nat-
ural and logical ways in which the disenfranchised survive hardships
and improve their lives. What is significant about these activities, and
thus interests us in this book, is precisely their seemingly mundane,
ordinary, and daily nature. How can one account for such daily prac-
tices? What values can one attach to such exercises? How do we
explain the politics of these everyday lives?
These are only some of the questions I hope to address in the course
of this book by focusing on the case of Iran between 1977-1990. A dis-
cussion of these issues helps us arrive at some important conclusions
with regard to the relationship between social movements and social
change. First, adopting a relative distance from both James Scott and
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his critiques, my aim is to show how these ordinary and often quiet
practices by very ordinary and often silent people engender significant
social changes—the kinds of changes that are comparable to those that
revolutions are said to achieve for them. Relying on the Iranian expe-
rience, I wish to deemphasize the totalizing notion of "the revolution"
as the change par excellence, to discard the assumption that real
change for all social groups comes necessarily and exclusively from a
generalized political campaign. A totalizing discourse suppresses the
variations in people's perceptions about change; diversity is screened,
conflicts are belittled, and instead a grand/united language is empha-
sized. This suppression of difference by the dominant voice of the lead-
ership has usually worked against the discourse of the ordinary, the
powerless, the poor, minorities, women, and other subaltern elements.
My aim, therefore, is to recover and give agency to one of those sup-
pressed voices, that of the urban disenfranchised."
Finally, I want to stress, in partial agreement with Gramsci, the sig-
nificance of the local both as a crucial arena of social struggle and as a
unit of analysis to examine social change. While a generalized/politi-
cal/global (revolutionary?) campaign is essential for removing many
obstacles for many real changes in favor of the poor, it is the local that
serves as the essential criterion and locus of change. It is in the locali-
ties that oppression is felt and resisted, where the people actually expe-
rience the effect of national policies.
At first glance, the ordinary practices I have described above con-
jure up James Scott's "everyday forms of peasant resistance." Scott,
Colburn, and others have highlighted the ability of poor people to
resist the "oppressors" by such actions as foot dragging, dissimulation,
false compliance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so forth. Peasants are
said to act predominantly individually and discretely, but given repres-
sive political conditions, their practices are functional to their needs.14
The "everyday forms of resistance" perspective has undoubtedly
contributed to recovering the Third World poor from "passivity,"
"fatalism" and "hopelessness"—essentialist features of the "culture of
poverty" with its emphasis on identifying the "marginal man" as a
"cultural type."'s Scott even transcends the survival strategies model,
which limits the activities of the poor to mere survival within the daily
context,16 often at the cost of others or themselves. As Escobar sug-
gests, the language of "survival strategies" may contribute to main-
taining the image of the poor as victims.17 Thus, to counter unemploy-
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ment or price increases, they are often said to resort to theft, begging,
prostitution, or the reorientation of their consumption patterns.
Scott's work is also important from a different angle. Until recently
the prevailing concern of scholars, from both left and right, focused on
the poor's political threat to the existing order; they were preoccupied
with the question of whether the poor constituted a destabilizing
force,18 thus ignoring the dynamics of the the poor's microexistence
and everyday politics. On the other hand, many of these authors still
view the politics of the poor in terms of a revolutionary/passive
dichotomy.19 Such a paradigm surely limits the possibility of looking
upon the matter in a different light—I do not mean by taking a centrist
approach20 but by adopting an entirely new perspective. The concept
"everyday forms of resistance" certainly contributes to a shift in the
terms of the debate.21
Yet Scott's "Brechtian mode of class struggle and resistance" is
inadequate to account for the dynamics of the activities of the urban
poor in the Third World. While it is undeniable that concerns of sur-
vival constitute the main preoccupations of the urban disenfranchised,
they also strive to move forward and improve their lives, however
calmly and quietly. Their struggles are not merely defensive, an every-
day resistance against the encroachments of the "superordinate"
groups; nor are they simply hidden, quiet, and mostly individualistic.
In my understanding, the struggles of the urban poor are also surrep-
titiously offensive, that is, disenfranchised groups place a great deal of
restraint upon the privileges of the dominant groups, allocating con-
stituents of the life chances of those groups (including capital, social
goods, opportunity, autonomy, and thus power) to themselves. This
tends to involve the urban poor in a collective, open, and highly audi-
ble campaign. Moreover, in addition to seeking concessions from the
state, their individual and quiet struggles, predominantly by direct
action, also effect steady and significant changes in their own lives,
thus going beyond "marginally affect|ing| the various forms of
exploitations which peasants confront."22 Scott's implicit subscription
to rational choice theory would overlook the complexity of motives
behind this type of struggle, where moral elements are mixed with
rational calculations.
Can these undertakings then be analyzed in terms of urban social
movements—understood as organized and territorially based move-
ments of the Third World urban poor who strive for "social transfor-
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mation" (according to Castells),2 ' "emancipation" (according to
Schuurman and van Naerssen),24 or an alternative to the tyranny of
modernity (in Friedmann's perception)?25 The similarities appear to be
quite striking: both movements are urban, struggling for analogous
aims such as housing, community building, collective consumption,
official recognition of their gains, and so forth. Yet they differ from
one another in many respects. First, whereas social movements in gen-
eral represent a long-lasting and more or less structured collective
action aiming at social change, the activities I describe here carry,
among other features, strong elements of spontaneity, individualism,
and intergroup competition. They place special emphasis, moreover,
on action over meaning, or, in Castells' terms, "urban meaning."
In addition, while these ordinary practices resemble both new and
archaic social movements—in terms of being self-producing, possess-
ing vague or nonexistent leadership, incoherent or diverse ideologies,
and a loose or total lack of structured organization—they nevertheless
differ significantly from both. The primitive social movements,
explored by Eric Hobsbawm, were often generated or mobilized by
distinct charismatic leaders,26 whereas the type of activism I describe
are mostly, but not entirely, self-generating. On the other hand, while
the new social movements are said to focus largely on identity and
meaning,27 my protagonists concern themselves primarily with action.
Therefore, in a metaphorical sense, these everyday encroachments may
be seen as representing a movement in itself, becoming a social move-
ment per se only if and when the actors become conscious of their
doings by articulating their aims, methods, and justifications.
However, should such public articulation occur, the characteristic of
quiet encroachment is lost. In other words, these desperate everyday
practices exhibit distinct undertakings with their own particular logic
and dynamics.
The Quiet Encroachment of the Ordinary
The types of struggles I describe here may best be characterized as the
"quiet encroachment of the ordinary"—a silent, patient, protracted,
and pervasive advancement of ordinary people on the propertied and
powerful in order to survive hardships and better their lives. They are
marked by quiet, atomized, and prolonged mobilization with episodic
collective action—an open and fleeting struggle without clear leader-
ship, ideology, or structured organization, one that produces signifi-
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cant gains for the actors, eventually placing them in counterpoint to
the state. By initiating gradual "molecular" changes, the poor in the
long run "progressively modify the pre-existing composition of forces,
and hence become the matrix of new changes."" But unlike Gramsci's
"passive revolutionaries]," disenfranchised groups do not carry out
their activities as a conscious political strategy; rather, they are driven
by the force of necessity—the necessity to survive and live a dignified
life. Thus, the notion of necessity and a quest for dignity justify their
struggles as moral, natural, and logical ways to survive and advance
their lives.29 Gramsci's "passive revolution" ultimately targets state
power. I wish to emphasize, however, that quiet encroachment,
although it might indirectly follow generalized political implications,
implies changes that the actors consider as significant in themselves
without intending necessarily to undermine political authority. Yet
these very simple and everyday practices are bound to shift into the
realm of politics. The participants engage in collective action, seeing
their doings and themselves as political only when confronted by those
who threaten their gains. Hence one key attribute of these movements
is that while advances are made quietly, individually, and gradually, the
defense of these gains is always collective and audible.
Thousands of such men and women embark upon long and painful
migratory journeys, scattering in remote and alien environs, acquiring
work, shelter, land, and living amenities. Driven by the force of neces-
sity (economic hardship, war, or natural disaster), they set out individ-
ually and without much clamor, often slowly and unnoticeably, as per-
sévérant as the movements of turtles in a remote colony. They often
deliberately avoid collective effort, large-scale operations, commotion
and publicity. At times squatters, for instance, prevent others from
joining them in specific areas; and vendors discourage their counter-
parts from settling in the same vicinity. Many even hesitate to share
information about their strategies with similar groups. Yet, as these
seemingly desperate individuals and families pursue similar paths,
their sheer cumulative numbers transform them into a potential social
force. This complex mixture of individual and collective action results
from both the social position of the actors and, to use Tarrow's term,
the "structure of opportunities" available for them.'"
The most common agents involved in quiet encroachment move-
ments encompass a variety of largely floating social clusters—migrants,
refugees, the unemployed, squatters, street vendors, and other margin-
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alized groups. Rural migrants encroach on cities and their amenities,
refugees and international migrants on host states and their provisions,
squatters on public and private lands or ready-made homes, and street
vendors on the opportunity costs of business as well as on public space
in both its physical and social facets—street sidewalks, intersections,
public parks, and the like. What brings these groups into this form of
struggle is, first, the initial urge for an alternative mode of life, requir-
ing them to change jobs, places, and priorities, and second, the lack of
an institutional mechanism through which they can collectively express
their grievances and resolve their problems.
This latter point partially explains why the struggles of these subal-
tern groups often take the form of a silent repertoire of individual
direct action rather than collective demand-making protests. Unlike
groups of organized workers or students, the unemployed, emigrants,
refugees, or street vendors are groups in flux; they are the structurally
atomized individuals who operate outside the formal institutions of
factories, schools, and associations. They therefore lack the institu-
tional capacity to exert pressure, since they lack an organizational
power of disruption—disruption, in the sense of "the withdrawal of
crucial contribution on which others depend," one that is therefore "a
natural resource for exerting power over others."" They may, of
course, participate in street demonstrations or riots, but only when
these methods enjoy a reasonable degree of legitimacy'2 and when they
are mobilized by outside leaders. Under exceptional circumstances,
land takeovers may be led by leftwing groups or the unemployed and
street vendors may be invited to form unions. This happens mainly in
relatively democratic periods, when political parties engaged in com-
petition inevitably attempt to mobilize the poor in exchange for elec-
toral support. That is how the unemployed were organized in postrev-
olution Iran, the self-employed women in Bombay, the housewives in
postwar Britain, and the street vendors in Lima." However, in the
absence of electoral freedoms, the contenders tend to remain institu-
tionally powerless since, more often than not, mobilization for collec-
tive demand-making is forcibly repressed in many developing coun-
tries where these struggles often take place.'4 This initial lack of insti-
tut ional power is compensated, however, by the poor's perforce
versatility in taking direct action, be it collective or individual, precip-
itous or piecemeal, which, in the long run, might evolve into a more
self-regulating/autonomous local life.
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Consequently, in place of protest or publicity, these groups move
directly to fulf i l l their needs by themselves, albeit individually and dis-
cretely. In short, theirs is a politics not of protest but of redress, and is
a struggle for immediate outcomes largely through individual direct
action.
The Aims
What do these men and women aim for? They seem to pursue two
major goals. The first is the redistribution of social goods and oppor-
tunities in the form of the (unlawful and direct) acquisition of collec-
tive consumption (land, shelter, piped water, electricity, roads), public
space (street sidewalks, intersections, street parking places), opportu-
nities (favorable business conditions, locations, and labels), and other
life chances essential for survival and a minimal standard of living.
The other goal is attaining autonomy, both cultural and political,
from the regulations, institutions, and discipline imposed by the state.
The disenfranchised express a deep desire to live an informal life, to
run their own affairs without involving the authorities or other mod-
ern formal institutions. This is not to suggest that tradition guides their
lives, but rather to insist that modern institutions, in one sense, repro-
duce people's traditional relations as solutions to the problems that
these institutions engender. In many informal communities in Third
World cities, people rely on their own local and traditional norms dur-
ing their daily activities, whether it be establishing contracts (e.g. mar-
riage), organizing their locality, or resolving local disputes. In a way,
they are compelled to exert control over their working lives, regulating
their time and coordinating their space. They grow weary of the for-
mal procedures governing their time, obligations, and commitments;
they are reluctant to undertake the discipline imposed, for instance, by
paying taxes and bills, appearing in public in particular ways, and
most broadly in the practice of everyday life."
This distrust of the modern state and of institutions has aroused two
contrasting reactions. Some sociologists, notably followers of the
Chicago school and politicians, dismiss the urban poor as marginals,
outlaws, and criminals, and their communities as bastions of rural
parochialism and traditionalism. This deviance, they suggest, can be
corrected only by integrating these people back into the state and the
society; in short, by modernizing them.'6 Others, notably Janice
Perlman and Castells, have vehemently attacked the premise of mar-
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ginality, arguing that far from being marginal, these people are all well-
integrated.'7 Despite their differences, these rival perspectives share
one important assumption. Both assume that the ideal man is the well-
adjusted and well-integrated man—in short, modern man.
The fact is that these men and women are neither marginal (i.e.
essentially traditional and isolated) nor ful ly integrated. Rather, their
poverty and vulnerability drive them to seek autonomy from the state
and from modern institutions. They tend to refrain from resorting to
police and other government offices primarily because of the failure of
bureaucracies and modern institutions to deliver for them. These insti-
tutions impose the kind of discipline (in terms of regulating their time,
behavior, and appearance) that many simply cannot afford or with
which they do not wish to comply. Only the the very poor may favor
integration since, at least in immediate terms, it gives them more than
it takes. Many slum-dwellers and those relocated from shantytowns,
however, are inclined to live in squatter areas partly because they seem
free from official surveillance and modern social control (for instance,
in terms of the ability to communicate easily, appear in public, and
practice their culture). While the poor tend to reject the constraining
facet of modernity, they welcome its liberating dimension. Thus, while
the squatters do want to light their homes with electricity, use piped
water and watch color TV, they do not want to pay bills subject to
strict bureaucratic regulations; they yearn for flexibility and negotia-
tion. Similarly, street subsistence work, despite its low status, low secu-
rity, and other costs, has the advantage of freeing people from the dis-
cipline and controlling relations of the modern working institutions.'"
Although somewhat romanticised, John Friedmann's characterization
of the Brazilian barrios as a kind of postmodernist movement points to
the alternative ways of life the poor tend to pursue. In his view, the bar-
rios' emphasis on moral economy, trust, cooperation, production of
use-values, local autonomy, and self-regulation in a sense challenges
modern principles of exchange value, bureaucracy, and the state."
Let me make two points clear. The first is that the notions of auton-
omy and integration in the view of both the poor and the state are far
from straightforward. They are the subject of contradictory processes,
constant redefinition, and intense negotiation. Informality is not an
essential preference of the urban poor; it serves primarily as an alter-
native to the constraints of formal structures. Indeed, as the examples
above illustrate, many poor people perhaps aspire and practice inte-
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grated life, only if they can afford its social and cultural—not to men-
tion its economic—costs. Thus in the early 19905 the settlers of
Islamshahr, an informal community in south Tehran, campaigned for
the official integration of their community. Once that was achieved,
however, new informal communities began to spring up around that
township. In addition, just as do the poor, states also exhibit contra-
dictory stands on autonomy and integration. Most governments tend
in practice to promote autonomy as an effort to transfer their respon-
sibilities to the citizens, hence encouraging individual initiative, self-
help, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and so forth. Observers
such as Gilbert and Ward consider these measures as a means of social
control.40 However, they fail to recognize the fact that at the same time
governments display apprehension about losing political space. It is
not uncommon to observe states simultaneously implementing con-
flicting policies of both promoting and restricting autonomous and
informal institutions. Third World urban life, in short, is characterized
by a combined and continuous process of informalization, integration
and reinformalization.
The second point is that the rich and the powerful may also desire
self-regulation and autonomy from the discipline of modern organiza-
tions. However in reality, unlike the poor, they mostly benefit from
those arrangements; it is the powerful who institute them in the first
place. Moreover, unlike the poor, the rich, by virtue of possessing
resources (knowledge, skill, money, and connections) can afford to
function within such institutions. They are able, for instance, to pay
their hills or get to work on time.
The two chief goals of the disenfranchised—redistribution and
autonomy—are quite interrelated. The former ensures survival and a
better material life; the latter serves not only as an end in itself but also
as a means to achieve the objective of the redistribution: acting
autonomously from the state, poor individuals may be able to obtain
public goods (illegal land, shelter, and so on) that they are unlikely to
attain through legal and institutionalized mechanisms, unless they
demand these goods through a powerful collective mobilization.
In the quiet encroachments, the struggles to achieve these unlawful
goals are hardly planned or articulated. They are seen as natural and
moral responses to the urgency of survival and the desire for a digni-
fied life, however defined. In the Middle Kastern culture, the notion of
necessity—the necessity of maintaining a dignified life—underlies poor
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peoples' sense of justice. The Persian phrase chare-ii neest (there is no
other way) and its Arabic equivalent na'mal eih? (what else can we
do?) articulate a moral language of urban politics, responses through
which the poor often justify their acts of transgression.41 And this idea
of dignity is very closely associated with the public judgment, with the
community or friends and foes determining its meaning. To maintain
a dignified life, a family needs to possess certain cultural/material abil-
ities. Preserving abirou or 'ard (honor) through generosity, bravery,
and more important, through securing the haya (sexual modesty) of
the women in the family mark a few such resources. But the essential
components more relevant to our discussion include the ability to pro-
vide, the ability to protect the harim of the household from public
intrusion, and finally the ability to conceal possible failures (abirour-
izi, or fadiha). For a poor head of a household, not only would the fail-
ure to provide for his family jeopardize their survival, it would also
inflict a blow to his honor. Homelessness, for instance, signifies an ulti-
mate loss in all these accounts. A dwelling, beyond its function of pro-
tecting the household from physical dangers (cold, heat, and the like),
serves also as a cultural location. By preserving the harim, safeguard-
ing people from moral dangers, a dwelling conceals shortcomings and
preserves abirou before the public gaze. The rich may also share simi-
lar values, but the poor have a lower capacity to conceal failures, thus
making their dignified life more vulnerable.
In this perception of justice informed by necessity, one who has a
basic need may and should fu l f i l l it, even if illegally, so long as he does
not harm others like himself. The rich can probably afford to lose some
of their wealth. When the state begins to challenge these notions, thus
violating codes of justice of the poor, the morally outraged poor tend
to rebel.42 Yet I have to stress that this moral politics does not preclude
the poor from the rational use of any political space in which they can
maximize their gains. Bribing officials, forming alliances with political
parties, utilizing political rivalries, and exploiting governmental or
nongovernmental associations are all part of the rules of the game.
Becoming Political
If these movements begin without political meaning, and if illegal
encroachments are often justified on moral grounds (as a way to sur-
vive), then how do they turn into collective/political struggles? So long
as the actors carry on with their everyday advances without being con-
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fronted seriously by any authority, they treat their doings as ordinary
everyday practice. Once their gains are threatened, they become con-
scious of their actions and the value of their gains, and they defend
them collectively and audibly. I describe the logic of transformation
from individual to collective action later. Suffice it to state here that
the numerous antigovernment riots by squatters, street vendors, and
other marginalized groups point to the centrality of collective resis-
tance among these atomized poor. The struggle of the actors is not
about winning a gain but primarily about defending and furthering
gains already won. In such conjunctures, the contenders may go as far
as to give some structure to their activities, by networking, cooperat-
ing, or initiating more structured organizations. Such organizing is
aimed at maintaining, consolidating, and extending those earlier
achievements.
When does the state enter the arena? State opposition usual ly
occurs when the cumulative growth of the encroachers and their
doings pass beyond a tolerable point. Depending on the efficiency of
the particular state, the availability of alternative solutions, and the
resistance of these quiet rebels, states normally tolerate scattered offen-
sives, especially when they have still not become a critical force. The
trick for the actors, therefore, is to appear limited and tolerable while
expanding so much that resistance against them becomes difficult .
Indeed, many (squatters, vendors, and car-parkers) try deliberately to
halt their spread in certain areas by not allowing their counterparts to
jo in them. Others resort to bribing minor officials, or minimizing vis-
ib i l i ty ( for instance, squatting in remote areas or vending in less
provocative areas). Almost all take advantage of undermined state
power at times of crises (following a revolution, war, or economic
breakdown) to spread further and entrench their position. In brief, the
protagonists exploit these three opportunities—crisis, bribing, and
invisibility—that allow them to remain apparently tolerable while they
are in fact multiplying.
Once the extent of their expansion and impact is revealed, however,
state reaction and crackdown often becomes inevitable. In most cases,
crackdowns fail: they are usually launched too late, when the
encroachers have already spread, become visible, and achieved a criti-
cal mass. Indeed, the description by most officials of the process as
"cancerous" captures the dynamics of such a movement.4'
The sources of the conflict between the state and the disenfranchised
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have to do with the economic and political costs that quiet encroach-
ment imposes on both the authorities and the rich. The informal and
free-of-charge redistribution of public goods exerts a heavy burden on
a state's resources. The rich—real estate owners, merchants, and shop-
keepers—also lose properties, brands, and business opportunities. The
alliance of the rich and the state adds a class dimension to the existing
political conflict.
Beyond the economic dimension, the poor peoples' drive for auton-
omy in everyday life creates a big crack in the domination of the mod-
ern state. A ful ly autonomous life renders states irrelevant. Popular
control over contracts, regulation of time, space, cultural activities,
working life—in short, self-regulation—reclaims significant political
space from the state. Herein lies the inevitability of conflict. Street pol-
itics44 exemplifies the most salient aspect of this conflict, accounting for
a key feature in the social l ife of the disenfranchised.
Street Politics
By street politics, I mean a set of conflicts and the attendant implica-
tions between a collective populace and the authorities, shaped and
expressed episodically in the physical and social space of the streets—
from the alleyways to the more visible sidewalks, public parks, or
sport places. The street in this sense serves as the only locus of collec-
tive expression for, but by no means limited to, those who structurally
lack any institutional setting to express discontent. This group includes
squatters, the unemployed, street subsistence workers (e.g., vendors),
members of the underworld (e.g., beggars, prostitutes), petty thieves,
and housewives. The term signifies an articulation of discontent by
clusters of different social agents without institutions, coherent ideol-
ogy, or evident leadership. Two key factors transform the streets into
an arena of politics. The first follows Foucault's general observation
about space as power.4' It results from the use of public space as a sight
of contestation between the populace and the Authority. At one level,
what makes street activity political is the active or participative (as
opposed to passive) use of public space; thus, the use of street side-
walks, crossroads, urban land, the space for assembly, and public prac-
tices of culture all become the sites of contestation. These sites increas-
ingly become the domain of the state power that regulates their usage,
making them orderly. It expects their users to operate passively accord-
ing to rules set by the state. Any active and participative use challenges
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the control of both the Authority and those social groups that benefit
from such order.
This kind of street life and these types of activities are by no means
a novelty. They could be seen in sixteenth- to eighteenth-century
Europe46 and, until very recently, in the urban Middle East.47 They did
not entail street politics, however. What makes them political are novel
features: in contrast with the past when local communities enjoyed a
great deal of autonomy and self-regulation, they are now under cen-
tralized governments that regulate and control the street and local life.48
The second element in shaping street politics is the operation ot
what I have called the passive network among the people who use pub-
lic space. Any collective political act—mobilization—requires some
degree of organization, communication, and networking among its
actors. For the most part this is constituted deliberately, either formally
or informally. Thus squatters, the unemployed, or immigrants from the
same place of origin may establish formal associations with constant
communication and regular meetings. Or they may instead develop
informal contacts among themselves. Vendors on the same street, for
example, may get together on an ad hoc basis to discuss their problems
or simply to chat and socialize. In both formal and informal cases, the
participants would have an active network among themselves in that
they become known to each other, talk, meet, and consciously interact
with one another. However, contrary to Tilly's perception of organiza-
tion—one with high "catness" and "netness" or strong cohesion and
interpersonal communication49—networks need not be active. The
street as a public place possesses this intrinsic feature, making it possi-
ble for people to mobilize without having an active network. Such a
mobilization is carried out through passive networks—the instanta-
neous communication among atomized individuals, which is estab-
lished by the tacit recognition of their common identity and is medi-
ated through space. A woman who enters a male-dominated party
instantly notices another female among the men; vendors in a street
notice each other even though they may never speak to each other.
Unlike, say, dispersed tax strikers, a passive network exists amon^
both the women in the party and vendors in a given locality.
The tenants of a council housing unit, illegal immigrants to a coun-
try, tax strikers, the women in a male-dominated party, vendors in a
street, or spectators at a football match all represent atomized individ-
uals who, at a certain level, have a s imi lar status and an identity of
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interests among themselves (see figures i . i and 1.2). For Bourdieu,
each of the above groups signifies a "theoretical group," becoming
"real" only when they are "represented."'" Bourdieu does not explore
how such representation takes place, however. In his formulation, a
fundamental element of groupness—the network—is either ignored or
taken for granted.
The fact is that these juxtaposed individuals can potentially act
together. But acting together requires a medium or network for estab-
lishing communication. Illegal immigrants or tax-strikers cannot resist
state action unless they begin to deliberately organize themselves, since
no medium like space brings them together (see figure 1.3). Tenants,
spectators, vendors, squatters, and the women described above, even
though they do not know each other, may act collectively because
common space makes it possible for them to recognize their common
interests and identity (see figure i .4)—that is, to develop a passive net-
work.
What mediates between a passive network and action is a common
threat. Once these atomized individuals are confronted by a threat to
their gains, their passive network spontaneously turns into an active
network and collective action. Thus the threat of eviction brings many
squatters together immediately, even if they do not know each other.
Likewise the supporters of rival teams in a football match often coop-
erate to confront police in the streets. This is due not simply to psy-
chologically induced or irrational crowd action but to a more socio-
logical fact of interest recognition and latent communication.
Already organized individuals also may attempt to extend their
(passive or active) network to those other than their immediate mem-
bers. Students, factory workers, or women's associations, for instance,
who demonstrate in the streets do so in order to publicize their cause
and gain solidarity. The very act of demonstration in public means, in
a sense, attempting to establish communication with those who are
unknown to the demonstrators but who might be subject to similar
conditions as themselves; the demonstrators hope to activate this pas-
sive communication in order to extend collective action.
It has to be stressed that the movement from passive into active net-
working and collective action is never a given. It is subject to the same
complexity and contingent upon similar factors as the movement from
a consciously organized network into mobilization/' Factors such as a
legitimacy crisis of the state, division within the ruling elites, break-
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FIGURE I.I
No network: Atomized individuals without a common position
i
F I G U R E 1.2.
No network: Atomized individuals with a common position
a a
F I G U R E 1.3
Active network: Individuals with similar positions brought together
deliberately—association with an active network
F I G U R E 1.4
Passive network: Atomized individuals with similar positions
brought together through space
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down in social control, and access to resources may all facilitate col-
lective action; and, in turn, the threat of "repression,"52 intergroup
division, and the usefulness of temporary compliance are likely to hin-
der mobilization. The point here is not that a threat to evict a group of
squatters may not necessarily lead to their collective resistance; trade
unions may also acquiesce before a threat of layoff. The point rather is
to show how groups of atomized individuals without active networks
and organization can and do engage, often instantly, in collective
action;this is due to the operation of passive networks among them.
This unplanned, unstructured, and instantaneous possibility of group
action renders the street a highly volatile locus of conflict and thus of
politics. It is the operation of passive networks that lies behind the polit-
ical danger of the streets: the streets represent public space par excel-
lence. No wonder every unpopular government pays such close atten-
tion to controlling them. While states may be able to restrict deliberately
organized demonstrations or rallies, they are often incapable of pro-
hibiting street populations from working, driving, or walking—in short,
from street life. The more open and visible the public place, the broader
the operation of passive networks and therefore the possibility of col-
lective action becomes. Passive networks, in short, represent an inherent
element of street and backstreet life; they ensure the instant cooperation
of the individual actors once those actors feel a threat to their well-
being. In the absence of the concept of passive networks, many find it
difficult to make sense of the surprising, unexpected, and spontaneous
mass eruptions that take place in urban settings." This dialectic of indi-
vidual and collective action—the possibility of collective resistance
together with their moral justification for individual encroachment—
perhaps explains the resiliency of the disenfranchised in carrying on
their struggle for survival and the betterment of their predicaments.
The Making of the Quiet Encroachment
How universal is the quiet encroachment of the ordinary? And under
what conditions is such activism likely to emerge? Quiet encroachment
in developing countries seems to evolve from a combination of structural
and cultural factors that render it a historically specific phenomenon.
To begin with, the raw material of the movement, the actors, origi-
nates largely from the desperate clusters of the urban unemployed and
underemployed, as well as from other marginalized groups.'4 It seems
that natural population increases (primarily resulting from poverty)
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and especially the classical model of rural-urban migration (resulting
from the maldistribution of land, rural unemployment, natural or
man-made disasters, urban bias, and limited industrial expansion)
have been the primary reasons for urban unemployment. Evidence
shows that for the most part the urban economy is unable to absorb
fu l ly the amount of labor created by natural population growth."
Thus a large number of relatively educated and first-time job-seekers
remain out of work. Overall, urban migration serves as the primary
factor. On average, nearly half of the increase in urban population in
the Third World has resulted from migration. This rate for both Ghana
and Tanzania was 60 percent, and for the Ivory Coast 70 percent.56
Beside this classic scenario, some new developments have in recent
years multiplied the size of these groups. A global crisis of populist
modernization in a number of Third World countries since the 19805,
and the collapse of socialist economies since the 19905, have led to
massive de-institutionalization, proletarianization, and marginaliza-
tion. Alternative strategies—structural adjustment and stabilization
programs—tend to make a sizable segment of already employed peo-
ple redundant, without a clear prospect of boosting the economy and
creating viable jobs. In the early 19905, during the transition to mar-
ket economies in post-Socialist, adjusting Latin American and Middle
Eastern countries, formal employment fell by 5 to i 5 percent.'7 In
Africa the number of unemployed grew by 10 percent or more every
year throughout the 19805, while labor absorption in the formal wage
sector kept declining/* By the early 19905 open unemployment in
Third World countries increased dramatically." Thus a large number
of the once well-to-do and educated middle classes (government
employees and students)and public sector workers, as well as segments
of the peasantry are pushed into the ranks of the urban poor in labor
and housing markets.
The state's unwillingness and inability to offer adequate work, pro-
tection, and urban amenities puts these new urban poor in a similar
collective position, if not a collective identity, as the unemployed,
squatters, slum dwellers or street subsistence workers—in short, they
become potential street rebels. The lack of an institutional setting
leaves these men and women to struggle in their atomized formations.
Many developing countries seem to have experienced similar
processes. What distinguishes the form of mobilization within these
nations has to do with local political cultures and institutions.
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The repressive policy of the state renders individual, quiet, and hid-
den mobilization a more viable strategy than open, collective protest.
Under such conditions, collective and open direct action takes place
only at exceptional conjunctures—in particular, when states experi-
ence crises of legitimacy such as the revolutionary crisis in Iran during
1979; Egypt after the 1967 defeat; and South Africa after the fall of
apartheid in the early 19905.
However, where some degree of political openness prevails, compe-
tition between political parties provides a breathing ground for the col-
lective action of ordinary people. The rival political groupings and
patrons, in order to win electoral and mass support, inevitably mobi-
lize the poor (as in India, Mexico, Peru, Brazil, and Chile in the early
1970s).60 This is unlikely to happen under autocratic systems where
winning votes is not a concern of the political leadership. In short,
quiet encroachment is largely the feature of undemocratic political sys-
tems, as well as of cultures where primordial institutions serve as an
alternative to civic associations and social movements. This may par-
tially explain why in most Middle Eastern countries, where authori-
tarian rule dominates and where family and kinship are pivotal for
individuals ' support and security, it is largely the strategy of quiet
encroachment that seems to prevail.'1 In many Latin American
nations, on the other hand, where some tradition and practice of polit-
ical competition and political patronage operate, mobilization tends to
assume a collective, audible, and associational character; urban land
invasions, urban poor associations, and street trade unionism appear
to mark a major feature of urban politics in this region of the world."
States may also contribute to quiet encroachment in another way.
This type of movement is likely to grow where both the inefficient state
bureaucracy and rigid formal organizations, notably the "mercan-
tilist" state described by De Soto (1989), predominate; such institu-
tions tend to encourage people to seek more informal and autonomous
living and working conditions. The situation in more efficient and
democratic settings is, however, quite different. The more democratic
and efficient the state, the less ground for the expansion of highly
autonomous movements; under such circumstances, the poor tend to
become integrated into the state structure and are inclined to play the
prevailing games, utilizing the existing means and institutions, how-
ever limited, to improve their lives.6'
T v; o
Mapping Out the "New Poor"
By the late 19705 the quiet encroachment of the disenfranchised had
clearly marked Iranian cities. Rural-urban migration, the housing
problem, spontaneous communities, demands for collective consump-
tion, and the spread of street subsistence work had all been discussed
and presented as major developmental failures. The urban poor were
seen as both villains (by policy makers) and victims (by the opposi-
tion)—they were the villains of development and modernization and
the victims of the "maldevelopment" and "pseudomodernization"
that Iranian society had been going through since the 1940$.
This chapter describes the main features of the "new poor" by
focusing on the city of Tehran. It spells out their origin, size, and eco-
nomic, communal, and housing conditions. It argues that by the eve of
the Islamic Revolution the poor constituted a fairly distinct social
group identified chiefly by the place of their residence.
The New Poor
The category "poor" is not simply an economic one. It points pri-
marily to social and cultural identity. Seen as a social category, the
prerevolution urban poor in Iran were a modern entity, a quite dis-
tinct social group. The members of this group, called interchange-
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ably the urban poor or the disenfranchised, were distinguished
chiefly by their low-income, low-skill, low-status, and insecure posi-
tion.'
At times the much criticized term "margmality" is employed to
describe this group. It so happens that this term is an exact equivalent
of the Persian term hashiyenishini, which has been widely used in offi-
cial language in Iran. Understandably, the problem with this terminol-
ogy is that those in the tradition of Chicago School sociologists tend to
essentialize the concept by giving the poor certain cultural essentials
that separate them from mainstream urban life/ However, I think that
the concept can be taken as an empirical category—as a structural and
historical process in the developing world that tends to exclude seg-
ments of urban populations from developmental achievements and
modern institutions.' In this sense the urban poor in Iran, somehow
overlapped with the industrial working class, were distinguished from
other social groups primarily by their social exclusion and their resi-
dential status as squatters and slum dwellers.4
In Iran the new urban disenfranchised developed as a consequence
of policies that both Reza Shah and Muhammad Reza Shah pursued
from the 1930$ onward/ Modernization resulted in rapid urban
growth, urban migration, the creation of new social classes (some of
which were highly prosperous), and a general rise in income. At the
same time it led to the economic and social marginalization of an
important segment of the urban population. It is by and large this
process of marginalization that characterized the marginal or new
poor, the disenfranchised.
Poor people, of course, existed long before modernization in Iran,
as well as in the other parts of the Middle East.6 Beggars, porters, ven-
dors, hawkers, and various menials filled the quarters of Iran's nine-
teenth-century and earlier cities. However, the context in which they
operated differed. Up until the early twentieth century, in the major
urban centers such as Tehran, Isfahan, Tabriz, and Shiraz, marked
social cleavage was based less on class than on communal differentia-
tion. People granted their loyalties first and foremost to their mahalles,
or quarters.7 The rich, the poor, the middle classes, ulama, merchants,
and shopkeepers lived largely side by side, intermingled socially, com-
municated on a daily basis, and shared cultural traits and religious
beliefs.8 They all participated in the same religious rituals—takiyeh,
ta'ziyeh, and muharram processions9—which cemented more or less
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homogeneous cultural and behavioral patterns, despite the persistence
of patronage linking rich and poor.
The new poor are the product of a modern stratification system.
From the early twentieth century on, the traditional stratification pat-
tern began to give way to a "dual class structure."10 The integration of
Iran in the world economy, along with the eventual establishment of a
manufacturing industry, resulted in the creation of new social group-
ings, notably a modern bourgeoisie, a working class, and modern
bureaucrats, all residing exclusively in urban areas. These social
changes were accompanied by the modernization of urban form, resi-
dential pattern, and social structure." The traditional pattern of com-
munity changed into what Khosrowkhavar has characterized as a
"neo-community," and is marked by ethnic and origin heterogeneity,
a tendency to modernize tradition and care about public space, com-
munity participation, and the state control of public order.12
Tehran, a walled city of nineteen square kilometers with i 60,000
inhabitants in 1905, grew to house over 300,000 in the early 19305,
with segments settling in new mahalles that sprang up outside the city
wall. In 1930 this wall was destroyed and modern straight streets were
constructed. This marked a new phase in urban structure. With the
establishment since the 19405 of city planning, the old mahalleh sys-
tem gave way to a planned zonal pattern based largely upon class seg-
regation. The low-income groups were invariably ignored by the vari-
ous urban comprehensive plans. The free market on land and its high
price, and unaffordable construction standards set by the plans—such
as size of plots, the form of construction, problems of gradual build-
ing, and cost of preparation—all pushed the poor to put up their shel-
ters informally just outside the city limits. This process was speeded up
part icularly after 1966 when the notorious Provision 100 of the
Municipality Law was approved. The law authorized demolition of
unlawful constructions both within the city limits as well as in the
buffer zones, harim, created around the cities." Subsequently, informal
and marginalized settlements began to grow, leading to the formation
of distinct poor communities.
In Slums and Squatter Settlements
By the eve of the 1979 revolution, Tehran, with a population of some
five million, exhibited a remarkable and perhaps unique class (eco-
nomic, social, and cul tura l ) hierarchy. Located on a north-to-south
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sloping landscape, the geophysical pyramid of the city reflected its
social and economic hierarchy. To the far north, the highest district
was the site of the most aff luent populations. The lowest lands of the
city were allocated to the poor, new migrants, and other strata of the
working class. The middle areas, from east to west, housed the middle
classes.14
A number of squatter settlements and lower-class neighborhoods
located in the old Tehran "villages" had spread into northern and cen-
tral areas of the city. Their scale, however, was insignificant in com-
parison to those in South Tehran. The poor were thus pushed to settle
in the vast southern plain, encompassing a variety of slums and squat-
ter settlements, beginning roughly from Mawlavi Avenue. Many of the
slums, especially those located in old Tehran (such as Munirieh,
Mawlavi, Park-i Shahr, Maidan-i Soush, Railway Station) were for-
merly the neighborhoods of the relatively well-off traditional middle
class who gradually moved into the modern northern areas, leaving the
poor behind to be joined by the new rural migrants. These quarters
then turned into overcrowded slums'5—urban services deteriorated,
illegal additions were made, and homes were redesigned or partitioned
to accommodate the needs of the poor. Yet other settlements, such as
Naziabad and Kouy-i Nuhum- i Aban, were deliberately created
through a strategy of spatial segregation. By the mid-19708 Tehran had
some fifty slums and squatter communities. Similar settlements spread
also in other Iranian cities, such as Tabriz, Kermanshah, Hamadan,
Bandar Abbas, Ahwaz, Bousher, Shiraz and Mashad. Among these,
Tabriz (with 7.6 percent) and Ahwaz (4 percent) had the highest ratio
<>t squatters to total population.16 Even so, the overall scale of those
settlements was smaller than their counterparts in such Third World
countries as Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey, the Philippines, or the Latin
American nations.
Like many of their equivalents in the Third World, the slums in
Tehran were overcrowded, muddy, dirty environs, with narrow alleys
in the middle of which ran /owys, open waste-water/sewer ducts, play-
grounds for barefoot children. But Tehran's poor neighborhoods had
their own peculiar features. Small, dense, and hurriedly built one- or
two-story houses lined the edges of narrow alleyways. Despite the
inadequacy of space, homes were characterized by little ponds in the
middle of their courtyards. Small identical mud or brick rooms faced
into the courtyard on three sides. Each room was usually occupied by
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a tenant household (with three or more children), which might live and
share the bathroom and kitchen with the landlord. The entrance door
and window (when they existed) of each room looked out beyond the
courtyard onto the neighbors. Thick curtains on the doors were the
only shield against the curious. The square front yard was the central
gathering place for almost all daily activities and important events: it
could be a washing area for women, a space to spread the laundry, a
playground for children, a secret rendezvous for young adults, a bat-
tleground for squabbling tenants (or quarelling tenants and landlords),
a joyous wedding hall, or a grieving funeral home. In slum dwellings
there was no room for privacy. Within each individual household, the
extreme limits of space exposed the most private affairs. The physical
density led poor residents to incorporate the alleyways into their own
private spheres. In these poor communities the line between private
and public could hardly be drawn. While young females spent much of
their time indoors or in the courtyards, male youngsters hung out
mostly in the sar-i koucheh (intersections of the alleyways and the
streets). The sar-i koucheh functioned as perhaps the most important
space where youth street culture took shape. It was here that the youth
formed gangs and group solidarity, articulated their local identity,
smoked, checked out the passersby—notably the adult girls—and were
recruited for cultural and religious events.
In the southern landscape of Tehran, meanwhile, lay the estates of
the traditional brick-making industry whose enormous chimneys
resembled the "satanic mills" of the industrial revolution. Around
these mills sprang up the main squatter communities of the metropo-
lis—including caves, tents, hovels, shacks, shanties, and urban vil-
lages—which lacked almost all city amenities. Although many sponta-
neous settlements mushroomed also in the north, east, and western
margins of the city, the southern plain maintained its lead well through
the postrevolution years.
The squatters usually called their communities by the terms that
described the mode of their construction. Thus Muftabad meant the
community built free of charge; Zoorabad, by force; Halabiabad,
those made of tin containers; and Hasirabad, of bamboo leaves. The
settlements exhibited a great diversity in terms of infrastructure, as
well as in socioeconomic and property relations.'7 But most shelters
were located in tiny spaces—over 63 percent of squatter households
occupied 1.5 square meter single rooms, when the average standard
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size was to he 18.5 square meters.1* This contrasts sharply with infor-
mal communities developed mainly after the revolution in the villages
around Tehran—such as Islamshahr, Akbarabad, and Sultanabad—
wherein per capita space was 10.6 square meters, well above those in
Nairubi, Rabat, or Tunis, which ranged from 5 to 6.7 square meters.
Most of the squatters owned their shacks or tents but had no legal title
to land.2" The size of the communities also varied, ranging from sites
with less than 10 units to ones with over 600 households.2' The gowd
residential community, a virtually underground settlement created by
the brick-making industry in South Tehran, sheltered 1,040 house-
holds and over 46,000 inhabitants;" in 1976 Halabiabad housed some
11,000 households and 60,000 residents.2 ' And by the late 19705
about 56,000 residents were concentrated in Zoorabad, a h i l l s i t e
squatter community in Karadj.24
By 1980 at least one million poor lived in the slums2' of Tehran and
an estimated 400,000 resided in the squatter communities. This figure
excluded spontaneous settlements that lay outside the city limits, such
as those around Varamin, Qarchak, and Shahriar. If these were
included, the total squatter population of Tehran would probably
reach some 500,000, or over i 5 percent of the city's population;2'' s lum
dwellers and squatters together accounted for 35 percent.
Informal settlements in Iran have, in many respects, been different
from those in other developing nations. Their total size is smaller, and
the quality of housing better. Nondurable shelters—such as shacks,
tents, boats, or rooftops homes—constituted only about i percent of
total housing units; most squatters, part icularly those in urban vil-
lages, lived in relatively spacious red-brick homes. And f i n a l l y ,
although land invasion and forceful seizure did take place, illegal con-
structions were erected mainly on purchased land.27
The vast majority of the urban underclass—squatters, slum
dwellers, and unskilled migrant workers—originated from among the
impoverished rural masses of various ethnic and linguistic back-
grounds who emigrated both before and after the land reform program
of 1962. Apart from such "pull factors" as the availabili ty of jobs,
higher income, and better l iving conditions in the cities, especially in
Tehran, important "push factors" were also involved. A decline in
agriculture, forceful expulsion from land, sale of land, reduced
income, and bad living conditions were among the most important of
these.28
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The poor in Tehran came primarily from the Turkish-speaking
regions (Azarbaijan, Zanjan, and Hamadan in the northwest and
west), the central provinces, and the villages around the capital.2* After
the Second World War Tehran experienced large-scale emigration from
Azarbaijan where the insecurity of war and struggles over regional
autonomy pushed many rural people out of the area. The immigrants
settled in poor districts of South Tehran, notably Javadieh."' A survey
of Zoorabad (in Karad j ) in 1981 showed that some 55 percent of
56,000 residents of this squatter community were Azari speakers from
Azarbaijan, Zanjan and Hamadan." The mostly rural origin and eth-
nic backgrounds among the migrant poor marked their cultural/social
segregation from the Westernized urban rich, who stigmatized the
poor as dihaati (rural/backward). For the disenfranchised, the multi-
ethnic migration created ethnical ly based neighborhoods that later
influenced the cultural evolution and community mobilization of the
inhabitants before and after the revolutionary upheaval of 1978-79.
Although these ethnically based communities commanded a high
degree of internal cohesion and solidarity, they also caused intercom-
munity conflicts and disunity at times.
Beyond ethnic variation, squatter settlements were also differenti-
ated along the occupational quality and income level of their occu-
pants. By 1979 some communities, such as Zoorabad in Karadj and
those urban vi l lages in Ray and Shahriar, were mostly industrial work-
ing-class communities: many (about 50 percent in Ray and over 30
percent in Zoorabad) worked in the nearby modern industries, while
others were skilled laborers with fairly high job security. In fact, no
more than 10 percent of the inhabitants were earning a street subsis-
tence.12
These settlements, however, were not typical. Their industrial char-
acter was due, principally, to their proximity to the largest industrial
sites in the country, located in the south and south east of the capital
city, stretching up to Karadj. Both in Tehran and even more in other
cities, the squatter poor subsisted chiefly (between 60 and 80 percent
of heads of households) by engaging in unskilled construction jobs and
various types of insecure casual work. They mostly worked in sweat-
shops or as street vendors, shoe polishers, car cleaners, lottery-ticket
sellers, doormen, waiters, shop assistants, servants, and porters—
across the vast underground economy (see table z.i). Nevertheless,
contrary to popular image, "fake, black and unhealthy occupations"
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T A B L E 2.. I
Occupational Structure of Squatters in Selected Settlements
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such as begging, drug-dealing, and prostitution constituted no more
than a small fraction of their activities." For instance, a 1971 study of
Tehran's several squatter settlements showed that over 80 percent of
squatters were involved in unskilled or semiskilled jobs, including con-
struction, street vending, and low-paid government employment. They
remained jobless on average between three to five months of the year,
while working hours brought to each household (with an average
number of 4.6 members) only Rls 4460 (about sixty dollars) a
month.'4 Other surveys in the 19705 confirmed the very high job inse-
curity among the squatter poor. Slum dwellers seemed to have higher
incomes and job security. " They were also less distant, geographically
and socially, from mainstream urban life and were descended from
older migrant generations. Many of them had been born in the cities.
These variations notwithstanding, by the late 19705 one could observe
a sizable marginalized urban underclass, identified by their geograph-
ical, social, and to a large extent economic exclusion from the formal
mainstream urban life. While the bulk of the new poor preferred the
existing conditions of their life to their past,'" vulnerability in every-
day life remained the salient feature of their collective existence—in
securing a place to live and a subsistence job, in debt payment and in
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maintaining their dignity (abirou}. The identity of this underclass was
very much tied to their place of residence. They evolved into a fa i r ly
distinct social entity—an identity articulated both by themselves and
others.
Slum dwellers carried their identities in the public discourse, not as
much with reference to their poverty or work conditions as to their
communities, which in the meantime connoted their particular social
and economic conditions. Thus Naziabadi or Mardum-i Javadiyeh
described the social identity of the slum dwellers in Naziabad and
Javadieh. On the other hand, squatters saw themselves and were
chiefly viewed as zaghehnishinan or alounaknishinan (literally settlers
of shacks and shanties) with some regarding them as belonging to a
"fourth class."'7 The official language, however, generally referred to
them as the mardum-i hashiyenishin, residents of city margins. Others
looked at the new poor through the eyes of denigration, pity, and
poetry. The middle-class use of demeaning words—amaleh and ham-
mal—stressed the urban poor's degraded status. Amaleh generally
means "unskilled construction laborer"—incidentally the major occu-
pation among the underclass. Yet its derogatory use presented the poor
as a caste, making them conscious of their particular position in rela-
tion to others: "My daughter tells me" stated a squatter,
When I go to school through this long and muddy road, my cloths get
all dirty, and I really get embarrassed among my classmates. And the
women of this neighborhood are now singled out (ma'rouf). When they
go shopping in other areas, people look at them with disdain. Their
appearance shows that they are poor (faqir).™
In addition, the image of the new poor has entered the movies, TV
programs, and critical literature. Khosrow Golesorkhi's moving recita-
tion, during his court trial, of his poem "Under the Javadiyeh Bridge"
expressed a sense of both pity and piety." Short stories by Samad
Behrangui40 and Gholam Hussein Sa'edi41 focused chiefly on the mis-
ery of the underclass and their wretched life. Anomie and rootlessness
among urban migrants was a principal theme in Jalal Ale-ahmad's
social criticisms.42 And Sa'edi's "Garbage Place" (Ashghaldouni),
which became the movie Dayere-ye Mina, dealt with the social psy-
chology of the lumpen proletariat whose life, according to Ali Akbar
Akbari, did not differ much from that of the "poor petty-bourgeoisie"
or the urban underclass.41 So in this period, although the new poor
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became a part of the public imagination, the image remained one of
powerlessness. It was not until after the Islamic Revolution that the
poor were granted an element of agency, when the term mustaz'afin
began to dominate the public language. The following chapter dis-
cusses in detail the complexity of this agency over the course of the
Iranian Revolution.
Three
The Disfranchised and the Islamic Revolution:
"Our Revolution and Theirs"
This momentous Islamic. Revolution is indebted to the efforts of this class—the class of
the deprived, the class of the gouidnilhin, the shanty dwellers, the class that brought
about the victory of the revolution, and yet did not expect any reward.
—Ayatollah Khomeini, in a speech to a group of gowd settlers of South Tehran'
Swear to God, this is unfair; we were told: "a revolution has occurred." Then we came
to believe that our situation would change and that we would not suffer that much any-
more. But the only thing we saw of the revolution was this: one day we heard from the
TV that the Shah had gone and Mr. Khomenini had returned! And nothing else.
—A settler of the South Tehran squatter community^
The Revolution
On February 11, 1979, Tehran radio announced the victory of the
Iranian Revolution with feverish jubilation. A mood of ecstasy over-
took the populace, who rushed into the streets en masse. Women
milled through the crowd, handing out candies and sharbat, sweet
drinks. Vehicles sounded their horns in unison, beaming their lights as
they drove down the main streets that only days before had witnessed
bloody clashes between the protesters and the army. These same streets
were now being patrolled by the revolutionary militias, the Pasdaran.
For those present, it was a day of incomparable victory.
This victory day was the culmination of more than eighteen months
of mass demonstrations, bloody confrontations, massive industrial
actions, a general strike, and much political maneuvering.' The gene-
sis of the revolution can be traced to the structural changes that had
been underway since the 19305, when the country began to undergo a
process of modernization. This process accelerated after the 1953
coup, engineered by the CIA, which toppled nationalist prime minister
Muhammad Mosaddeq and reinstated the Shah.
The modernization policy and the economic changes initiated by
the state under both Reza Shah (1915-1946) and his son, the late
36 THE DISFRANCHISED AND THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION
Shah, resulted in the growth of new social forces—much to the dismay
of the traditional social groups. By the 19705 a large and well-to-do
modern middle class, a modern youth, women engaged in public
activism, an industrial working class, and the new poor—slum-
dwellers and squatters—dominated the social scene. With the excep-
tion of the latter group, these groups were the beneficiaries of the new
economic development; they enjoyed high status and high economic
rewards. However, the persistence of the Shah's age-old autocracy pre-
vented their participation in the political process. This angered them.
At the same time the old social groups—represented by the traditional
bazaaris or merchants, the old urban middle strata, the declining
clergy, and those who adhered to Islamic institutions—were also frus-
trated by the strategy of modernization since it undermined their eco-
nomic interests and their power bases.
With all the institutional channels closed through repression for the
expression of discontent, the populace was increasingly alienated from
the state. In the meantime, corruption, inefficiency, a sense of injustice,
and a feeling of cultural outrage marked the social psychology of many
Iranians. During the tense years of the 19705, therefore, at the height
of the Shah's authoritarian rule and during a period of remarkable eco-
nomic growth, many people (except perhaps the upper class and the
landed peasantry) seemed dissatisfied, albeit for different reasons. But
all were united in blaming the Shah and his western allies, especially
the U.S., for that state of affairs. It is therefore not surprising that the
language of dissent and protest was largely antimonarchy, antiimperi-
alist, Third Worldist, and even nationalist, turning in the end into a
religious discourse.
The opportunity for popular mobilization arrived with what we
used to call the "Carterite breeze" (nasseem-e Carteri). President
Carter's human rights policy in the late 19705 force the Shah to offer
a political space for a limited degree of expression. This expression
built up cumulatively and in the course of less than two years swept
aside the monarchy. It all began with a limited relaxation of censor-
ship, which allowed some literary/intellectual activities (in the Goethe
Institute and the universities in Tehran) and public gatherings of
Islamists (in Oqba Mosque). It continued with distribution by the
intellectuals and liberal politicians of openly critical letters to high-
level officials. While this was all going on, an insul t ing article against
Ayatollah Khomeini in a daily paper, Ettilaat, triggered a demonstra-
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tion in the shrine city of Qum that left some demonstrators killed. To
commemorate this, a large-scale demonstration took place in the Azeri
city of Tabriz in the north. This marked the beginning of a chain of
events that formed a nationwide revolutionary movement in which
diverse segments of the population—modern and traditional, religious
and secular, men and women—participated in massive numbers, and
in which the ulama, the Shi'i clergy, assumed its leadership.
Over twenty-five years of the Shah's autocracy since the 1953 coup
had removed or destroyed almost all the effective secular political and
civil organizations. The coup crushed both the nationalist and com-
munist movements; trade unions were infiltrated by the secret police
(SAVAK); publications were strictly censored; and hardly any effective
NGOs remained.4 The main organized political dissent came from the
underground guerrilla organizations, the Marxist Fedaian and the rad-
ical Islamic Mujahedin, whose activities were limited to isolated armed
operations/ Student activism also remained restricted either to campus
politics inside the country or to actions carried out by Iranian students
abroad. In short, the secular groups, while badly dissatisfied, were
organizationally decapitated.
Unlike the secular forces, however, the clergy had the comparative
advantage of possessing invaluable institutional capacity; this included
its own hierarchical order—over ten thousand mosques, hussemiyehs,
huwzehs, and associations, which acted as a vital means of communi-
cation among the revolutionary contenders. Young Islamists, both
boys and girls as well as young clergymen, linked the institution of the
ulama to the people. A hierarchical order facilitated unified decision-
making and a systematic flow of order and information; in the
mosques higher-level decisions were disseminated to both the activists
and the general public. In short, this institutional capacity, in addition
the remarkable ambiguity of the clergy's message, ensured the ulama's
leadership.
Given the insecurity, poverty, inequality, and high inflation charac-
teristic of the poor communities, the availability of a mobilizing force
of revolutionary agitators was sufficient for many observers to assume
the active participation of the disenfranchised in the Islamic
Revolution. The portrayal of the revolution by new Islamic leaders as
the inqilab-i mustaz'afin, the revolution of the downtrodden, signified
the supposed centrality of the underclass to the revolutionary process.
The Islamic leaders derived their own legitimacy and that of the revo-
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lution by propounding this image of participation by the tnustaz'afin
and the koukhnishinan.
Politicians apart, many scholars have also come to similar conclu-
sions. Some have pointed to dislocated rural migrants as the funda-
mental social basis of the Islamic Revolution.6 Others have written that
the miserable living conditions, violent behavior, and the déclassé char-
acter of the lumpen proletariat made them fit to support the Khomeini-
type revolution.7 Many writers have stressed the institution of hey'at,
ethnically based and ad hoc Islamic sermons, as the mechanism
through which the poor were mobilized by the clergy."
What all these conclusions imply is a functional, structural, and
even essential affinity between the poor and political Islam. Lacking
adequate empirical backing, they are largely theoretical constructs
based upon either an ideology or a deduction whereby the economic
and social position of a group a priori determines its political behav-
ior. These authors also share an assumption that privileges general-
ized/global or political struggles over local mobilization.
By focusing on the city of Tehran, I argue here that the urban poor
were not revolutionary in the conventional sense of wanting to trans-
form the existing macro power structure. Indeed the disfranchised
remained on the margins of the revolutionary campaign nearly until
the end. Yet, I will suggest, they were not passive. Rather, the poor
were involved in a parallel struggle to bring about change in their own
lives and communities. They were engaged in the kind of struggles—
quiet encroachment at the localities—that, unlike that of the revolu-
tion, seemed to them both meaningful and manageable.
The Poor and the Revolution
Reviewing the major daily paper reports (Kayhan, Ettilaat, and
Ayandegan) during 1977 and 1978, one encounters detailed accounts
of daily demonstrations, strikes, and riots in various cities and
provinces, sometimes with unusually detailed descriptions of the num-
ber of participants, slogans voiced, leaders, speeches delivered, resolu-
tions read, as well as the nature and outcome of the events. They report
the procession of various members of the population: teachers, stu-
dents, workers, lawyers, nurses, the clergy, women, guilds, and unions,
with each group and institution carrying its own symbols. Among
these participants one hardly comes across squatter groups or, for
instance, men of Khak-i Sefid. My interviews with a number of young
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middle-class participants in the street demonstrations and riots con-
firm this observation. Janet Bauer, an American anthropologist who
carried out fieldwork among the poor communities of South Tehran
and a number of rural communities for the eighteen months just before
the revolution (June 1977 through late 1978), also observed that "up
through the end of 1978, relatively few women (or men) from the low-
est income neighborhoods of Tehran were actively participating in
street events."' In addition, out of a sample of 646 people killed in
Tehran in the street events during the revolution (from August 2.3,
1977 to February 19, 1978) only 9 or just over i percent came from
the shantytowns.1" The largest proportions were among artisans and
shopkeepers) 189), students (149), factory and workshop workers
(96), and state employees (70).
Why were the poor, especially the squatter settlers, generally aloof
from the revolutionary struggles?
Poverty, inequality, and oppression do not by themselves induce
antistate political action. The crucial questions are: how do the poor
perceive their poverty, oppression, and day-to-day troubles? Who do
they blame? What mechanisms and strategies, if any, do they devise or
resort to to tackle those problems? F ina l ly , to what extent are external
political forces interested and able to "activate" the poor by offering a
different analysis and treatment of their problems?
The members of the underclass in Tehran clearly viewed themselves
as poor, unfortunate, afflicted, and even wretched—the terms used
were "faqir va bichareha"(the destitute), "badbakhtha" (the unfortu-
nate), and "tabaqeh-ye se'iiha" (third-class people). They were aware
of the differences between their lives and those of the rich." Yet it is
not clear whom they blamed for their misfortune. At times they attrib-
uted their problems to "their fate, destiny, and God's will." Neverthe-
less, in general they expected the "government," perhaps as a great
patron, to ameliorate their difficulties.12 As for the Shah, if anything
they seemed to view the monarch as outside the circle of their day-to-
day troubles.
In some ways the migrant poor of the 19705 in Iran (especially those
in Tehran) are reminiscent of eighteenth-century mobs in the prein-
dustrial cities of southern Europe such as Rome, Palermo, or
Istanbul." Like them, the migrant poor seemed to regard the ruler, in
their case the Shah, as the great patron, the provider of livelihood, and
the source of justice: they both admired him and feared his power. It
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was to this ultimate arbitrator that the poor turned in times of acute
crises. "To his excellency, the crowned father of the nation,
Shahanshah Aryamehr!" pleaded a squatter who had lost his home to
demolition agents in 1977: "I have borrowed 100,000 tumans to build
my home. Now, the agents have demolished it. Who should I go for
compensation? I am hungry and wretched. I always pray and will pray
for your well-being. I beg Your Excellency to consider my case.14
There were some who, even after the downfall of the Shah, believed
that "the country needs a taaj-o-takht"^ and that without its monarch
it could not continue to function.16 Although in the perception of the
poor it was clear that the local officials, the municipality agents, the
bureaucrats, and the other rich sucked the blood of the poor, they
thought the Shah probably did not know what was done in his name.
"The Shah himself does not mind, and he does not know about this
problem [of the municipality demolishing their homes). It is these bul-
lies and bureaucrats who destroy our homes." "The one who is sitting
at the top [the Shah| does not want to see people's homes get ruined.
He doesn't know. It is the [Municipality] agents who destroy homes."1
Far from tactical statements to gain "political insurance," these
appeals reflected the urban underclass's mythology about their
monarch.1* This mythology may perhaps be traced back to their rural
communities, where the tradition of patronage was so widely practiced
among the peasants and the rural poor. I can recall how we, the resi-
dents of a village in the Central Province, constructed a transcendental
image of the Shah. We always wondered, for instance, up to what
grade the Shah had studied if the maximum were twelve. Our answers
varied from twenty to one hundred! We also imagined what he ate:
always roast turkey? With what? About this, we were quite sure: it
must have been with golden forks. When transistor radios came to the
village, they brought his mythical qualities much closer to home. Folk
tales about the power and the generosity of k ings abounded. Even the
shaikh of the village advanced stories of this nature. He had large por-
traits of the royal family on his wall. The deeds and discourse in the vil-
lage conveyed a sense of sympathy, admiration, and yet apprehension.
As these personal stories illustrate, the poor's image of themselves
and the Shah contrasted sharply with those of the revolutionaries (the
participants and the agitators a l ike) who seemed to charge the state
and its head with all the country's social, economic, and political short-
comings. From these groups the disenfranchised were largely margin-
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alized. They were located on the periphery of the city's political econ-
omy in many respects.
Among the squatters, the number of the employees working in
large-scale formal enterprises was minimal (see chapter 2.). In this sense
the composition of the squatters in Iran was quite different from that
of Turkey, Egypt, or most of Latin America, where large numbers of
the middle and working classes have been forced to reside in informal
settlements and have brought outside experiences with them into the
shantytowns.1" In Tehran the poor communities were located on the
fringes of the city or in the enclosed spots within it, inhibiting inhabi-
tants' contact with the city's mainstream life. For instance, only about
40 percent of the men (and just 4.5 percent of women) of a poor dis-
trict in South Tehran traveled more than sixty minutes from their
homes daily.2" Although a few settlements spread in wealthier areas
(like Shahabad community near Niavaran Palace) their number was
very insignificant.21 Their access to the print media was also limited, as
most of the heads of households in these communities were illiterate.22
The urban poor also lacked meaningful formal associations of their
own that could act as political intermediaries between them and the
national elites. There was no equivalent to the Latin American popu-
lar organizations in the I ran ian shantytowns. Although a k ind of
neighborhood association (anjuman-i mahalli) did exist, they were
state-sponsored and their leaders were in alliance more with the local
bureaucracy than with their "constituencies." There is no evidence to
suggest that these state-sponsored associations were used by the poor
to serve their own interests as, for example, many state-run unions
were converted to serve the factory workers/1
This is not to suggest that the poor in Iran were uninterested in col-
lective activities. Rather, important political factors were involved in
their nonorganization. Formal associations between the poor and
national movements develop normally in conditions where (as, for
instance, in India, Turkey and some Latin American countries) the
existence of representative democracy allows a relatively genuine
rivalry between political parties. To secure the votes of the large pop-
ular sector, parties inevitably attempt to mobilize the poor, which in
the end makes the poor conscious of their power and their political
leverage at the national level.24 Even illegal movements, such as
Sendero Luminoso movement in Peru, mobilize the poor in the shan-
tytowns in exchange for securing the latter's polit ical support.2S In
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addition, organized indust r ia l workers, who make up a large segment
of the squatters in Latin America, often play a significant mobilizing
role by bringing their experience of collective action from the factories
into the shantytowns.
In the Iran of the 19705 these conditions were largely absent. The
political dictatorship of the Shah had made genuine party rivalries
impossible, let alone the possibility of bargaining for the electoral sup-
port of the poor. Industr ia l workers did not constitute a significant
portion of the squatter population, although they do seem to have had
a significant presence in the inner-city slums.26 Moreover, the industrial
workers themselves were largely deprived of independent labor orga-
nizations. The independent trade union movement had been sup-
pressed since the coup of I953 2 and the official factory unions had
been infiltrated by the secret police, leaving little room for genuine
union activity and collective action.28 These circumstances prevented
the poor—living in the slums or the squatter settlements— from setting
up voluntary and formal associations in their neighborhoods.
In practice, traditional networks in the form of kinship, ethnic rela-
tions, and self-help relations took the place of formal community orga-
ni/ations. To tackle their daily problems, the poor relied on their rela-
tives, friends, and fellow villagers. They assisted each other in provid-
ing loans, labor, and advice, and in taking care of children, the
unemployed, and the elderly. This is not to say that conflict was not
endemic to life in poor communities. Daily disputes over children,
gang-like groups (laats), ethnic differences, competition over scarce
resources such as land, water, or other resources characterized the life
of the poor.29 Nevertheless, the poor did exhibit a strong sense of unity
and coordination when their common channels of survival, especially
their dwellings, were put in danger.'0
Community r i tua l s were crucial in br inging the poor together.
Weddings, funerals, Nowrooz (the I ranian new year), and religious
commemorations provided fertile grounds for cooperation and net-
working. Islamic institutions were particularly significant. The months
of Ramadan and Muharram" were the time of intensive religious
activities. All members of the communities—men, women and chil-
dren—would attend the mosques, husseimyehs or hey'ats.u These
establishments, places of religious practice, also served as sites of cul-
tural activities, friendly association, leisure, and deliberation over mat-
ters of common interest.
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It is commonly assumed that these institutions were utilized by the
clergy to mobil ize the poor in the ant i -Shah campaign during the
Iranian revolution of 1979." There is, however, no solid evidence of
this. Indeed, both secular ( lef t or l iberal) and Islamic agitators (the
antiregime clergy) largely ignored the underclass, concentrating
instead on the politico-intellectual training of young educated groups,
chiefly students. In eighty-eight sermons, messages, and letters, in the
fifteen years prior to the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini made only
eight passing references to lower-class people, compared with fifty ref-
erences to educated youths, students, and universities.'4 In turn,
Ayatollah Mutahhari's elitist approach is clear through his warnings
about avaam-zadegui or populism;" and for AH Shariati, it was intel-
lectuals, not the popular masses, that constituted the revolutionary
force.'6 Interestingly the term " mustaz'afin" entered Khomeini's dis-
course only during the height of the revolution (Aban 1357), when he
used it merely to repudiate the Communists' and attempted to offer
an alternative (Islamic) conceptualization of the poor. Indeed, the
clergy directed its attention to the mustaz'afin, or the lower classes,
predominantly after the revolution. They did so, first, because the
lower classes were seen as a solid social basis for the new regime; sec-
ond, because lower-class radicalism in the postrevolution forced the
clergy to adopt a radical language; and third, because the clergy's
emphasis on mustaz'afin could disarm the left's proletarian discourse
after the revolution.
But during and before the revolution the activities of both leftist and
religious militants were limited to casual agitation among the squatters
during the government crackdown on illegal settlements, such as the
Fedaian Guerrilla Orgam/ation's bombing ot the municipality build-
ing of Key in 1977 to exhibit its solidarity with poor squatters.18
Religious sermons (rowze-khani), preaching, and prayers certainly
did exist in underclass neighborhoods. I myself was an active partici-
pant in these activities throughout my adolescent years. But they
focused almost exclusively on religious injunctions and stories, Islamic
behavior, purity, and the like. It was perhaps true that "nothing brings
us together more than the love for Imam Hussein," as a young squat-
ter proudly stated. These "hey'ats have a positive role in uniting us and
keeping us informed about each other." But the occasions did not go,
as he attested, beyond "sociali/.mg" and simply "sacrificing Imam
Hussein and weeping |for his dead body]."'
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For the marginal poor, the revolution remained by and large a prac-
tice whose slogans, aims, and ideals appeared distant and detached
from their daily concerns and comprehension. They were concerned
primarily with those matters that were essential to maintaining their
d a i l y survival. They needed concrete and immediate solutions to their
problems. These were bound to be limited to their localities.
Until the last phase of the revolution, the poor in general seemed for
the most part silent, on the fringe of events. They were not, however,
passive. Indeed, they were involved in a parallel struggle to bring about
change in their own lives and communities. The disenfranchised were
engaged in the kind of struggles that, unlike the revolution, seemed
both meaningful and manageable, as well as in bringing about a kind
of change no less significant than the one the Islamic Revolution was
to bring about.
The Parallel Struggles
We have been here for a long time now, since everything in the village
was destroyed, and our house was demolished. Even in those days we
hardly had a decent house in the village. But whatever happened, we
managed somehow. That village, called Nowrou/, had a little orchard in
i t . One day my hushand, who was forty then, came home and said:
"Pack up! we are going to lehran ." And we came. In those days, no one
was l i v i n g m the l l a l a b i a b a d . There was not even such ,1 p l a t e ,is
Halahiahad at all. But when we came, we searched all over the garbage
and mud to look for t ins and t i n plates. |We collected them] then we put
them on the top ot each other, added some mud in between. And began
to l ive in them. That was the first day. But my hushand was jobless. So
he looked for a job, for a n y t h i n g to l i ve by. One day he worked as an
amaleh (unski l led ( . ( i n s t r u c t i o n laborer], another day hammali [working
as a porter), then garbage collecting, and selling Libou (cooked sugar
beets]. But he almost always remained unemployed. We managed some-
how unti l our children grew up.4"
Fundamentally, it is the will to survive and a strong resilience in the
face of hardship that motivates the poor to change the pattern of their
lives. By doing so, they also change the social environment in which
they live and hence the nature of politics. It is true that often, though
not always, they proceed individually and quietly, but these individual
and quiet actions entail collective and noisy consequences, involv ing
issues of power and politics.
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Khaleh Fatimeh, one of the founders of the Halabiahad squatter set-
tlement in South Tehran, is one such actor. The exigency of her (and
her husband's) life and their desire to survive the hardship caused them
to venture on a long journey. They packed up, taking a chance and set-
tling in a remote and mysterious land where they hoped to begin a new
and better life. To escape from the agony of high rent, bills, formal
institutions, and the insecurity of dealing with urbanités, they "natu-
rally" set up their own dwelling in the cheap, common, state land out-
side the city boundaries. They began a new life, raising chickens, goats,
and children.
As protagonists, however, they were not alone. Others gradually
joined them as the years passed. Many came directly from villages or
smal l towns; some emerged from the nearby overcrowded slums,
escaping the hardships associated with life there. By 1976, 12,000
households were living with Khaleh Fatimeh in the settlement they
named Halabiabad. The settlers gradually began to demand security of
tenure, improvement of dwelling units, and services ranging from elec-
tricity, running water, and sewer systems to social needs such as health
centers and transportation.41 When their demands fell on deaf ears,
they resorted to quiet direct action. They stole electricity from the
nearby power poles and obtained water illegally and ingeniously from
the main water pipes in the streets; they extended their private domain
into the public space of the alleyways. They made their living by engag-
ing in diverse activities, chiefly in the unauthorized and underground
economy. This kind of work was carried out by and large in the social
and physical space of the street corner, the kiosk, basaat, or behind
wagons and hand trucks. For security, they began to establish com-
munity networks, informal associations, and cultural/religious group-
ings to compensate for their anomie and uprootedness. With the
incremental agglomeration of people organized along similar lines, the
sector of spontaneous habitation was complete.
This quiet encroachment process represents the kind of significant
sociospatial change engendered by people such as Khaleh Fatimeh. But
they hardly considered this change and the activities associated with it
as political; they saw them s i m p l y as natural ways to survive and
improve. Nevertheless, the political outcome of this change followed
before long. It was manifested in the contestation between the poor,
whose strategies for survival required a good degree of autonomy in
the practice of everyday life, and the modern state, which took for
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granted its power to maintain order and regulate space, time, work,
community life, and leisure. This active or participative use of public
space, embodied in the poor's initiative in spontaneously taking over
and constructing land/space, came into sharp conflict with state con-
trol of order. The state's solution was to attempt to eradicate these
informal communities. On the other hand, the tendency of the- poor to
practice a cultural autonomy (with respect to dwellings, community,
and work) flew in the face of the state's intervention in people's ways
of life.
By the summer and autumn of 1977 the squatter areas had emerged
as battle grounds. The municipality's demolition squads, escorted by
hundreds of paramilitary soldiers, as well as dozens of bulldo/.ers,
trucks, and mili tary jeeps, raided the settlements to destroy illegal
dwellings and to stop their further expansion.
The policy of violent eradication was not new. Much earlier, m
1953, the state had resorted to violent action in evicting the migrant
poor from the cavelike settlements in South Tehran. The new wave of
action against illegal housing started in 1974 an^ culminated in 1977.
The major targets included those communities located in east Tehran
(Javadiyeh in Tehranpars, Majidiyeh, and Shemiran-nou in Narmak),
and in the southern and southeastern peripheries (in Afsariyeh,
Mushiriyeh, Kavousiyeh, Solennaniyeh, Mesgarabad, Dowlatabad,
Aliabad, Cheshmeh-ali, and many more). Similar operations, although
on a smaller scale, were also undertaken in other cities i n c l u d i n g
Shiraz, Zanjan, (Jhazvin, and Karadj .
The assaul t s were normal ly carried out at night, when co l lec t ive
resistance against demolition was very difficult—when the residents
were either in bed or away from their shelters. The municipal agents
would ask people to come out of their dwellings and the bulldozers
would wreck the shacks and shanties, leaving behind the rubble of tin
plates, car tires, and mud bricks. "Well, yes," observed a resident of
Javadieh in Tehran 1'ars,
when we got out of the house that night, I saw something that I hope
nobody wil l ever see again. The whole neighborhood had been sur-
rounded by the soldiers who hail sue,iked in quietly and stopped anyone
from turning a light on. . . . Yes, they had brought four bulldo/ers . They
forced everybody out of their homes, and then started to demolish t h e m .
In one house, a whole f ami ly inc lud ing chi ldren went u p o n the rooftop,
and said "we won't come out." But the agents destroyed the house. The
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man fell and the house collapsed on him. And the woman, as soon as she
saw this, fainted and dropped her child from her hands/'1
According to a series of reports based upon over one hundred obser-
vations and interviews with squatters, hundreds of homes were demol-
ished in Tehran in the autumn of 1977 alone. This involved at least
thirteen bloody clashes between the squatters and the government
forces, leaving a dozen dead.4'
At times the crowd, bewildered and outraged, remained shocked
and helpless. At other times, confronted with the demolition agents,
they resorted to every method possible to protect their homes. The
squatters attempted to talk the agents out of their plans, pleaded with
them, and argued about the immorality of their destructive acts.
Women sought sanctuary in their homes with their children and a copy
of Quran, making their shelter a kind of a sacred place, a shrine that
could not be demolished. A few, probably bisaz-o-befroush (land
developers) offered bribes. Many hoisted the Iranian flags and hung
portraits of the monarch on their walls, chanting "Long Live the Shah,
Long Live the Shah!"
Few of these scattered efforts managed to save homes. The perva-
siveness and frequency of the attacks did not leave much doubt among
the squatters that "tomorrow might be our turn." The necessity of col-
lective resistance was genuinely felt. "We are not united; we ourselves
are responsible for whatever ills happening to us, because we don't
stick together"44 echoed the mood of the crowd. Yet in the end they did
demonstrate group solidarity. Collective resistance included both
spontaneous and planned crowd action.
During or following many attacks, the indignant crowd responded
with rage and fury, resorting to clubs, stones, shovels, and whatever
was at hand. On many occasions they ransacked m u n i c i p a l i t y offices,
set government cars on fire, and beat up and, on a few occasions, even
killed the demolition squad agents. During the autumn of 1977 at least
thirteen major confrontations were reported. These crowd actions did
succeed in repelling a number of raids.
You see they [the demoli t ion squad] wouldn't dare come d u r i n g the day.
They did come once, but on that occasion pc-ople got together and beat
them all up. They all ran away, hut the head of the shahrdari [the dis-
t r i c t m u n i c i p a l i t y ] could not. The crosvd got h im and heat him with
sioiies .ind clubs so much that he was torn apart. Then we put him into
a cemetery. The crowd smashed t h e i r cars. They also set a couple of
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them (the cars] on fire. And now they [the squatters] have prepared
themselves with knives, clubs, shovels and pickaxes. They are on guard
every night in case the agents come to raid again.45
While some vigilante groups were formed to defend the settlements,
diplomatic activities were also initiated to negotiate with the authori-
ties to legally halt the demolition. On several occasions clusters of
locals, among them women and children, assembled in the streets to
discuss strategies. Most deliberations seemed rather disorderly, with the
participants seldom coming to an agreement. A few concrete initiatives,
nevertheless, were taken. Small crowds (of two hundred or so people)
were organized and dispatched with women in the forefront to negoti-
ate or appeal with the authorities in the local municipality, local coun-
cil, Rastakhiz Party, and the royal palace. But each time they were dri-
ven away, often with false promises. The squatters were thus forced to
rely primarily on their own defense initiatives and on a war of attrition.
Following each demolit ion and the departure of the government
agents, the squatters would reappear on the ruins of their wrecked
shelters and try once again to put together the rubble to resurrect their
homes. "If they demolish even for 50 times, we will rebuild again,"
said a shantytown dweller/'' The lack of an alternative solution,
together with a sense of justice and a vague dream of victory in the
long run , allowed the poor to carry on their resistance. "Of course not,
they can't simply k i l l all of us!," a squatter stated assuringly, "They
[the government) have lifted restriction [on home building) in other
areas, they will eventually do the same in here too."4 And eventually
they did.
Facing a crisis of such proportion—daily clashes in the shantytowns
followed by revolutionary riots in the streets of central Tehran—suc-
cessive cabinets acted with desperation and confusion, moving from
one decision to the next. Their response to the crisis varied according
to the political mood of the day, ranging from tenancy reform to the
construction of low-income housing and, finally, tolerance of sponta-
neous settlements. But each and every policy offered the poor new
opportunities and leverage to keep their pressure mounting.
The Poor, the State, and the Revolution
Aware of the acute problems of high rent, the high cost of land, and
the shortage of housing, the government of Jamshid Amuzgar, in the
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midst of shantytown clashes in October 1977, began to force owners
of vacant apartments to rent out some 2.4,000 units in Tehran. About
70,000 tenants sent applications, 5 5,000 of them came from poor fam-
ilies, migrant workers and university students; all of these applicants
had requested single rooms. The monthly rent was set between 8 per-
cent to 12. percent of the price of the homes.
By summer 1978 it had become clear that practical difficulties
doomed the policy to failure. For instance, while the municipality was
authorized to rent out an entire home to a tenant, it could not rent
individual rooms within a given house. So the hopes of low-income
families who could afford to rent single or double rooms were dashed.
The project did not bring many tangible results for middle-class home-
seekers either. In almost all cases, the landlords refused to comply with
the new regulations. Only seventy-two such homes were rented out in
the course of one year48. Some landlords proceeded to place a few
pieces of furniture in the vacant flats, pretending their apartments were
already occupied. In the end both landlords and tenants remained dis-
satisfied.
Following the fall of the Amuzgar government on August 2.7, 1978,
Manucher A/moun, a cabinet minister under Prime Minister Ja'far
Sharif-Imami, unveiled a new plan to build "inexpensive housing
units" for "the masses of the people." Some of these were to be located
in the low-income vicinities of industrial plants near Tehran.4'' This
hardly seemed a practical policy, given the bureaucratic bottlenecks
and the urgency of the situation. Thus, on September n, 1978
(Shahrivar 2.0, 1357), three days after the "black Friday" massacre,
when scores of demonstrators were killed in lower-class neighbor-
hoods in defiance of martial law, the government submitted to the
strategy that the poor themselves were already pursuing/" For the first
time, the state recognized the legalization and consolidation of squat-
ter communities.
The policy began gradually, each step determined by the political
exigency of the day. During September and October 1978, for exam-
ple, it was decided that squatter settlements would receive electricity.
Some 35,000 squatter families submitted applications to the munici-
pality in response to the government's decision.51 The mayor of
Tehran, Shahrestani, sought for the first time the "participation of the
people in the planning of the city."" In a dramatic policy reversal,
Azmoun announced that the concept of kharej-i mahdudeh ( l i tera l ly
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outside city boundary)" had "caused inflation in housing and rent, a
serious hardship for the people." The government thus off ic ia l ly
endorsed home construction beyond the munic ipal i ty limits. An
important condition attached to the plan, however, was that these
areas were not to be entitled to basic urban services.54 Even this condi-
tion was dropped within a few days. Thus, on September 26, 1978, the
government authorized construction of homes within the new and
enlarged (by 500 hectares) city limits of 250 kilometers, along with a
pledge to provide the squatters with piped water and electricity."
The policy in itself was a radical concession. Thanks to their resis-
tance and to the broader revolutionary protests, the underclass had
won a long battle. However, these concessions did not tame the mobi-
lization of the underclass. Far from it, they further legitimized their
street politics. Land occupation continued, independent from both
government initiatives and the leadership of the revolution.
Earlier troubles in the shantytowns in the summer of 1977 had pro-
duced the Shah's decree that the demolition of shantytowns and ille-
gally built homes be discontinued; this in turn led the government, in
October 1977, to l i f t restrictions on squatting in sixteen districts in the
south, southeast, and Shahr-e Rey, although it continued to stop squat-
ting in the remaining restricted zones. Squatters in such southern and
southeastern areas as Hashimabad, Nazarabad, Kouy-i Deylaman,
Zahirabad, Afsariyeh, Homayounshahr, Qal'eh Morghi, Yakhchiabad,
and others were legally allowed to maintain or further construct
dwellings/6 However, red tape delayed the process of obtaining build-
ing permits for which the squatters were hardly inclined to wait. The
mere fact of legal authorization legitimized further land takeovers.
Illegal housing mushroomed not only in the newly permitted zones but
also beyond them. Some squatters could not distinguish between the
authorized and restricted zones and hence went ahead, taking over
plots; others, among them many aff luent opportunist developers
(bisaz-o-hefroush), simply ignored the new rules. When confronted
with the demolition squads, almost all referred to the royal decree to
justify their claims."
With the escalation of riots and demonstrations, the attention of the
security forces was diverted from the shantytowns. Thus even when
the politicians were enacting legislation to end intervention on build-
ing, the underclass poor were busy reclaiming hundreds of acres of
land in the vicinity of the city. In South Tehran, during October and
THE DISFRANCHISED AND THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 51
November 1978 (Aban 1357), scores of slum dwellers from
Darvazehghar, Khazane-ye Farahabad, Khaniabad, Naziabad and
elsewhere took over a plot of roughly one hundred acres. The news
spread, bringing more people onto the scene. "Everybody was looking
for a piece of land."5* They divided the plots by drawing lines with
white chalk powder, leaving no room for streets or alleyways. When
allocation was complete, each remained responsible for his own plot.
They made sure to leave someone on guard on the land, except at night
when martial law forced them to stay indoors. A large number
installed national flags on the lots to discourage attacks by government
forces. To offset the common threat, they made sure to act collectively
in order to maintain their hold over the land." Similar actions contin-
ued in other parts of the capital city and in various other towns until
the collapse of the Shah's regime, which triggered yet a new squatters'
movement with a larger scale and novel features.
Mobilization in the Popular Neighborhoods
It was not until toward the end of the Shah's regime in December 1978
that youths brought the concrete experience of the revolution home
into the underclass neighborhoods. The community-based organiza-
tions of the Islamic Consumer Cooperatives and Neighborhood
Councils served as the most effective link between the revolutionaries
and the underclass communities.
The condition of dual power during the last phase of the revolution,
December 1978 to January 1979, characterized the eroding power of
the ancien régime and the mounting authority of the opposition.
Demonstrations of millions of people during the holy month of
Muharram, on December 10 and 11, in the midst of the military rule,
underscored the regime's vulnerability to the revolutionary movement.
The collapse of the military cabinet of Azhaari, the coming to office of
Bakhtiar, and the return of Ayatollah Khomeini from exile in Paris cre-
ated favorable conditions for the transfer of power.
At this stage, the old administrative and decision-making centers in
the cities were relinquishing their power, and new organs of authority
were emerging. In most urban areas, police authority collapsed, the old
city councils gave up authority, and the municipalities ceased func-
tioning. As a consequence, various revolutionary committees sprang
up to fill the vacuum. Militant youths took control of various provin-
cial towns and cities in Rezaieh, Shahpour, Ardabil, Maragheh, and
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Ajabshir in Azarbaijan Province, as they did in the cities of Ramsar and
Langroud in Gilan Province.
Setting up committees in different districts and neighborhoods,
bands of militant youth mobilized to foil counterrevolutionary attacks
on properties and public amenities by regime thugs. The committees
were, in the meantime, involved in certain police functions: maintain-
ing order, administering traffic, welfare activities, food distribution,
petroleum rationing, and street sanitation.6" "In Langroud [a Caspian
Sea town]," a daily paper in Tehran reported, "the police have with-
drawn. They no longer show up in the streets. The town is now con-
trolled by the people. Every night some two thousand volunteers are
guarding the city. [To coordinate their activities], youths have devised
secret codes in each district.'"'' This situation lasted until the aftermath
of the insurrection on February 10 and 11, 1979.
Islamic Consumer Cooperatives
From December through January, the distribution of food was dis-
rupted in the midst of the cold Tehran winter. The disruption was
caused partially by the general disorder in the national distribution
system that had resulted from the general strikes and governmental
dysfunction. It was also due to the profiteering activities of some busi-
nessmen who indulged in hoarding. Similar practices by well-off but
nervous families contributed to the problem. As the leader of the
Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini had called upon the business com-
munity to be fair, but his appeal fell on deaf ears.
The urban poor were immediately affected by the maldistribution.
In order to relieve hardship and to possibly neutralize the poor at this
late stage, Islamic Consumer Cooperatives were set up. They aimed, in
effect, at forcing down price rises by a policy of dumping, providing
the needy with basic materials including food, warm clothing, and the
like.62 Init ial ly some twenty-five cooperatives started operating in the
poor southern neighborhoods of Tehran, such as Bab-i Homayoun,
Naziabad, Khazaneh, Maidan-i Khorasan, and Shadshahr in early
January i978.6! At the beginning the cooperatives were mobile stores
on the back of trucks driving through the poor settlements; later they
developed into more stationary shops and large outlets.
The founders of the cooperatives, encouraged by the clergy, were
philanthropists from diverse urban backgrounds, ranging from
mechanics, shoe-makers, and drivers to frui t sellers, government
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employees, and students.64 A manager of a bookstore, for instance,
filled his bookcases with basic food supplies for sale at low prices.
Bazaar merchants contributed to the cooperatives by extending credit
or providing certain scarce commodities, such as fuel. While the initial
capital for the cooperatives came mainly from the aff luent middle
classes, the labor power and executive elements were drawn largely
from the popular neighborhoods themselves, predominantly from
enthusiastic youth groups. These youths volunteered to sell merchan-
dise, supplying their fellow customers with plastic bags and carton
boxes. They were also responsible for transporting commodities from
wholesale markets to cooperative stores.6' Often the volunteers pro-
vided the coops with "shelves, scales and weighing devices, and even
refrigerators. They constantly keep in touch with their relatives and
acquaintances asking them to offer the cooperatives with short-sup-
plied food stuff."6"
A Coordinating Committee of the Consumer Cooperatives was set
up in order to monitor the activities of the local coops throughout the
city. It attempted to organize the supply of scarce commodities to indi-
vidual coops. Cooperatives of this sort subsequently expanded into
provincial towns throughout the country.
The ancien regime's reaction to the alternative supply systems was
first apprehension and then defeat. The regime was witnessing the
birth of a new civil order over which it had no control. Far from being
able to appropriate or incorporate it, the regime simply resorted to the
tactic of disruption. Security forces ransacked scores of cooperatives in
Tehran and other cities; they set many coops on fire and detained vol-
unteers67. Immediately following each attack, however, the coopera-
tives reorganized their operations and began work. They continued to
function until the fall of the Shah. Following a brief halt after the rev-
olution, they resumed work, albeit with a different form and structure
(see chapter 5).
The Neighborhood Councils (Shuraha-ye Mahallat)
The Neighborhood Councils (NCs) represented neighborhood-based
groups informally organized to alleviate the daily needs of the local
people by mobilizing them. They were established to respond to the
economic and civic exigencies brought about by this phase of the rev-
olution. NCs differed from the Komitehs. The latter were initiated by
local youths primarily to maintain public order and withstand coun-
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terrevolutionary sabotage. After the revolution they were incorporated
into the state as part of the urban security forces functioning alongside
the old police institution.
In early January 1979 NCs were set up in a number of popular dis-
tricts in Tehran and in provincial cities. They also emerged in order to
contain the counterrevolutionary activities of agents of the incumbent
government. The regime's thugs began to attack not only insti tutions
such as the Islamic Consumer Cooperatives but also public properties,
in order to falsely represent the revolutionaries as violent. In response,
groups of militant youth, often under the direction of a local leader or
clergyman, were organized in the neighborhoods to deal with such
sabotage. In the popular districts, however, the most pressing issue
was the shortage of fuel caused by strikes, maldistribution, and possi-
bly by sabotage. Beyond the issue of fuel, the NCs concerned them-
selves also with a number of other areas of civil life, including the sup-
ply and distribution of daily necessities, medical care, defense, and
political work.
The NCs mobilized young people in each locality to supply and dis-
tribute the basic and daily needs of each neighborhood. They delivered
fuel, fresh bread, and foodstuffs to the doorsteps of the inhabitants
who otherwise had to line up in front of the stores for hours. A large
amount of these supplies was offered free of charge to the very poor,
the elderly, and the sick.6* The initiative began in Yakhchiabad, a pop-
ular neighborhood in South Tehran, where over 3,140 liters of heating
and cooking fuel were distributed. The NCs also monitored local
stores to prevent maldistribution (hoarding or favoritism) and over-
pricing. In some settlements, women in particular were in charge of
inspecting the price tags of the merchandise and reporting any mis-
conduct, for which the culprit was punished by public denunciation
and boycott.
Some NCs supervised areas as large as Narmak, in east Tehran. The
council divided the area into several administrative districts. In every
district the council issued households with special coupons for fuel,
petroleum, and chalk coal, to make sure the locals obtained their fa i r
share.'1'' Maintenance and development of the neighborhoods also
came under the supervision of the NCs. They repaired local water
pipes, remedied power outages, and dug deep wells to supply water to
the local bakeries, public baths, and households in communities such
as Afsariyeh in South Tehran where running water was lacking.
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Although the Iranian Revolution was comparatively short and
peaceful, violence did occur in certain instances. To alleviate the con-
ditions of the injured, a number of shuras attempted to organize med-
ical teams with the cooperation of physicians and nurses within these
urban communities. The teams were to train local volunteers in first
aid and assist the inhabitants with their regular medical needs. Women
were particularly instrumental in these efforts. The NCs mobilized the
youth sending them door to door to collect sheets, blankets, and med-
icine to be used in the hospitals to care for the injured. They also made
special efforts to ensure that medical doctors' automobiles as well as
garbage trucks received adequate petrol. "
Defense seemed to be on the agenda of most of the Neighborhood
Councils. The NCs needed to encourage the volunteers in each local-
ity to form vigilante groups to maintain order where the police system
had vir tual ly collapsed. At the same time they organized political dis-
cussion meetings, disseminated news (particularly the number of the
"martyrs"), distributed leaflets, and circulated the tapes of the revolu-
tionary leaders.
It was concrete local measures of this nature, generated by these
popular organizations and administered in a decentralized and com-
prehensible manner, and not simply the hey'ats (ad hoc religious ser-
mons), which brought the experience of the inqilab (revolution) into
the communities of the underclass.
Structurally, the NCs represented loose and informal associations
with limited division of labor, where leaders were recognized and
respected rather than formally elected. Attempts were underway, how-
ever, to establish a more solid structure in the councils, by forming
executive committees which had decision-making power. The execu-
tive committees were to identify the daily needs of the locality, mobi-
lize resources, and assign tasks to volunteers from among the local
people and youth from other areas. The institutionalization of the civic
and community organizations would most l ike ly have continued had
the revolutionary crisis lasted longer. The victory of the revolution
brought these activities to an end, giving rise to new grassroots move-
ments with different structures, scales, and constituencies.
Despite their civic functions, the activists of the Popular Organiza-
tions (the ICCs, LCs, and Security Organizations), did possess politi-
cal biases that at times contradicted their presumed principles. Their
repudiation of ideologically r iva l elements as "saboteurs" was in con-
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flict with the principle of community "solidarity and cooperation."
This, however, did not reduce the vital role of the Popular Organiza-
tions in responding to an immediate need, creating the nucleus of civil
associations, and finally linking the experience of the revolution to the
immediate concerns of the underclass. Youth played a decisive part in
this process. The young revolutionaries from better-off areas went into
the popular neighborhoods where they found the underclass youth
ready for mobili/.ation.
Certain sociological traits distinguished underclass male youth
sharply from their parents and sisters. A good number of them had
attended high schools and were more mobile. Many were second-gen-
eration migrants, with more contacts with other social groups.'2 They
had witnessed the modern middle-class lifestyle and desired to be a part
of it. They longed to pursue the leisure, fashions, and dating games of
the rich boys.7' But these required money, social skills, and a suitable
cultural environment—all of which they lacked. Even going to the
uptown parks "gives us new complexes . . . when we rarely have the
opportunity to even talk to a girl."'4 Their shabby and tacky imitation
of Westernized youth became a matter of ridicule and denigration, forc-
ing them to rehearse within their own sar-i kouchehs (intersections of
alleyways and streets). The north Tehrams used the derogatory termi-
nology of uzgal and dihaati to refer to this group of youths who knew
that they were poor but were fascinated by the lifestyles and values of
the rich. Frustrated by the impossibility of attaining such life-styles and
by the ensuing confusion in terms of identity, they turned against what
they could not be or have. Hence the underclass youth joined the revo-
lution in its moment of breakthrough, becoming the indignant postrev-
olutionary critical "mass on the stage" (mardutn-i dar sahneh). They
were the street warriors, the thugs, of the clerical figures who in return
offered them regular income, power, and a divinely sanctioned social
role, setting the scene for a novel stage in street politics in Iran/'
Until the very end, the disenfranchised, the squatter poor in particular,
remained on the fringes of revolutionary events. Only at the end were
they drawn into the discourse and the practice of the Islamic-
Revolution, primarily through the activities of popular organizations,
the Islamic Consumer Cooperatives, and the Neighborhood Councils.
Although on the periphery of the large events, the underclass were not
passive in their daily lives. They were involved in the process of grad-
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ual but significant change that their struggle for survival had engen-
dered. Their diverse struggles for subsistence came into being years
before the revolutionaries set out in 1978 to demonstrate in the streets
of Tehran and other big cities. Lacking an institutional mechanism to
advance their demands collectively and coherently, they resorted to
quiet direct action in acquiring shelter, setting up collective consump-
tion, acquiring jobs, and consolidating their communities.
This process represented a crucial change in the lives of millions of
poor who pursued similar actions. Indeed many of these developments
occurred outside state regulations, with the poor living an informal
life. They made their advances gradually, albeit with great hardship.
Once the state began to exert its authority, they resisted. The resistance
of the poor squatters did not represent deliberate political struggle
against the state as such, nor even opposition to private landowners or
the system of private property. Rather, their campaign originated pri-
marily from the violation of their sense of justice and was reflected in
the struggle over the use of public space, community development, and
cultural autonomy.
What the poor saw as a natural, rational, and just way of sustain-
ing their livelihood was, according to the state, a breach of law.
Unauthorized land takeovers, illegal siphoning of electricity and run-
ning water, demanding basic amenities, extending private domain into
the public space, squatting on public thoroughfares, using streets as
markets, assembling in the communities—to the state all these activi-
ties meant chaos, loss of control, and political instability. For the poor,
however, these unlawful activities were seen as just acts, necessary to
sustain dignified lives. The response of the squatters to the municipal-
ity's demand for ownership titles to the land was: "we do not need a
sanad (ownership titles], our sanads are our wives and children (who
need a dwelling]."76 As a squatter during the 1977 riots stated:
They |the municipali ty) say that we are in the kharej-i mahdudeh and
that the city cannot afford to give water, paved-roads and so on to these
areas. But still people cannot simply sleep in the streets! They must have
a shelter to live in. Besides, these people cannot afford to get a place in
the city. So they come here to make a dwelling. . . . The municipality
must not destroy these homes. You know how much money, energy and
effort we have put on these?"
In retrospect, the local/community struggles of the Iranian poor to
improve their lives were not necessarily less significant than those of
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the revolutionaries targeting state power. After all, many poor people
continued waging similar campaigns as before. They continued to
migrate massively, squat vacant apartments and lands, march in the
streets to demand jobs, and make a living in the underground econ-
omy. The occurrence of the revolution did not alter their needs sub-
stantially, although it established a new structure of opportunity for
mobilization. It implanted in the poor a new spirit and new experi-
ences, offering a broader ground for their usual claims, albeit more
militantly and daringly. The quiet encroachment of the ordinary sur-
passed in continuity the revolutionary struggle. The following chapters
explore the manifestation of this form of politics, as well as the story
of these mobilizations in the spheres of both living space and working
life.
Four
The Housing Rebels: The Occupation
of Homes and Hotels, 1979-1981
Khaleh Sakineh and Hassan' were among the many hundreds who had
joined the crowd, carrying their entire belongings in a tremendous
rush. Utensils, bed, boxes, and babies hung down from their shoulders;
and chickens and children followed the multitude. Mobilized by young
activists, the crowd had emerged from a South Tehran slum. Young
men directed the crowd toward an empty building. Upon their arrival
the group flooded into the house taking over the empty rooms. The
activist leaders began putting up banners and billboards around the
structure, informing the public that the homeless poor were squatting
this vacant home.2 Thus was a large home in Mirdamad, an upper-
middle-class neighborhood in Tehran, taken over.
This was one way in which the poor secured their dwellings.
Others, like Hassan's brother, Mahmoud, had been involved, days
earlier, in taking over a piece of land in Dowlat Abad where he hired
his wife's cousin to put up a shelter into which he and his family
moved the following day. In the same way as the inhabitants of many
neighborhoods who had scattered around like blots of dropped ink,
Khaleh Sakineh and Hassan became homeowners literally overnight.
Unlike Hassan's group, Mahmoud's operation was rather discreet and
without much clatter. Thus they began a new life in the new commu-
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nity. The revolution had paid off for both families, as well as many
thousands more.
This and the following chapters show that the silent revolution, or
quiet encroachment, which the urban poor had inaugurated decades
prior to the Islamic Revolution continued ceaselessly after the insur-
rection of February 1979, albeit in a different context. The new squat-
ters' movement represented a break from the past; the Islamic
Revolution altered the form and structure of the squatters' activities.
Between 1979 and 1981, under political uncertainty, various political
groupings emerged, striving to gain popularity and support by mobi-
lizing the disenfranchised groups. The resultant political competition
within the oppositional groups, and between the opposition and the
government, offered an opportunity for squatters to mobilize radically.
Thus the squatter poor experienced, through kinship and individual
initiatives, not only creeping direct action but also some kind of a
social movement—one characterized by collective effort, some degree
of organization and network, and a perception of social change.
Taking over Homes and Hotels
The new squatters' movement emerged against the background of the
insurrection of February 10 and 11, 1979, when the Islamic Revolu-
tion had reached its climax. An enormous energy had been released
and a tremendous void had emerged. In this "moment of madness,"
the body politic tingled with every little move in any segment within
the society. It was a time of great dualities—of enormous hope and
despair, of exhaustion and rejuvenation, of relaxation and energy, of a
sense of job-done and work-to-begin.
The central authority had collapsed. There was no secret police, no
municipali ty guards, not even a traffic police. Following the insurrec-
tion, the power vacuum began to be filled by various grassroots orga-
nizations, as well as by opportunistic, self-declared power heirs in var-
ious sectors of the society. Many business people deserted companies;
managers left factories; the rich abandoned homes, hurriedly leaving
behind million-dollar properties. In the end, some 150,000 housing
units—palaces, hotels, villas, and unfinished apartment blocks
remained; their original owners had either rushed to the West, or were
in hiding somewhere in the country. The properties would later fa l l
under the control of the Bonyad-i Mustaz'afin (the Foundation of the
Dispossessed).'
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Landless peasants confiscated large agribusiness estates; hundreds
of factories were taken over by workers; and the state offices began to
be run by their employees. The revolutionary youth took the charge of
the city police. Even the unemployed, who intr insical ly lacked any
institutions in which to function, took control of the streets by regu-
lat ing the traffic. It was the time of role-playing, of making a differ-
ence, of being counted, of taking revenge, of seizing the moment. It
was at this moment of madness, of the new social order, that the new
squatters' movement came into life.
Only days after the insurrection, a group of tent-settlers at the
southern margin of the capital warned that if the new regime did not
provide them with decent housing, "we will occupy vacant apart-
ments." Two days later, some three hundred families, most of them
armed, took over apartment blocks in Dowlatabad in South Tehran.4
In the days and weeks that followed thousands of homeless families,
poor tenants, and students joined the protagonists in Tehran and other
urban centers, occupying empty apartment blocks, luxury homes, vil-
las, and deserted hotels.
Tehran witnessed the largest incidence of squatting, mainly in the
southern plain of the city, but homes, hotels, and apartments were
occupied in other areas as well. Mirdamad, Maidan-i Azadi, Maidan-
i Inqilab, Tajrish, Park-i Laleh, and Khiaban Hashemi, plus the town-
ships of Tehran Pars, Kianshahr, Islamabad, Nizamabad, Dowlatabad,
Shahrak-i Najafabad, and ( i i l anshahr account for only a few of the
reported cases. In the latter three communities alone, according to a
report, over 4,500 villas had been taken over by the "poor" in the first
months of the revolution/
Home invasions took place collectively, with kin folk, village mates,
and neighbors acting together, often mobilized by the leftist and
Islamic activists, and at times with sophisticated planning. On
December z i, 1979, some thirty families from the poor neighborhoods
of Maidan-i Soush and Gowdnishinan, in South Tehran, took over
half-finished apartments near Islamabad in the southeastern plain. The
group was led by a thirty-year-old, left-wing factory worker. The news
spread among neighbors and acquain tances , and hundreds of families
from the vicinity invaded the area. About 400 households occupied
308 homes.6 In another early operation, at the beginning of 1980,
some forty-one squatter families who occupied homes located in South
Tehran gowds, forced the Municipali ty to supply them ready-made
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apartments in the Shahrak-i Soush. The Municipality purchased the
occupied homes from the settlers in order to level them for develop-
ment/ A few communities grew even larger as the occupation of newly
built apartments continued. About five hundred families had settled in
the township of Kianshahr by 1985.H
Young activists played a crucial part in organizing the homeless.
"We were a group of left-wing workers who had known each other tor
years. . . . We began planning to expropriate so many vacant homes
and apartments."9 The core group had some twenty members, each
relating to a dozen contacts who were active in popular areas such as
Shadshahr, Darvazehghar, and Halabiabad. The core group would
identify vacant properties, and the contact teams mobilized the home-
less and brought them to the target buildings. "We would begin our
invasion in a specific time. Then men, women, and children carrying
their utensils, rugs, heaters, beds, and whatever would join in the occu-
pation."'" In this manner, they occupied buildings in the Shadshahr,
Mirdamad, a neighborhood near Maidan-i Azadi, Maidan-i Inqilab,
and Khiaban Hashemi.
Provincial cities also experienced home invasions. They included
Qasr-i Shirin, Sanandaj, and Kirmanshah in the west, Abadan (in
South Iran), Arak and Tonkabon (in Central Province), and Mashad (a
holy city in East Iran)." In Abadan, in addition, some one hundred oil
industry workers' famil ies moved in to the apartments previously
occupied by "the military personnel, SAVAK |the Shah's secret police]
employees, policemen, and loyal workers."'" These units were believed
to belong to the Sazman-t Kargaran (Workers Organization) of the
company, but had been allocated illegitimately to the above-mentioned
people. In Kirmanshah, during the first week after the insurrection,
one hundred and fifty families of flood victims were mobilized in a
carefully planned campaign by left-wing youths who led them to
occupy the government-built apartment blocks in the Shahrak-i
Valiye'ahd. The apartments were or ig ina l ly to be allocated among
these Hood victims, but only for an unaffordable sum of Rls 500,000
(more than U.S.$6,500)."
Beyond homes and apartments, many luxury hotels also became the
target of highly organized occupations in which university students
typ ica l ly took the lead. The students participated not only as mobiliz-
ers of the poor but also as beneficiaries in their own right. Dur ing
( ktober 1979, over one thousand students, complaining that the gov
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ernment failed to provide them with suitable dormitories, took over
the Internat ional Hotel and the Royal Garden Hotel on Takht-i
Jamshid Avenue.14 Around the same time, mostly left-wing students
occupied the Hotel Imperial, the Hotel Sina, and many more in
Tehran. Both male and female students thwarted the resistance of the
hotel employees, who were afraid of losing their jobs. The squatters
guarded the buildings, resisting the hizbullahia, informal groups orga-
nized by some clergy, who attempted to oust the original occupiers."
The major impetus for hotel occupations came from the radical
Islamic groups, which mushroomed in those days under the leadership
of such figures as Ayatollah Beheshti, Sheikh Muhammad Karrubi, and
Hojjatal-Islam Hadi Khosrowshahi who sanctioned and guided the
activities of the mil i tant Muslim students in taking over hotels and lux-
ury villas. These clerical leaders were not only constructing mass sup-
port for themselves; they were also undermining the weak Provisional
Government. Sheikh Muhammad Karrubi (brother of Mehdi Karrubi)
began his agitation activities (in September 1979) by seizing a two-
story house in north Tehran (Serah-i Zarrabkhaneh) as the headquar-
ter for his Committee for Housing for the Downtrodden (Komite-ye
Khaneh Baraye Mustaz'afin). Around him gathered young men from
different walks of life—leftists, tnujaheds, laats or street bullies, and
opportunists. Many of them came from South Tehran, acting as
Karrubi's executive soldiers. Bands of young males grouped in the
streets identifying homes, hotels, and land for the sheikh, who would
"officially" assign these dwelling-places to the needy as well as to his
own associates."1 "I also received a few assignment orders," stated a
participant in the operations, "and consequently I managed to trans-
fer about ten families from Naziabad into these homes."'
Immediately following an occupation, the squatters would appoint
a committee, a shura, to take care of the internal order within the
buildings and organize against external threats of eviction. In the occu-
pied hotels the shuras assigned rooms to "needy students" who came
largely from the provincial towns. Normally each room was given to
two or more students. "For instance, I used to live with my parents in
Tehran," described a student squatter, "but I shared a room with a
friend in the hotel."'" In line with their ideological commitment, the
students often took organizational work very seriously. They held
largely free and competitive elections for the shuras, and formed vari-
ous executive committees to operate the daily lives of the residents. In
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the Hotel Royal Garden they formed Committees to deal with resi-
dence, transportation, cooperation with the employees, and defense.1"
"The students, both boys and girls, maintained order and discipline,
protecting the Hotel by a twenty-four-hour petrol of the building."2
Most squatters came from poor migrant families who either could
not afford to pay rent or were living in tents and shacks in other parts
of the cities. In Dowlatabad the newcomers came from various poor
communities of South Tehran, including the alounaks (shacks) of
Tehranpars, Tehranvila, Darvazehghar, Naziabad, and Maidan-i
Soush. "We used to live in a damp basement," said A women squatter
in Dowlat Abad, "I get terrified thinking that we might still be forced
to return to that place."21 Residents in the squatters' settlements of
Halabshahr in District 2. in Tehran seized the opportunity to upgrade
their position, moving in to empty apartments and houses located in
Mahalle-ye Seraj.22
Not all the squatters came from poor backgrounds; nor were all
desperately striving for a place to live. Some relatively affluent devel-
opers and local bullies (laat) also furthered their own interests. A rev-
olutionary committee member claimed that some of the squatters had
already "owned a home." They simply sold these to others to make
money.21 Some of them, he reported, had escaped from prisons dur ing
the revolutionary chaos; they were now involved in gambling and drug
dealing.24 Corruption at the level of the officials themselves also played
a role. The Pasdaran Committees, who were in charge of controlling
the neighborhoods and were later to assign expropriated apartments
to the homeless, actually gave a number of homes away to their own
relatives, friends, and "ideologically correct" families.2 '
The mass of student squatters was mostly from the provinc ia l
towns; their complaints about their accommodation problems in the
rent-notorious capital city dated back to many years before the revo-
lution. Yet the logic behind their mobilization had less to do with an
immediate need for housing and more with a desire to negate the opu-
lence that they admired in private but turned against because they
could hardly afford to be part of it. lor lef t is ts , as one leader put it,
"the occupation of the hotels which belonged to the large capitalists
was in accordance with our political and ideological lines."2<1 These
radical measures also fit well with the strategy of the hardl ine Islamic
leaders of p u t t i n g pressure on the moderate Provisional Government
of Mehdi Bazargan. The largely political mot ive (as opposed to sheer
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need) of the students in taking over properties was later reflected in
their early eviction by the authorities.
Life in the Occupied Dwellings
Unlike the students, the poor began to consolidate their positions in
the occupied residential blocks. Squatting for them represented a long-
awaited objective they could not afford to lose. Once they moved in,
they began completing the unfinished apartments, putting up win-
dows, glasses, and tiles. In Dowlatabad, each household spent some
Rls 2.0,000 (U.S.$280 at 1979 exchange rate) to install doors and win-
dows. The squatters divided the apartments, each family occupying a
single room, and brought their chickens, goats and even their cows
into the settlements."
Within the occupied buildings, the left-wing activists organized lit-
erary and language classes, held political and ideological meetings, and
taught social skills to the youngsters.2"
Upon squatting, some men began opening their businesses in the
same neighborhoods, whether in the apartments, by the door, or in the
street. Street butcher shops were opened, poor grocery shops started to
operate, and the unemployed looked for jobs on construction sites. Yet
most men maintained their previous occupations, which required them
to commute longer hours. Like their fathers, children, too, had to com-
mute long hours to attend their previous schools. The problems of the
squatters who had resided in the affluent parts of north Tehran seemed
even greater. They had to shop in the stores of the affluent. Class ten-
sion remained .mother problem. In their gestures, jokes, and day-to-
day interactions, the rich expressed their distaste over being neighbors
with the dispossessed migrant poor."
None of these shortcomings, however, reduced the attraction of
being the master of one's own dwelling. Thus the biggest challenge
remained to protect these homes from the forces of eviction. To this
end, some families made sure that a member of family stayed at home
during the day. Some men who stayed behind to protect their dwellings
from the eviction forces lost their jobs, so it was mainly women who
undertook the task of dealing with the authorities and defending the
dwellings. Maintaining the dwellings, however, required an organized
resistance.
Like the students, the poor squatters in a number of communities
went as far as to constitute more structured orgam/ations: the shuras.
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elected or appointed councils, represented and organized inhabitants
of a building, or many occupied blocks wi th in a neighborhood. The
shuras bore the responsibility of tackling problems that might jeopar-
dize the inhabitants security of tenure. They were to upgrade the com-
munity, deal with day-to-day problems, maintain cleanliness, resolve
disputes, and administer cultural events. More immediately, they were
to coordinate the relations of the communities with the outside world,
including hostile neighbors and especially the original owners of the
properties.'" Several local power centers had emerged, each claiming
sole authority over the affairs of the neighborhoods, and all, by impli-
cation, were hostile to the organization of the shuras. They ranged
from the local Pasdaran Kommitte, the clergymen, and the local
mosques to the office of the Construction Crusade and the local
municipality. To counter the threats and intrigues coming from these
bodies, the organization of councils seemed vital.
In a southwestern outskirt of Tehran, according to Bassri and
Hourcade, the four hundred families that had taken over three hun-
dred and eight apartments elected a left-wing council in which women
played an active role. The households of each street (koucheh) elected
three representatives all together, making a twenty-one-person general
assembly. The general assembly, in turn, elected a five-member central
council, which was to meet once a week and was responsible for the
decisions concerning the entire neighborhood. Once consolidated, the
council went so far as to create a coordinating council to organize all
squatters at the level of the city of Tehran. It organized rallies and
called for a rent strike by poor tenants."
In a sense, the shura associations attested to the "spatial solidarity"
among the inhabitants who came from different social, ethnic, and lin-
guistic backgrounds but shared one important goal: protecting and
upgrading the already occupied homes.'2 Out of this common interest
and mechanical solidarity, based upon what John E. Davis termed
domestic property (land and bui ld ings that are used |or usable) for
shelter)," grew friendship and kinship ties that further cemented the
local bond. Young adults within the communities married; neighbors
looked after each other's children and watched one another's belong-
ings; and children played with their new mates.
Despite this rejuvenated mood and the highly energetic local atmos-
phere, the specter of the bearded Pasdaran and the nightmare of evic-
tion kept haunting these housing rebels. Knowingly or unknowingly,
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they had violated a fundamental property right that all the govern-
ments in the postrevolution period were committed to protect. The
confrontation between the squatters and the authorities thus seemed
unavoidable.
Being Evicted
The occupation of residential buildings, homes, and hotels constituted
one of the first challenges to the new authorities in the revolutionary
period. There had been other incidents that defied the Islamic regime,
such as nationalist rebellions in Kurdistan and Azarbaijan, the activities
of the left-wing organizations, seizure of farming land in the north, and
the takeover of factories by the workers in most parts of the country.
Housing seizures, however, proved to be a more acute crisis. In
direct actions such as factory takeovers, the government was confident
that it could eventually secure the ownership of the enterprises.34 These
enterprises would eventually belong either to the state or to the origi-
nal owners; the most workers could do would be to maintain some
degree of control over the operation of the workplaces through the
organizations of the factory shuras. The situation with regard to the
buildings was quite different. With a simple hint of governmental
recognition, the squatters would virtually usurp the occupied proper-
ties. There was no easy, short-term, and middle-of-the-road solution,
especially since many unfinished apartments, unlike the luxury villas
and hotels, belonged legally to individuals such as school teachers and
the government employees for whom the previous regime had built
homes as part of their benefits. The new authorities were consequently
caught up between threats of disorder and chaos, of losing their legit-
imacy as the "servants of the dispossessed," and of being irrelevant.
On the other hand, the instability of the Islamic regime, with the
intense power struggle at the top and the constant turnover of politi-
cians, meant there was hardly a consistent policy to deal with the prob-
lem. The Housing Foundation along with a number of radical clerical
leaders such as Khosrowshahi, Karrubi, and Beheshti, encouraged
takeovers; the provisional government of Mehdi Bazargan opposed the
action vehemently; the subsequent Rajaaii's cabinet tolerated it with-
out, however, giving it official recognition. Indeed, the authorities'
response to the squatting crisis during the first two years remained
largely decentralized; it was handled mainly by the local power cen-
ters, especially the local committees or Pasdaran, and the local mullas
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and their armed men centered in the local mosques. The committees'
position on the issue depended on which authorities they were follow-
ing—sympathetic or critical. The radical clergy's sympathy for the
squatters had in general the political aim of undermining the
Provisional (iovernment. Yet, since the squatters were mobilized gen-
erally by the radical left groups, the Pasdaran were quick to oppose the
squatters on the ground that they were acting as the agents of the
"communist counterrevolution."
The success of the local Pasdaran in ending the occupation, and the
extent of the squatters' hold over the occupied properties depended on
a balance of forces at both national and local levels. The power strug-
gle at the top (between the liberals and the radical clergy) offered
breathing space to the ordinary citizens in their mobilizational efforts.
This macro schism reflected itself at the localities, with groups allying
with this or that governmental tendency or personality. But there were
other players on the local level as well: the squatters, their leftist allies,
the local Pasdaran, local mosques and mullas, and the owners of the
occupied homes. In short, the degree of the squatters' hold over the
occupied properties varied a great deal. It depended on how organized
they were, how forceful the original owners were, who the owners
were (either the old elites or ordinary people), and which officials the
squatters resorted to (sympathizers or opponents). This may explain
why some squatters managed to stay on; others lasted over six years;
and some, like those in the occupied hotels, were evicted after a few
weeks.
The ways in which the government and the Pasdaran confronted the
housing rebels varied considerably. They adopted different tactics that
ranged from issuing strongly worded warnings, using religious verdicts
publicly denouncing the "un-Islamic" nature of their actions, to
divide-and-rule tactics, cutting water and electricity, arrests, and
armed raids. Some, mainly students, left without much resistance; oth-
ers did so after obtaining compensation or a promise of alternative
housing; many resisted and stayed on, though some agreed to pay
some compensation to the government.
Students were among the first to vacate the hotels, largely of their
own free will. Immediately after the seizure of the U.S. embassy by the
militant musl im students (on November 4, 1979) many hotels were
evacuated. Even prior to that event, ideological division within the
organizing student bodies in the hotels had already undermined the
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viability of long-term occupation. The students sympathizing with the
Mujahedin argued for peaceful evacuation; they thought these kinds of
direct actions would undermine the nascent revolutionary regime's
position with the West. The Marxist students, in contrast, wanted to
stay unless the government did something for their housing conditions.
In many hotels this division paralyzed the protective function of the
shuras." With the seizure of the U.S. embassy, as a left-wing partici-
pant in one operation put it, "the justification behind the occupations
lost its validity." In this situation, the "excuse of student housing [for
the occupation of the hotels) also shed its legitimacy."'6 Although a
number of the students retained some hotels (for instance, those in
Takht-i Tawous and Karim Khan in Tehran) because the owners were
tawghouties (opulent royalists), the political/ideological logic of stu-
dent squatting made their occupation far less viable.
The situation with the poor squatters was quite different. For them,
squatting was not a political or ideological battle but simply a way to
survive. Defending their gains was vital. And this alone would make
their eviction difficult. As a squatter stated:
From the beginning, I have sacrificed all of my things on this revolution.
. . . I have sold my carpet and TV [to pay for my costs]. Now I won't
leave this home. You see, we too have the right to live a life. [I want to
say to] those who want us to leave this place: first give us a place of our
own.'
The squatters were invariably denounced in public by some reli-
gious authorit ies as "counterrevolutionaries." "They are opportunists
who have taken advantage of the good will of the revolutionary lead-
ership and the Provisional Government," declared Hojjat al-Islam
Khansari, the leader of the committee located in Nizamabad. "They
have illegally seized these apartments, in the days when our combatant
people were engaged in armed struggle (during the revolution]."1
For the most part, the religious authorities condemned the squatters
and justified their eviction on religious grounds. Upper echelon clergy,
such as Ayatollahs Qomi and Mar'ashi, issued fitwas ruling that occu-
pying homes was haram, unlslamic. In one specific case in Mashad,
they ruled that the "prayer of the Muslims in such homes are not
acceptable."'9 In response, squatters referred to earlier proclamations
by Khomeini on free housing and urban services. "Does the govern-
ment not plan to provide hous ing for the mustaz'afin?" asked a squat-
ter of the authorities who demanded his eviction, "We have behaved
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and their armed men centered in the local mosques. The committees'
position on the issue depended on which authorities they were follow-
ing—sympathetic or critical. The radical clergy's sympathy for the
squatters had in general the political aim of undermining the
Provisional Government. Yet, since the squatters were mobilized gen-
erally by the radical left groups, the Pasdaran were quick to oppose the
squatters on the ground that they were acting as the agents of the
"communist counterrevolution."
The success of the local Pasdaran in ending the occupation, and the
extent of the squatters' hold over the occupied properties depended on
a balance of forces at both national and local levels. The power strug-
gle at the top (between the liberals and the radical clergy) offered
breathing space to the ordinary citizens in their mobilizational efforts.
This macro schism reflected itself at the localities, with groups allying
with this or that governmental tendency or personality. But there were
other players on the local level as well: the squatters, their leftist allies,
the local Pasdaran, local mosques and mullas, and the owners of the
occupied homes. In short, the degree of the squatters' hold over the
occupied properties varied a great deal. It depended on how organized
they were, how forceful the original owners were, who the owners
were (either the old elites or ordinary people), and which officials the
squatters resorted to (sympathizers or opponents). This may explain
why some squatters managed to stay on; others lasted over six years;
and some, like those in the occupied hotels, were evicted after a few
weeks.
The ways in which the government and the I';isdaran confronted the
housing rebels varied considerably. They adopted different tactics that
ranged from issuing strongly worded warnings, using religious verdicts
publicly denouncing the "un-Islamic" nature of their actions, to
divide-and-rule tactics, cutting water and electricity, arrests, and
armed raids. Some, mainly students, left without much resistance; oth-
ers did so after obtaining compensation or a promise of alternative
housing; many resisted and stayed on, though some agreed to pay
some compensation to the government.
Students were among the first to vacate the hotels, largely of their
own free will . Immediately after the seizure of the U.S. embassy by the
militant muslim students (on November 4, 1979) many hotels were
evacuated. Kven prior to that event, idc-ologic.il d iv i s ion w i th in the
organi / ing student bodies in the hotels had already undermined the
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viabil i ty of long-term occupation. The students sympathizing with the
Mujahedin argued for peaceful evacuation; they thought these kinds of
direct actions would undermine the nascent revolutionary regime's
position with the West. The Marxist students, in contrast, wanted to
stay unless the government did something for their housing conditions.
In many hotels this division paralyzed the protective function of the
shuras." With the seizure of the U.S. embassy, as a left-wing partici-
pant in one operation put it, "the justification behind the occupations
lost its validity." In this situation, the "excuse of student housing |for
the occupation of the hotels) also shed its legitimacy."'" Although a
number of the students retained some hotels (for instance, those in
Takht-i Tawous and Karim Khan in Tehran) because the owners were
tawghouties (opulent royalists), the political/ideological logic of stu-
dent squatting made their occupation far less viable.
The situation with the poor squatters was quite different. For them,
squatting was not a polit ical or ideological battle but simply a way to
survive. Defending their gains was vital. And this alone would make
their eviction difficult. As a squatter stated:
From the beginning, I have sacrificed all of my things on this revolution.
. . . 1 have sold my carpet and TV |to pay for my costs). Now I won't
leave this home. You see, we too have the right to live a life. [I want to
say to] those who want us to leave this place: first give us a place of our
own.
The squatters were invariably denounced in public by some reli-
gious authorities as "counterrevolutionaries." "They are opportunists
who have taken advantage of the good will of the revolutionary lead-
ership and the Provisional Government," declared Hojjat al-Islam
Khansari, the leader of the committee located in Nizamabad. "They
have illegally seized these apartments, in the days when our combatant
people were engaged in armed struggle (during the revolution)."'
For the most part, the religious authorities condemned the squatters
and justified their eviction on religious grounds. Upper echelon clergy,
such as Ayatollahs Qomi and Mar 'ashi , issued fitwas ruling that occu-
pying homes was haram, unlslamic. In one specific case in Mashad,
they ruled that the "prayer of the Muslims in such homes are not
acceptable."w In response, squatters referred to earlier proclamations
by Khomeini on free housing and urban services. "Does the govern-
ment not plan to provide housing for the mustaz'afin?" asked a squat-
ter of the authorities who demanded his eviction, "We have behaved
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exactly according to the government policy."4" Their resistance thus
grew not simply from the moral economy of the poor, nor purely from
their rational conviction. Rather, it represented a moral politics on the
part of the rational poor.
Ignoring such verdicts or interventions, the squatters left the
authorities with no other option but to take action that at times had
far-reaching political consequences. In Dowlatabad, in Tehran, the
Pasdaran cut off running water in the public taps on the grounds that,
according to a resident, "its use was announced to be haram ( re l i -
giously prohibited!."4 ' Such pressures, however, failed to yield results.
Following several warnings to the squatters to vacate, the Pasdaran in
one case raided a squatters' community at night. The settlers expressed
their outrage at the assault by organizing a five-hundred-person angry
demonstration in front of the Pasdaran headquarters, demanding the
release of five women who were arrested. Scuffles broke out and shoot-
ings followed, leading to the withdrawal of the Pasdaran.42 Five years
passed, during which time the Pasdaran patrolled, off and on, around
the settlement, reminding the squatters of their insecure position. On
February 10, 1985, the Pasdaran returned in ful l force to finish the
evictions. In response, thousands of the inhabitants of Dowlatabad
staged a demonstration. "The demonstrators blocked the Be'sat high-
way, and the streets around the township, br inging the traffic to a
halt." In the confrontations that followed, a large number of the squat-
ters and Pasdaran were injured. The security forces withdrew once
again, only to return two days later with the aid of the paramilitary
(gendarme). They were confronted with fierce resistance again, and
left.4 ' This was the end of the affair for a time.
Squatters made special efforts to organi/.e themselves more system-
atically at the local level, often with the aid of left-wing groups. They
designed strategies to confront the security forces, to outline alterna-
tive solutions, and to negotiate with the authorities. In the township of
Kianshahr, in South Tehran, after four years of unsuccessful eviction
attempts, the settlers elected a number of local leaders to appeal to a
populist clergyman, Ayatollah Montazari. He referred them to the
municipal authorities. Not being prepared to accept any responsibility,
the latter in turn suggested the squatters pa-sent their case at the Friday
prayer sermons where most officials , including the prime minister,
would be in attendance.
In the meantime, an already-established Council of the Apartment
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(shura-ye apartimaan] invited people into the local mosque to discuss
the plan. They agreed that they would not leave the apartments and
would take their case to the Friday prayer session. One of the propos-
als pointed out that "If these houses belong to police personnel, we are
prepared to purchase them. The government may begin building new
apartments for the personnel with our monthly payments. Otherwise,
we demand the government to build suitable houses for us." The day
of Friday prayer arrived. The settlers presented their petition to the
prime minister, who assured them that they could stay in the apart-
ments unt i l an appropriate law was enacted with regards to these
properties. One year later, however, the Pasdaran raided the commu-
nity to force them out. The dwellers remained steadfast and the secu-
rity forces were once again repelled.
While evictions continued in many spots in Tehran, due to its polit-
ical sensitivity, things appeared easier in provincial urban areas. In the
holy city of Mashad, the government was able to end, albeit after sev-
eral unsuccessful attempts, the occupation of the apartments of
Aabkouh, which had been taken over few days after the revolution.
On December i z, 1980, some four hundred armed security men raided
the buildings, and in one surprise move forced out some five hundred
squatters.44
The prevailing tactic of the authorities consisted of divide-and-rule.
They would offer a segment of the squatters the promise of alternative
housing or the consolidation of their tenure, in exchange for repudiat-
ing more uncompromising, especially leftist, factions.4S Once the shura
members were divided, the situation would be ripe for the security
forces, backed by the lawsuit of the original owners, to exert pressure.
Alternatively, through enforcing new elections or creating alternative
s/7Mrtzs, the government would eventually eliminate the dissenting
groups.46 This tactic was reinforced especially after 1982 when, fol-
lowing the suppression of the liberals, the Mujahedin, and the left, the
regime began to consolidate itself. Although apartment seizure
stopped, evictions lingered on for some years to come.
Most apartment squatting lasted between two and six years. Only
a fraction of the squatters were allowed to stay on. For the rest, forced
evictions eventually occurred. The major problem was that the squat-
ters had aimed at the wrong targets. Unl ike their counterparts in
Portugal in 1974 or in Britain in 1968-70, who aimed at forcing prop-
erty owners (in Portugal) or local governments to provide homes with
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reasonable rent, the Iranian squatters had seized the properties of
other citizens.47 Although some properties belonged to the previous
government, foreigners, or very rich landlords, many belonged to the
citizens—government employees, teachers, or police personnel who
were not considered particularly opulent. Some had not even com-
pleted their payments to the contractors. These citizens were adamant
to resecure their properties.
On the other hand, the government's promise of housing for the
poor through the Fund 100 program in i t i a l ly created some hope
among the poor. The activities of the Jihad-i Sazandegui (the
Construction Crusade) seemed ini t ia l ly a viable grassroots solution.
But these measures were both limited and far off.4x These shortcom-
ings, together with the soaring price of land and rent, a new wave of
urban migration, and the release of war refugees, therefore encouraged
the poor to focus on the alternative strategy of spontaneous settle-
ments through the occupation of urban land.
Taking over empty apartments and land around the cities represented
a key means by the poor to survive homelessness and the hardship of
urban housing. The actors also aimed at mastering their own physical
space and practicing their autonomy by liberating themselves from the
whims of landlords and government regulations. In this sense, the
squatter activities of the poor represent an extension of their dai ly
practice involving the constant struggles for the redistribution of
resources and the expansion of their autonomy.
But what facilitated such practices at this part icular juncture was,
apart from the urge for survival, a political space created by the revo-
lution. This political space opened up a new opportunity and granted
a new character to the squatters' practice, making it an exceptional
measure. The experiment of widespread home takeover was the first its
kind in Iran, and was not repeated in the postrevolutionary period.49
Unlike the occupation of hotels by students, home squatting by the
poor was not intended as an ideological challenge against private
property. While the students attempted to create a bigger squatter
movement by involving more participants, poor squatters were wary
of such measures. They preferred more silent, limited, small-scale
operations. They knew that at times of encroachment, visibility, soli-
darity and clamor, would be counterproductive. Some even attempted
to cur ta i l the extent of their activities. Yet when the chal lenging
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moment of eviction and thus defense of their gains arrived, the poor
did their best to extend their movement by advocating involvement,
participation, and solidarity.
Also, unlike the student takeovers, the squatter activities of the poor
were not meant as a deliberate protest action to force the state to solve
the housing problem. Their measure was the solution to that problem.
Whereas squatting for the students largely meant a deliberate political
action, for the poor it meant simply a living practice, a form of daily
resistance and struggle to survive and improve life, to redistribute col-
lective goods and win autonomy. Both groups, the students and the
urban poor, were involved in illegal acts. Whereas ideological bias jus-
tified the students' action, the notion of necessity warranted that of the
poor. As a squatter of the Nizamabad apartment blocks in South
Tehran firmly stated:
We are mustaz'af— mustaz'af in a real sense; otherwise we wouldn't
i n v a d e the apartments in such a manner . . . We have heen tenants for a
long t ime; have had enormous hardships; a miserable life. All of our con-
cern has been to feed our children, and pay rent, which in most cases,
we simply could not manage. Our children have never tasted any kind
of f ru i t throughout the year. After the str ikes that broke the Shah's
back—and ours as well!—our situation got worse; so that we could
hardly pay our rent, and make ends meet. So we had no choice but to
resort to squa t t ing these apartments.™
Indeed, the motives behind each group's actions influenced their
outcome a great deal. Many students relinquished the occupied hotels,
especially after the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, when they
reexamined their political motives and found their action politically
unsound. But the motive of the poor, the necessity to survive, made
them more determined to defend their gains. Their eviction proved to
be not so easy.
A squatter movement of this sort, if it occurred under nonrevolu-
tionary conditions and/or especially under a liberal democratic state,
might be seen as one which questions bourgeois legality and private
property/' The Iranian case was, however, quite different, since the
emergent political space created by the revolution and the initial sup-
port of the populist clergy justified to a considerable degree the squat-
ters' cause. The radicalism of the poor and that of the populist clergy
had a reinforcing effect upon each other.
Maldis t r ibut ion and the sheer shortage of urban housing were
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problems upon which the squatters had reflected, problems the gov-
ernment strove to address. However, with the government's inability to
resolve the housing problem (discussed later), together with an almost
total collapse in private investment in housing, the flooding of war
refugees, and the new waves of rural migrants, basic dwelling contin-
ued to remain a chief issue that galvanized the social activism of dis-
enfranchised groups.
Although the squatter movement made important gains by allocat-
ing homes among some poor families and by affecting public housing
policy, it faced its limitations before long. The time for organized and
radical direct actions had come to an end. Activist support for the
movement was curtailed by the advent of political repression. In addi-
tion, the short supply of usurpable homes and the subsequent legal
complications of takeovers made the option nonviable. In short, the
extraordinary conditions that had given rise to the birth of the move-
ment soon came to an end. The poor needed to adopt a sustainable
strategy to suit the subsequent period of political normalcy and stabil-
ity. They did so by returning to a strategy of ind iv idua l and silent
encroachment. Quiet squatting and illegal construction of thousands
of plots of land in the back streets of the urban centers and beyond was
seen as the most viable solution. The following chapter spells out the




I have talked to many residents of these shahraks (settlements]. Apart from many who
have come from other towns and villages, there are also those who come from differ-
ent [Tehran] neighborhoods. I myself was a tenant in a home [in Tehran]. . . . But real-
ized that I could not afford to pay the rent. Negotiations with the landlord went
nowhere . . . So one day a colleague of mine said to rue "Why don't you take a look at
the areas around Saveh Road." Well, I came here and settled. Now, I am happy that at
le.ist my f a m i l y lives under a roof.
—A squatter in Saveh Road in South Tehran'
Is is common among scholars to examine the politics of the poor in
terms of a set of simple dichotomies—conservative/radical, orientation
to individual resistance/collective action, and adherence to primordial
loyalties/civil associations.2 The narratives of this chapter demonstrate
the inadequacy of such dichotomies in uncovering the complex nature
of the poor's politics. The disenfranchised, indeed, combine and expe-
rience all of these seemingly contradictory positions. Change in the
political climate, the efficacy of tactics used, and their own ability to
mobilize account for major factors determining the variation in their
methods. Concern for the concrete and the immediate compels the
poor to adopt pragmatism; unlike the intellectual class, the disenfran-
chised cannot afford to be ideological.
In postrevolutionary Iran, the poor realized that radical, direct, col-
lective action (e.g., squatting in hotels and homes) belonged to an
exceptional conjuncture, and that the phase of political normality and
regime-stability required a movement with a new strategy—low-key,
nonprovocative, often individualistic, requiring patience, precision,
and perseverance.
Because squatting homes and hotels proved to be a nonviable solu-
tion, many poor turned to the alternative strategy of colonizing silently
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the territories outside the big cities, away from the watchful eyes of the
police, putting up shelters and setting up communities without much
regard to regulations or legality. This largely discreet direct action
allowed the disenfranchised to evade the burden of high rent and state
control by constructing communities at the marg ins of government
influence, where family, kinship, and local norms governed their daily
lives. To secure their status in the face of the state, economic hardship,
and social anomie, both traditional networks and modern associations
became an inseparable part of their communal l ife. While kinship and
ethnic identities cemented their collective existence with the informal
norms governing their dai ly lives, the modern associations (Neighbor-
hood Councils and Consumer Cooperatives) even in their restricted
forms strove to articulate spatial solidarity overriding ethnic and k in -
ship divisions.
Here I examine the dynamics of this alternative community con-
struction, spelling out conflicts of interest and perceptions between
these settlers and the authorities. The elements of conflict revolved
around three major areas: First, over the meaning of migration from
one place to another; second, over the d is t r ibu t ion of social goods
(e.g., public land, d r ink ing water, electricity, roads, schools, cl inics,
clean air, etc.); and third, the struggle over the extension of autonomy,
of cul tural and political space free of state control.
Usual Business
I ven at the height of the occupations of hotels and homes, the process
of illegal squatter settlement had never entirely stopped. I a r l i e r chap-
ters have described how during the revolution the needy (as well as
greedy developers) continued squatt ing on many plots of urban land,
erecting dwellings overnight. The process continued immediately after
the revolution, despite parallel home and hotel occupation. But both
the limited supply of vacant apartments suitable for occupation and
the attendant legal complications rendered squatter settlement as the
most viable immediate alternative to the housing crisis and excessive
state control. Thus hashiyemshmi and zaghehmshini, the construction
of illegal communit ies , c o n t i n u e d to increase, affecting even the
smaller towns.
Many large cities experienced gradual but extensive land invasions
and illegal construction. In Tehran the increase was more rapid. The
number of shanty dwellers, or zaghehnishman, began to climb quickly
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from the very first year of the revolution. The shanty settlements
(zagheh) of Zanjan-i Jonoubi Street increased by 140 percent; and
those of Soleimanieh, Resalat Highway, Zanjan-i Shomali Street, and
Tajrish almost doubled. In the meantime, new spontaneous communi-
ties emerged in Maidan-i Azadi, and in South Tehran.' Thus, the total
population of the gowdnishinan (inhabitants of gowds) and shanty
dwellers within the capital city reached some 100,000 households by
early 1980.
In 1980 the municipality formally enlarged the city limit from 225
square kilometers to 520 square kilometers, recognizing many infor-
mal communities on the margins of the city by extending urban ser-
vices. Despite this, figures show a sharp drop in Tehran's annual
growth rate from 5.2 percent in 1976 to 2.9 percent in 1986.4 The
decline was at the cost of extensive growth just outside the formal city
limits, on agricultural lands, nearby villages, in planned townships,
and informal communities. Thousands of urban poor acquired land,
legally or illegally, and constructed more durable homes with reason-
able materials such as mud or baked bricks. A large number created
permanent settlements. Large areas experienced spontaneous con-
struction around Shahr-i Rey, Varamin, Nizamabad, Shahrak-i
Mama/an, Shahrak-i Qiam, Kianshahr, Shadshahr, and Qarchak in the
southern plain of the capital city, and Khak-i Sefid in Tehran Pars.
From the west the city stretched as far as Karadj and its satellite towns
Rajai ishahr and Mehrshahr, encompassing numerous enlarged com-
munities such as Shahrak-i Quds (see maps i and 2). In 1990 the pop-
ulation of these townships reached some 1.2 million/As early as 1986,
23 of the settlements that had mushroomed around the capital quali-
fied for integration into the city bus service. These settlements had a
population of well over 460,000, six times their size in 1976.'
Perhaps for the first time, rural communities at the margin of the
city began extensively to house the urban poor. These new urbanized
villages provided cheaper land for home construction, lower density,
cheaper goods and services, and more autonomy from typical urban
regulations. Agricul ture was only a minor activity; the inhabitants,
mostly immigrants from other rural areas as well as from the inner city
areas of Tehran, were dependent on the economy of the urban center.
Population of these spontaneous communities grew nearly 17 percent
per year between 1976 and 1986, and i o percent between 1986-1991
(from 904,000 to 1,284,000);' at the same time Tehran's overall
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growth rate declined from 2.9 percent to i .4 percent as many poor and
middle-class Tehranies, as well as low-income families from other
cities, moved into marginal settlements and urbanized villages."
Islamshahr and Bagherabad are two such communities. Islamshahr,
Tehran's largest satellite community, where the capital's largest popu-
lar protest took place in April 1995, is located 18 kilometers southeast
of the city. Originally known as Shadshahr, it grew out of ten neigh-
boring villages with a population of 1,000 in 1966; by 1976 its popu-
lation had reached 50,000. Since the revolution it has grown an aver-
age of 18 to 13 percent annually, housing an estimated 300,000 to
500,000 people by 1990.9 Over 70 percent of them came from the cap-
ital city.'" Most of the inhabitants worked in the streets, workshops,
and factories in the vicinity.
Bagherabad with 15,000 inhabitants is located near Varamin, 10
kilometers south west of Tehran. The population of this shahrak con-
sists of poor migrants of various ethnicities including Kurds, Lours,
Azaris, Baluchis, Arabs, and Afghans, and some who came from the
slums of the capital." They spread out in a village that once housed
only eighty-seven peasant households. "Beginning in the early seven-
ties," remembered an elderly inhabitant of the old village,
the landlords sold their lands and deserted the village. With them gone,
the agriculture deteriorated, leading to the out-migrat ion of peasant
families. Then, the newcomers appeared little by little. As soon .is any-
one arrived in the village, he bought a plot of land, which at the time was
very cheap . . . put up a shelter, placed his wife and children in it, and
left for work in the city. Many worked .is laborers in Tehran. They
spread the news around [about the village); and their friends came and
joined them. And in this way, the vi l lage got larger. But these people
hardly did any a g r i c u l t u r a l work . . . Now if you move around Tehran
these days, you will find a new shahrak every few miles.12
Indeed, by the early 19905 new shahrak communities, including the
shantytowns and urban villages, numbered well over one hundred
within and around the Greater Tehran." In 1992 the mayor of Tehran
admitted bitterly that, "The land area of Tehran has rapidly expanded
from zoo square kilometers in the first year of the revolution to 600
square kilometers at present." He went on, "This rapid expansion has,
for the most part, been devoid of any order and legal procedures.
Much of the construction has been qacbaqui [illegal], carried out in the
middle of the night. Homes have been turned into shops and many
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buildings have been built on public thoroughfares and public
spaces."14 In 1994 some 674,000 low-income people were living in the
informal settlements around Tehran."
The capital was not alone in experiencing squatter colonization.
Hashiyenishim mushroomed also in the provincial cities and towns,
including Mashad, Tabriz, Bakhtaran, Arak, Hamadan, Isfahan,
Shira/, Bandar Abbas, Maragheh, and Ahwaz to name only a few."1 By
the end of the i 9808, in the holy city of Mashad in the far east, the size
of the hashiyenishinan had reached some 500,000 residing in squatter
settlements such as Kouy-e Aab-o-Bargh, Seyedi, Najaf i , Al-Mehdi,
Hemmatabad, and Kouy-e Tollab. This last was the site of three days
of riots m i 992, the country's biggest political event of that year. These
settlements outside the capital developed mainly after the revolution.
The squatters consisted of the rural migrants, Iran-Iraq war refugees,
Iranians expelled from Iraq, and Afghanis. Kouy-e Aab-o-Bargh was
built by the gradual colonization of the hillsides overlooking the city
by migrants fleeing from the nearby rural areas of Ghouchan, Dargaz,
and Torbat-i Haydariyeh. Altogether they managed to build some
2,000 homes under the high pressure electricity poles supplying
Mashah, not neglecting to take a share of that electricity.'
Between 1980 and 1983 the land area of the city of Bakhtaran grew
from a mere 6 square kilometers to about 80 square kilometers.18 In
1984 the mayors in the northern cities of Tabriz and Urumiyeh warned
about the threat of hashiyemshmi and illegal nighttime constructions,
call ing for measures to halt the trend.19 In short, as experts confirmed,
by the end of the 19805, "against our expectations, the hashiyemshmi
spread even to the small and medium-sized towns in the country."2
Why So Much Expansion?
Undoubtedly the Islamic government inherited a good portion of the
problem from the previous regime, but in the early years after the rev-
olution the situation deteriorated further. It was estimated that dur ing
the 19705, 200,000 new homes a year were needed to keep up with
demand/1 This number jumped to 300,000 dur ing the postrevolution
years." Yet the relative supply of housing declined sharply. In the first
years following the revolution, private investment in housing almost
totally collapsed. The total number of homes with permits bui l t in
1 9 X 2 ( ju s t over i 1,600 units) was only one-tenth of that in 1979
(some 160,000 homes)/1 To ameliorate the situation, the government
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aimed both to ensure renting vacant accommodations and to build
low-cost dwellings. Rent enforcement failed due to the landlords' non-
cooperation, even though the measure was supported by draconian
state control over land and housing transactions. On the other hand,
despite the much publicised policy of home construction for the poor,
and large sums of money at the disposal of the Housing Foundation
the results were less than impressive.24 By i98z the Foundation had
distributed not more than i z,ooo plots of land to low-income families
in Tehran at a time when, according to the Chief Justice, Ayatollah
Moussavi-Ardabili, some zoo,ooo "homeless families" were living in
the capital.2'
Rapid increase in the urban population played a key role in the
urban housing crisis. Between 1976 and 1986 the urban population
grew by about 72. percent, with an annual growth rate of 5.5 percent
(from i 5,715,000 to z6,991,000). Three main factors contributed to
this. First, the influx of 1.5 million Iran-Iraq war refugees, many of
whom were forced to live in makeshift housing and temporary tents in
the major urban areas. Second, by the mid-1980s an estimated z mil-
lion Afghan refugees had entered the country, many of them relocating
in big cities such as Mashad, Zahedan, and an estimated i zo,ooo to
300,000 in Tehran. Finally, rural-urban migration played the biggest
role. During the decade 1976 to 1986, over z,zz5,ooo rural people left
their homes to live and work in the cities—about 1.5 million to Greater
Tehran." The population of some cities, such as Bakhtaran, more than
doubled.
The early migrants rushed to the big cities expecting to harvest the
frui t of the revolution—free housing, jobs, or high income. Many
opportunist developers also joined the bandwagon of the mustaz'aftn
taking over urban land for rent or sale;27 these seemed insignificant,
however, compared to the needy. Thousands of villagers camped in the
big squares and thoroughfares of Tehran to get their share of the free
homes that radical clergy like Ayatollah Khosrowshahi had promised
to the mustaz'afin. Later migrants were pushed out of the rural areas
largely by economic necessity. The rhetoric of the new leaders with
regard to the high value of agriculture and rural development in an
Islamic Iran was rarely translated into practice. While the Jihad-i
Sazandegui (Construction Crusade) carried out many development
projects (in particular road construction and electricity supply),28 the
poor farmers' income from agriculture remained sluggish. In 1981 a
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rural household earned less than half—44 percent—of an urban fam-
ily." A survey by the Jihad-i Sazandegui in 1984 on migration in the
provinces of Hamadan and Isfahan showed that over 8 5 percent of the
poor migrants had left their villages because of low income, and inad-
equate water and land.'"
Hence scores of poor villagers, war refugees and displaced people,
against the wishes of their political leaders, chose to live in the cities to
utilize the available services and opportunities. However, just as before
the revolution, the high price of land and costly legal procedures—stip-
ulated in the city plans—continued to exclude not only these emigrants
but also many low-income urbanités from the formal housing market.
Even the formalized squatter communities, such as Islamshahr, began
to create their own informal settlements once city planning was put
into effect." Thus some poor families managed to purchase plots of
land outside the city limits where they built their shelters illegally;
some settled in nearby villages with secure land holdings and buildings
but lacking urban services. Many simply took over pieces of public and
legally obscure land, as far as possible out of public sight—behind a
hill , in a river bed, under big bridges, or out of town. Certainly the
poor utilized the existing political opportunity; yet they justified their
un lawful actions by the moral principle of necessity. While some
resorted to "land belongs to God," most reasoned forcefully that
"chare-ii neest," "there is no other way out." " In the end they shaped
new communities that in some ways differed from their prerevolution
counterparts. The massive and rapid dislocation of migrant families
with diverse origins marked the hybrid character of these communi-
ties: they contained more residents of urban origin, they were less com-
munal and traditional in their social relations and institutions and con-
tained a wider range of occupations.
Shaping the Communities
Having secured a dwelling, the most urgent need for the settlers was to
obtain water and electricity. Later on came sewerage systems, refuse
collection, clinics, schools, roads, and cultural activities. To ensure
these essentials, the poor utilized self-help initiatives to organize col-
lective campaigns, but when these efforts did not yield results, they
resorted to silent but direct action. Once the gains were assured in this
discreet fashion, the poor did everything they could collectively to
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defend them. As the disenfranchised laid further claims, they consoli-
dated their position and captured wider arenas of power.
In 1980 some 48,000 households remained without running water
and i 8,800 were without electricity in Tehran alone. By 1986 the num-
ber of families without running water in the urban areas of Tehran
Province was twice that of six years earlier. In the same year 538,000
families in other cities lacked piped water."
In the new squatter communities, electricity was either nonexistent
or had to be purchased from the small power generators that richer
dwellers installed in certain squatter communities to earn an income.'1
Drinking water had to be supplied either from outdoor fountains or
from ad hoc elevated reservoirs that residents had connected to their
homes through plastic hoses. Purchasing tanker water was also com-
mon; every day water tankers would drive into the heart of the slums,
where they were surrounded by women and children with buckets.
Both the inadequacy as well as the cost of water and electricity, how-
ever, became a heavy burden. In 1983, 17,000 inhabitants of a poor
community such as Shahrak-i Masoudieh in South Tehran, or that on
the north side of Ayatollah Kashani Boulevard, had to pay as much as
Ris i ,ooo-Rls i ,500 for a tank of portable water that was hardly suit-
able for dr inking." Some spent as much as Rls 2,000 a week for unpu-
rified water that "had caused kidney problems among the children."'
An alternative was local cooperation and self-help. Somt- commu-
nities got together to dig deep wells. This method, however, did not
always work due to the short supplies of equipment.'7 The infamous
squatter community of Zoorabad, 40 kilometers east of Tehran, was
one such community. Spread out on the h i l l s ides dominating the
migrant city of Karadj, the settlement housed about 56,000 inhabi-
tants in 1980.'" Purchasing water from water carriers cost them up to
ten times the cost of piped water to which only i 2. percent of the resi-
dents had access.'9 Digging deep wells and ins ta l l ing sewer pipes
proved extremely arduous. It was a tremendously hard job for women
to carry heavy buckets of water up the hills every day. The settlers,
therefore, turned to buying tank water and storing it in aab-anbaars,
underground water reservoirs constructed especially for this purpose
beneath their houses.40 The aab-anbaars, however, harbored many
sorts ot bacteria and diseases. As the benefits of self-help proved lim-
ited, residents turned to local government to demand proper urban
amenities.
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Many locals publicized their needs in the form of petitions and open
letters to the authorities in the daily papers. "Khaniabad-i Nou lacks
safe drinking water," wrote the settlers of the community in South
Tehran. "We are buying water from a well that a few profiteers dug
some twenty years ago. . . . The water is full of calcium materials and
salt. . . The shortage of clean water has caused problems for the peo-
ple in observing their religious duties.41 The inhabitants of Shahrak-i
Valiye'asr, in South Tehran, protested: "We are using underground
water which is unhygenic and causes disease . . . Now that this settle-
ment has [officially] become part of the city of Tehran, we expect the
honorable authorities to grant us a favor, the tnustaz'afin, by extend-
ing piped water to our community."42 The open letters covered all
aspects of local life, ranging from garbage collection (in Khaniabad-i
Nou), pavement of roads (in Afsariyeh)41, electricity, power-cuts (in
Afsariyeh)44 and food rationing. The people of Islamshahr complained:
"Rice has been distributed only once in the last three months; and no
eggs have been brought to the locality at all during the last five
months," demanding the authorities to "come and end this situation
here."4'
In the meantime people took to the streets in demonstrations and
sit-ins in front of government offices and municipalities to pressure the
authorities for results. In 1981 the women of Zoorabad, Karadj, fol-
lowing days of mobilization, forced city officials to extend the city's
refuse collection network to their communities.
In the first year of the revolution, the women had organized them-
selves in order to acquire running water for each house. They went to
the Water Board of the city and "refused to leave until they had been
promised piped running water to all households."4h Within two
months, piped water gushed into the alleyways of a large part of the
settlement. They had earlier campaigned, with the help of more edu-
cated women, to improve conditions in their local public bathhouse,
whose owner had confined its usage to men only on the grounds that
women would use a lot more water and take more time.47
Indeed the struggle for piped water in this settlement continued
until 1985, when the growing community needed even more running
water. That year the settlers managed to obtain the consent of the
municipality to extend the supply. Yet without waiting for the initia-
tive of the bureaucracy, they themselves began to dig ditches and lay
pipes. In doing so, they offended officials. In a bloody confrontation
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between the people and the Pasdaran, some settlers were arrested and
a number injured.4*
In 1984 in Arak, an industrial town in the central province, hun-
dreds of squatters from Zoorabad marched toward the town hall to
demand running water. Rattl ing metal containers, they chanted:
"water, water, we are thirsty." The protesters were forced to retreat
after the Pasdaran were sent to control the situation."" Women of
Mehdiyeh in South Tehran (in June 1985), Shahrak-i Fardis in Karadj
(in June 1984), and elsewhere began similar struggles in the hope of
developing their communities/" The residents of squatter areas in
Tehran-Karadj road demonstrated while chanting "na sharqui, na
gharbi; na aabt, na barqm" (neither Fast nor West; neither water, nor
electricity), sarcastically referring to a government policy that ignored
internal crises, such as urban problems, in favor of a senseless foreign
policy rhetoric that dogmatically rejected ties with both the East and
the West.
When noisy demonstrations proved insufficient, households began,
individually or collectively, to connect their homes to the main street
water pipe or to the electricity poles, at times by ingenious methods.
The people of the Husseini neighborhood, m the southwest of Tehran,
having attempted through the necessary formal channels to secure run-
n ing water, decided in June 1984 to take the matters into their own
hands. One night they secretly broke the main water pipe in the street
and connected their already prepared pipes. Although this brought the
arrest of six participants and a fine of Rls 300,000, they managed to
maintain the illegal flow of city water." In Khak-i Send, a settlement of
4,000 inhabitants, the squatters acquired electricity by do-it-yourself
tactics. "We requested so many times to the Min is t ry of Power to con-
nect us; but they didn't," stated a settler. "Now, because we really
needed electricity, the people cooperated with each other to br ing
power into the community."" Another zaghehntshin in Tehran had
similar story. "When I came to this place |in 1985], things were bad.
But then people collected money to pave the roads. We got electricity
from the power poles. And as for water, we ourselves installed pipes
from the main street water tap"; "but we are still waiting for a school
and gardens." In i 987 an extensive study of about fifty shanties with
some 8,000 t . imi l ies m seven districts of Tehran concluded that the
majority of these settlements utilized illegal running water and elec-
tricity, in some cases with the tacit agreement of the municipality/4
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At times the skills of young volunteers, mainly students and
activists, were also utilized for development, education, and health
purposes. Groups of young volunteers established libraries, tutorial
and literacy classes in neighborhoods." In 1980 the residents of the
Dowlatabad settlement brought illegal light to their community when
student activists hooked their homes to power lines that passed over
the settlement. With the new electricity came a communal place to
receive guests, a mosque, and a mobile clinic/6 Volunteer work in spe-
cialized fields was even more prevalent. Many popular neighborhoods
enjoyed the assistance of doctors, nurses, and engineering students. In
the squatter areas of South Tehran (e.g., Arab gowds), a number of
medical units were set up, where over a hundred patients were diag-
nosed daily for a meager RIs 30 (nearly U.S.$0.5) each. In this com-
munity some 1,000 medical files were organized/7 The spirit of volun-
tarism, however, tended to diminish among the middle-class activists
when revolutionary fervor began to subside and the police surveillance
kept many youths from such activities.
Unlike scattered zaghehs built before the revolution, I found a
number of squatter areas such as Khak-i Sefid or Islamshahr reason-
ably clean, green, and orderly, with wide paved streets and alleyways,
and sizable one-story homes whose residents collectively self-managed
the communities. In Khak-i Sefid, for instance, residents realized that
"the area did not have a plan and the streets were all irregular. So we
got an architect who did the job; and we helped to build the pave-
ments. . . . We built our own mosque where every two weeks people
go for rowze-khani."^
This appears to be the kind of community participation that many
in today Third World, including the right and the left, favor. The right
views self-help as reducing dependence on the state and its financial
burden; community participation, in this sense, is hoped to consolidate
the political system. For the left, community participation serves to
raise the social consciousness and living standards of the poor, eventu-
al ly producing social transformation. Based upon Latin American
experience, others conclude that community participation serves the
interests of the state better than it serves the poor." The Iranian pat-
tern deviated from the prevailing models, first because, in their strug-
gles the Iranian poor often combined institutional channels with direct
actions, legal with illegal methods. On the other hand, community par-
ticipation was understood not simply as self-cost self-help but as com-
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munal activism that incurred costs (in terms of property, profit, and
power) to the state and the rich—in short, others-cost self-help.
In the case of Iran, as the government confronted extensive illegal
land occupation and unpaid consumption of urban amenities, it felt
that it would be better off integrating parts of the settlements to ensure
both state control and compensation for the use of collective services.
As a result some squatter lands in South Tehran were placed under
awqaf, which, although it tolerated settlers, required them to pay some
annual rent. In this way, the authorities recognized and extended
urban services to a number of poor settlements.
The immediate problem, so far as the government was concerned,
was that over-consumption of water and electricity entailed lowering
water pressure and daily power cuts, thus causing widespread dissatis-
faction and protests.60 For the settlers, on the other hand, the policy
appeared to be a victory. Apart from securing the formal provision of
city amenities, off icial recognition also greatly reduced their tenure
insecurities. Yet the involvement of the authorities conflicted with the
desire for autonomy and for life without state interference.
Formalizing the settlements meant undergoing bureaucratic control
and taxation. Formal subscription to water, electricity, and refuse col-
lection meant that the poor were obliged to pay for these services, at
specific times. The issues of payment, timing, and procedures were no
longer negotiable. Although the poor had struggled to extend such ser-
vices to their illegal homes, they soon realized that they could not
afford to pay the bills and play bureaucratic games.61 Some poor fam-
ilies ended up having services suspended due to delays in payment (as
in District 16 in Tehran). Once again women made journeys to nearby
mosques and neighborhoods to wash dishes and clothes, and resorted
to oil lamps and burners instead of electrical power. The more persis-
tent inhabitants resorted to manipulat ing meters as their short-term
alternative.
In sum, to develop their communities, the poor utilized their own
initiatives and efforts. When the effects of self-help proved limited,
they pressed the government to assist them. When the authorities
resisted, the poor redistributed collective goods to their own advan-
tage—that is, they stole urban infrastructure. Once gains were assured
in this unlawful fashion, the poor collectively defended them, eventu-
ally forcing the state to recogni/.e the communities in exchange for
their integration into the formal structures. Thus the disenfranchised
BACK-STREET POLITICS 89
laid further claims, consolidated their position, and secured wider con-
cessions. In these attempts, creating local associations was particularly
significant, since in their genuine forms, the associations represented a
significant counterpoint to formal power.
Associational Life
In poor communities, association and networking served in the short
run as the necessary mechanism for mobilization and defense.
Although the encroachments of the poor were, by and large, quiet and
individual , there were issues concerning everyone that were beyond the
capacity of individual households. Dealing with floods, police raids,
paving roads, digging ditches, collecting garbage, setting local prices,
and other undertakings needed the cooperation of all settlement mem-
bers. In the long term autonomous life under a modern state also
required some kind of local affil iation and identity, which often
assumed an organizational expression. Performing common cultural
and religious rituals, resolving conflicts, and providing mutual assis-
tance were among the more salient examples. The associational life
was one of primordial and civil extra-kinship. Two associations par-
ticularly stood out in the poor neighborhoods—the Neighborhood
Councils (NCs), and the Local Consumer Cooperatives (LCCs).
The Neighborhood Councils
The Neighborhood Councils (NCs)(Shura-ye Mahallat), or Neighbor-
hood Committees (Komite-ye Mahallat) as some preferred to call
them, were loosely structured local bodies that were formed,
appointed, elected, or even self-designated in order to protect, regu-
late, and upgrade local communities. Their function ranged from
negotiating with the authorities for urban upgrading to resolving con-
flicts in the localities. The terms "committee" or "council" referred
interchangeably both to the appointed/elected executive body and to
the totality of the organization including the executive body, the con-
stituency, and finally its activities.
Along with the Factory Committees (Shura-ye Kargaran), Peasant
(Shura-ye Dehqanan), University (Shura-ye Daneshgah), and City
Councils (Shura-ye Shahr) (as in Kurdistan, for instance), and
Pasdaran Committees (Komite-ye Pasdaran) in the early days follow-
ing the insurrection, the NCs constituted the massive grassroots mobi-
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lization of the revolution. These organizations, along with other self-
help activities, gave an organized expression to popular mobilization;
they exemplified the social and civic (as opposed to purely political)
aspect of the revolution.
A whole range of NCs sprang up in various lower-class neighbor-
hoods. Some continued the activities of the Local Committees that had
emerged during the last phase of the revolution. Others were estab-
lished after the insurrection. Apart from the general mood of mobi-
lization during the postrevolutionary period, certain material reasons
also stimulated their emergence.
Confronting common crises such as flooding or earthquakes in the
localities often necessitated collective mobilization. The gowd com-
munities of South Tehran were the victims of frequent flooding due to
their location some 50 meters below ground level (some places had
150 stairs). Any ra infa l l , flood, or sewage system failure would
threaten almost every household. Only the cooperation and coordina-
tion of all of households was capable of countering such disasters.
Protecting alleyways from flood, securing personal belongings, and
diverting flood water from the community demanded highly collective
efforts. Although these crises and their consequent social impact were
periodic, they nevertheless implanted the seeds of a nascent yet durable
and structured form of cooperation.
Prior to the revolution, a number of neighborhoods in the gowds
formed informal local associations. They raised funds and managed to
construct stairways connecting the underground settlements to the sur-
face. They also succeeded in bringing communal water taps to their
alleyways, and installed electricity poles. Soon electric light i l l u m i -
nated the narrow passageways and before long found its way into
homes as well. The graveyards of the poor surrounding the area were
transformed into picnic places with greenery and trees.62
local mobilization aside, the competition of various poli t ical
groups over mobilizing the poor also contributed to the formation of
the NCs. The advocacy of the radical left and Mujahedin organization
for the idea of "councilism" certainly played a significant role. Their
sympathizers were involved directly in local mobilization, and their
emphasis on the idea of shura forced eventually the authorities to give
legal sanction to the idea.
One important figure who pursued shuraism quite vehemently was
a popular liberal clergyman, Ayatollah Taleghani, whose death in 1979
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brought the concept into public discourse. Radio, TV, and the print
media, not to mention public speeches, began to focus extensively on
the merits of shuraism, and on how this notion originated with Islam.
Hor the most part shuraism was conceived of as some degree of popu-
lar participation, but its extent and mechanism remained vague. Some
even went so far as to propose restructuring the country's political sys-
tem along the principle of shuraism. The left joined many others to
support Taleghani who had called in April 1979 for the constitution of
local associations as well as city and regional councils.61 Sympathetic
figures in the municipality followed suit and began implementing the
idea from above.
In the spring of 1980 the government of Isfahan, the second largest
city in Iran, took up the initiative. Within a few months some 70 per-
cent of the city was administered by the Neighborhood Committees.
NCs elected the mayor and administered their locales. But the policy
ceased to function in the summer of that year, when the budget allo-
cated by the Governorate was halted due to financial difficulties.*"*
The city of Tehran followed Isfahan. Conditions of the war with
Iraq had made the need for local administration and self-organi/.ation
more urgent. People needed to get mobilized, remain vigilant, organize
in self-defense committees, and participate in the local distribution of
basic resources such as food and medicine. The capital was divided
into twenty districts and 341 neighborhoods of 10,000 people. Each
constituency was to "appoint" five representatives from among "trust-
worthy," "pious" (ba-taqwa) and "enthusiastic" people, who then
needed to be approved by the imam of the local mosque. This restric-
tive selection of shura members shows that the Islamic state perceived
local organizations as an extension of itself.
The early enthusiasm and pretense of officials with regard to the
idea of councilism and decentralization was followed, before too long,
by the monopoly of power and paternalistic and selective mobili/ation
of progovernment individuals. Councils were incorporated into the
Islamic Constitution, but they were not properly convened. It was a
concession to Taleghani and the left, but once he died and the left was
crushed, the promise was forgotten."" Despite the state's attempt to
control local initiatives, people in certain neighborhoods managed,
with the cooperation of the volunteers, to establish genuine local coun-
ci ls . The gowds of South Tehran, for instance, developed a highly
active shura, which came to be known as the Shura-ye Aalt-ye Eskan-
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/' Gowdmshtnan (Council for the Resettlement of the Gowd People) or
in short, the Council of Resettlement (CR).
The Council of Resettlement
In the early days of the spring of 1980 a group of young volunteers
came to the gowd settlements to offer their help in improving the con-
ditions of l i f e in these neighhorhoods. A few weeks later, on April 4,
1980, an election was held, with the support of the radical mayor of
Tehran, Muhammad Tavassoli, to form the Council of the gowdnishi-
nan. Fifteen out of sixteen gowd settlements took part in the elections,
each sending three delegates to form the central council of the gowd-
nishinan. A combination of two representatives from the central coun-
cil, two from the municipality, and one from the local Pasdaran
Committee established the Shura-ye Aali-e Gowd, the supreme
Council of the Gowds."
Most of the elected representatives were local leaders who were fac-
tory workers in nearby industries such as SAKA on Tehran Karadj
Road. Although the CR aimed, in the short term, to improve the con-
ditions of l i fe in the gowds, its prime concern revolved around the
resettlement of the 46,000 residents into more decent housing.67
With the help of the council and the cooperation of the central
municipality, the settlers, in particular the youth, established a clinic, a
husseinieh (an ad hoc mosque), several libraries, and a soccer field.
Fishaaris (street fountains) were erected; sewage ditches (jouys) were
dug, and the roads of fourteen settlements were fu l ly paved.6"
The council also set up mobile medical teams and clinics in the
streets of South Tehran, providing general medical services and vacci-
nation for infants.6 ' ' Some cultural activities and sports facilities for
youths were housed in the already occupied buildings of the previous
regime,7" while the morally deviant elements in the community, e.g.,
gamblers and drug dealers, were identified and isolated.
The outbreak of war with Iraq in September 1980, and the ensuing
threat of air raids broke new ground for the activities of the CR and
the local poor. The CR and the Mujahedin Organization in the gowds
called for the creation of Local Resistance Groups (LRG) to respond
to the wartime emergency situation. They were to l ink their activities
with the local people through instructions on wall posters, pamphle-
teering, and assemblies in the local mosques. Although not entirely
successful, some LRGs were formed in South Tehran with the partici-
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pation of the youth. They identified local resources, especially medical
services and basic needs, for emergency purposes, formed vigilante
teams, engaged in military training, put up wall posters with informa-
tion and war news, and provided instructions regarding security and
self-defense.71 A young volunteer described some of the functions of
the l.RGs in Yakhchiabad squatter settlement:
Initially, we began talking to our local fuel-distribution branches about
the problem of tin- fuel shortage, and suggested implementing a
rationing system. They accepted the suggestion. We then t.ilked to the
people about the plan and they received it warmly and offered their
cooperation. To implement the plan, we divided our neighborhood,
which is quite large, into smaller zones. Then, we took a census of the
households wi th in each zone. With the cooperation of Basij
[Mobilization Ci roups | brothers, we planned to issue rationing cards to
each household, so that they could get their shares on the assigned days.
This aimed to prevent long queues and hoarding. We now plan to ask
the people to provide us wi th some help so tha t we can bring each house-
hold's share of fuel to their door steps. . . . About other basic food stuff,
we have already prepared things l i k e grain, eggs, nee, sugar, tea, and
washing powder, which we s u p p l y to the people without making any
profit. However, we're planning to ration these items as well in the
future.72
Despite these activities, the CR considered its most important func-
tion to be relocating the gowd residents. Some significant steps were
taken. The CR was able to compensate the owners of over five hun-
dred run-down homes so that they could settle in other areas; it also
managed to rehouse another six hundred households in already occu-
pied apartments. ' Some families needing immediate assistance were
taken to emergency headquarters unt i l permanent housing was avail-
able.74 The CR also combined its policy of negotiations with the
authorities with a more militant tactic of local mobilization. When
necessary, the CR staged street demonstrations so that local people
could make their demands to the authorities more forcefully.7'
The activities of the CR came to an end after a year and a half, in
the midst of growing political r ivalry and intolerance. At the beginning
it seemed that all the different local groupings—the Komitehs, the
Mujahedin , the leftists and the municipality—cooperated with one
another on local issues. However, political and ideological differences
soon surfaced, and alliances gave way to sectarianism both at the
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national and local levels. The Pasdaran Komitehs, which originally
emerged as a voluntary civic organization consisting of youths with
different political orientations, soon became a vestige of the ruling
Islamic Republican Party. In early summer 1979, the Komitehs were
"cleansed" of those who refused to follow the IRP line. In Tehran
alone, some 40,000 to 50,000 members of about i ,500 Komitehs were
sent home.76 Many others had already left after becoming disen-
chanted with the monopolistic policies of their leaders. The Komitehs
then began a sustained campaign against the growing power of leftists
and the Mujahedin.
Thus the CR became the target of mounting pressure on the part of
the local Pasdaran Komiteh, which by now had become a parallel
power in the community. Organized thugs supported by the local
Revolutionary Guards attacked the headquarters of the CR; the
Komiteh organized mass meetings to discredit the CR; and rumors
spread accusing its members of bribery. Finally, material support to the
council was suspended from both the municipality and, of course, the
Komitehs. Not being able to cope with such a mounting pressure, all
members of the CR jointly resigned on May 14, 1980 as a gesture of
protest. A few months later the publication of Faryad-i Gowdnishin, a
weekly journal of the Mujahedin, devoted to the gowd community,
was suspended by the government. With this, the activities of one
autonomous local organization came to an end.
Beyond political pressure, internal problems also weakened the CR.
Political organizations lent their support to localities not so much to
promote people's welfare as to cu l t iva te political support. For the
Mujahedin, for example, the "Local Resistance Cells not only play an
effective role, in the short run, in alleviating war damages, but in the
long run serve people's mobilization against imperialism."77 On the
other hand, the elitist nature of such activism made residents rely
excessively on outside organizations, whose infighting ultimately
undermined local mobilization. Finally, the council was far from gen-
uinely democratic institution; activists had only begun to experience
participatory democracy. To make a comparison, in postrevolutionary
Portugal, for instance, the neighborhood commission was an elected
body. Although activists spearheaded local organizations, ordinary
people were extensively involved in decision-making. Local power lay
in weekly general assemblies, with the votes cast by raising hands.7* In
Iran formal polls were uncommon and lines of power and responsibil-
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ities unclear. As regular, general meetings were rare, rumors more than
correct information reflected local politics, in turn, fueling sectarian
conflict and rivalry. Ordinary people only began to experience modern
participatory democracy in these turbulent times when the state insti-
tuted its own brand.
Working Within the System
Like the Council of Resettlement, many of the independent shuras
were dismantled and their members were purged. With the state-spon-
sored "new elections" more proregime members were put in charge,
and in many ways the neighborhood councils turned into an extension
of the ruling IRP. The poor had to adjust to the new phase of increas-
ing political restriction and the absence of opposition groups. They
needed to work within and against the official apparatuses. Patient
and persevering, the poor struggled to gain from these paternalistic
institutions as much as they could by exploiting the pm-mustaz'afin
discourse of the government to exert pressure on local authorities.
As autonomous and grassroots institutions were gradually disman-
tled due to political pressure and their own shortcomings, the alterna-
tive government-sponsored organizations, Mosque Associations
(shura-ye masajid) and Islamic Neighborhood Councils (INCs),
rapidly filled the vacuum. They began to serve with more zeal and
commitment, partially in order to demonstrate the efficacy of the alter-
native arrangements. The local Pasdaran Komitcs first took the initia-
tive, involving proregime local individuals who then centered their
activities in the local mosques. These local councils became increas-
ingly active after the outbreak of the war with Iraq, when local popu-
lar mobilization became a necessity. Thus the Mosque Associations
were engaged in mobilizing the local population for the war effort, dis-
tributing scarce goods such as domestic appliances, and settling dis-
putes. They were also charged with supervising and monitoring the
rationing system involving local shops. The members of these associa-
tions, in the meantime, also acted as neighborhood watchdogs for the
ruling IRP.
Hundreds of such associations functioned throughout the urban
areas during the eight-year war. Their main strength derived from their
official status, which enabled them to utilize government resources and
political support. They cooperated with the Governorate of Tehran
(Farmandari) to control the flow of rural migrants to the city, by con-
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trolling the issuance of ration cards within the localities.^ In
Mahdavi-Kani called upon the Mosque Associations to "furnish the
ground for the stability of the Islamic Republic.""
The weaknesses of the INCs, however, remained more acute.
Corruption, inefficiency in the distribution of the basic needs, bureau-
cratic incompetence, and overlapping functions with other agencies
(such as Komiteh-ye lmdad-i Imam), tarnished their image before their
constituencies.1" Yet, given the condit ions of war, scarcity, and govern-
ment intolerance of autonomous association, the situation at the local
level would probably have been worse without the Mosque Associa-
tions. With the war at a stalemate, and with the gradual relaxation of
pressure on the distribution system, the conjunctural role of the asso-
ciations began to subside. By the time the war was moving toward a
resolution, the Mosque Associations were essentially withering away.
Controlled by local elites, their function in the postwar period was rel-
egated largely to ad hoc ceremonial activities.82
The Local Consumer Cooperatives
On May Z4, 1980, a group of angry housewives from a lower-class
neighborhood, (iorgan Street, forcefully closed down the fruit market
of the Maidan-i Somaiyeh and the nearby stores. The women's
repeated complaints to both local shopkeepers and the authorities over
the high prices of food had been ignored. When one woman protested
to a fruit-seller about his high prices, others rallied behind her, express-
ing their frustration and anger. A street demonstration of local people
soon followed, as housewives proceeded to close down the market
place, one shop after the other, by yanking down the metal gates (kerk-
ereh) of each store. The police reported that the angry women wanted
to set the market on fire but were persuaded to disperse only by an
immediate repricing of the goods. The shops remained closed for the
entire day.*1
Like housing, food constituted a special commodity, one that the
poor viewed in moral terms. When the satisfaction of these basic needs
was lef t to the whims of the market alone, the poor resisted and
attempted to subvert the market both by direct action, as evidenced by
the angry housewives, and by institutional means, e.g., the consumer
cooperatives.
Through Local Consumer Cooperatives (l.CCs), poor urbanités
attempted to secure easy access to inexpensive consumer goods by
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removing greedy middle men. Earlier attempts to set up consumer
cooperatives had occurred during the few weeks before the insurrec-
tion (see p. 5z). After an initial decline immediately after the revolu-
tion, LCCs resurfaced throughout lower-class and poor districts after
the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. By December 1979 the constitution
recognized cooperatives as one of the three main economic sectors. In
1981 some 60 LCCs were set up in the lower-class neighborhoods of
Tehran. By 1985, 600,000 Tehranies cooperated in 530 LCCs with a
total capital of Rls 4,000 million. These cooperatives, along with those
in the provincial cities, were placed under the supervision of the
Central Organization of the Cooperatives, a government agency.84
In general, the people themselves ran the cooperatives. In the more
independent experiences, a number of individuals, the "constituent
group," set up ad hoc cooperatives, inviting local people to purchase
shares. The members subsequently elected executive committees (EC)
and dissolved the constituent groups. The ECs then assumed the
responsibility of managing the LCC in terms of purchasing, distribu-
tion, and book-keeping. A group of observers (bazresan) were respon-
sible for monitoring the operation.81 Middlemen were eliminated and
the profit motive, when it existed, was only to cover the cost of hiring
full-time administrators.86
Most of the LCCs, however, were dominated by local elites, the
religious, community, and economically well-to-do leaders." For
these leaders the LCCs served more as their personal properties, at
best functioning as typical charities and at worst as a source of local
prestige and access to the high officials. Instead of cooperation, a
spirit of paternalism prevailed. During the revolution ideas of soli-
darity and selflessness constituted the spirit of voluntarism. After the
revolution principles of efficiency and profit- motive eventually
replaced ideals of cooperation. As a result, some cooperatives, ended
their activities.8*
Yet the LCCs did contribute to the poor's access to basic commodi-
ties in the difficult times of the scarcity of consumer goods, war-time
economic conditions, and high-priced black market goods. In addition
to subsidizing basic goods and implementing a rationing system, the
government contributed to the LCCs by allocating 10 percent of the
total domestic production and imported goods directly to the LCCs to
be distributed among members, with fixed prices and without profits.
Moreover, the LCCs furnished a vehicle through which common peo-
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pie were activated socially and were directed onto a path of institution-
building.
Nevertheless, when insti tutional channels such as LCCs were
nonexistent or proved to be ineffective, the common people did not
hesitate to take matters directly into the streets. Early plans to remove
subsidies on bus fares provoked riots in Tehran and Mashad. Indeed,
the postwar economic liberalization under President Rafsanjani wit-
nessed widespread unrest on the part of the urban poor in the early
199os (see below). The latest of these riots in April 1995 in Islamshar,
a South Tehran squatter settlement, left at least one dead, do/ens
injured, and hundreds arrested. This three-day street protest was
sparked by some two hundred youths who demanded better supplies
of fresh water, as well as a decrease in the bus fare. It rapidly grew into
a demonstration of 50,000 poor people protesting against price rises
for public transport and fuel. The police used tear gas from helicopter
units to disperse the crowd who attacked government buildings,
banks, department stores, gas stations, and buses.1" As elsewhere, poor
housewives were major actors in the street politics that involved food
prices and shortages.
In contrast to occasional food riots and collective actions (e.g., the
housewives of Maidan-i Somaiyeh and the Islamshahr riots), public
nagging was employed as an everyday form of protest by ordinary peo-
ple. It involved people collectively voicing their complaints without the
fear of persecution in public places—in taxis, buses, bakery queues,
grocery shops, and so on—in the form of loud conversations about
state policies inc lud ing prices, rents, war, shortages, and the l ike.
Public nagging represented an effective mechanism for expressing the
public opinion of ordinary men and women; it became an epidemic
and irrepressible source of dissent.9"
Squatters and the State
In brief, squatters' struggles took place in three main arenas: First,
resistance to existing hardship and aspiring to a better life. These were
manifested in physical movement and migration and entailed a pro-
found demographic change in the country. Second, struggles around
the redistribution of public goods, including land and urban collective
consumption. And third, attempts to extend autonomy from the state,
relying on local norms instead of state legislatures, traditional and
accessible institutions instead of modern official arrangements. These
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struggles, when cumulative, positioned the poor as a counter-hege-
monic force against officialdom, as each practice captured an arena of
control from the state and encroached on its power. These three areas
accounted for the most important sites of contestation between the
state and the marginal poor. Without intending to, the mustaz'afin had
become an enemy of the Islamic state. How did the Islamic state, as the
government of the poor, respond to these struggles?
The earlier official responses to squatters' actions were character-
ized by competition, confusion, and contradiction. Whereas prior to
the Islamic revolution the poor had remained virtually unnoticed (see
chapter z), after the revolution their mobilization became the subject
of competition among over twenty official and unofficial groups and
organizations working within poor neighborhoods.
The ruling clergy, seeking a reliable social base, made the mus-
taz'afin the champions of struggle for Islam and the Islamic revolution.
Within this broad category, urban marginals, or koukhmshtnan (liter-
ally hut-dwellers, the destitutes), acquired a central position. "This
Islamic revolution is indebted to the efforts of this class, the class of
shanty dwellers," declared Ayatollah Khomeini. "These South
Tehranies, these footbearers, as we call them, they are our masters
\i>ali-ne'mat\ . . . They were the ones who brought us to where we
are."1" To the dismay of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, Khomeini
declared only a few days after the revolution that "everyone must have
access to land, this divine endowment," that "no one must remain
without a dwelling in this country," and that water and electricity
should be supplied free of charge to the poor."" Bazargan, like
President Bani Sadr and Muhammad Tavassoli, the mayor of Tehran,
feared that such statements would unleash uncontrollable migration
and urban disorder. They called instead for rural development and
improvements in agriculture, although they also favored the selective
upgrading of existing poor neighborhoods. In 1980 the Revolutionary
Council discussed, without results, ways to repatriate to the country-
side some shanty dwellers, l ike the inhabitants of the gowd in South
Tehran.
In the meantime, as I have already discussed, the Office of Housing
tor the Dispossessed led by Hassan Karrubi and the Housing
Foundation of Ayatollah Khosrowshahi, opted for radical confiscation
and allocation of homes and land for the homeless. The major leftist
groups supported these measures. The Pasdaran opposed the confisca-
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tions, advocating the upgrading of poor communities instead. Yet they
prevented volunteer groups, in particular Leftist and Mujahedin orga-
nizations, from undertaking similar activities there.9'
This rivalry in practice and opinions had significant implications for
the housing sector and the status of squatters. First, it offered new
opportunities for the mobilization of the poor by encouraging them to
make demands and further legitimizing their direct action. On the
other hand, a profound policy confusion with regard to housing and
land prevailed, rendering the systematic handling of homelessness and
poverty impossible. Troubles eased slightly only when, in June 1980,
Hassan Karrubi's Office was abolished and Ayatollah Khosrowshahi
was sent off to be the ambassador in the Vatican.M
With the fa l l of the housing radicals, the government brought some
legal and administrative order to the sector; its most important single
step was the promulgation of the Urban Land Law whereby the
Revolutionary Council nationalized and thus controlled mawaat
(unused) land and later baayer (previously used) lands in urban areas.95
Nevertheless, the government never formulated a consistent policy
with regard to housing the poor. Even the new thinking, which advo-
cated the elimination of government responsibility by leaving the hous-
ing of the poor to themselves and to their "savings," remained up in
the air.96 Indeed, throughout the 1980$ the prevailing policy combined
five strategies: selective housing provisions, halting rural-urban migra-
tion, integrating the informais, demolishing unlawful homes, and de
facto tolerance.
Selective Provisions
The Housing Foundation continued to function with the aim of pro-
viding housing for the poor. In 1980, upon the invitation of the
Foundation, more than 800,000 people sent in applications for land or
housing. The foundation claimed to grant about roo,ooo plots of land
and 1,500 homes, most of them in rural areas.97 Yet following the Iran-
Iraq war, the bulk of the foundation's activities were directed to war
reconstruction, and its function was limited to promoting self-help
housing through interest-free loans and the provision of materials and
technical assistance.9" In addition to the Housing Foundation, the
municipalities in the large cities cleared a number of slums, relocating
their residents to more decent dwellings, or offered them aid and loans
to build their own homes. The squatters of Khaniabad in South Tehran
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were to be relocated in about 1,000 two-bedroom, yz-square-meter
flats the government planned to construct,1" converting the settlement
to public parks and recreational facilities. Some of the communities,
such as the notorious gowd settlements in South Tehran, have had
symbolic significance for officials as the embodiment of istiz'af
(poverty and misery), and thus were incompatible with the self-image
of the Islamic Republic as the government of the dispossessed.
Halting Migration, "This Social Catastrophe"
Yet the continuous flow of rural poor to the cities in search of a better
life diluted the effects of such piecemeal measures. While the regime
seemed to have succeeded in reducing the overall fertility rate,100 city-
ward migration remained a major problem. By 1983 Iran had more
people in cities (52..5 percent) than in the countryside. Despite the
shortcomings, squatters were evidently happier in the city and were
not prepared to return to the country.""
Whereas the poor viewed migration as a means to a better life, for
the authorities it represented a "social catastrophe,""2 "the most
important problem beside the war,""" and "a major threat to the rev-
olution and the Islamic Republic.""4 This was because the population
flow was altering the urban order by bringing about communities,
social groups, and social practices upon which the central authority
would have little practical control.
By 1983 when the cityward migration was accelerating, officials
frantically sought a solution. In February of that year, the mayor of
Tehran, Habibi, pleaded with Ayatollah Khomeini to declare a "state
of emergency" terming the migration one of the most crucial political
concerns of the day. The state media subsequently began a campaign
against the population drift; Friday prayer leaders were mobilized to
discuss the vices of moving to cities and numerous seminars were orga-
nized to address this "major social problem."
The dominant discourse denounced migration as a social pathology
that was infecting the whole of urban life. It was responsible for "land
speculation," "unemployment," "parasitic occupations," "drug deal-
ing," "disease," and urban unrest, and was also "destroying] social
and Islamic values." I IS In their turn, migrants were portrayed as the
victims of this disorder. Hamshahri, the Tehran municipality daily,
unknowingly invoked the spirit of Simmel, Park, and Wirth when it
described rural migrants as "those who wander aimlessly around in
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the quicksand of the city . . . these victims of ignorance, naivete, and
propaganda—they live a particular sort of life; they represent the men
on the margin." 1 'h The anxiety over squatter expansion also perplexed
the community of experts: the rural poor were shaking their epistemo-
logical order. These experts viewed migration as "a phenomenon
which is transforming the destiny of the cities, presenting itself as an
urhan and political challenge."1 r The roots of the disorder were to he
found primarily in the "wrong policies of the past regime," notahly in
the Land Reform program.'"" At times the problem was even attributed
to "a calculated plot by our enemies who lure the villagers into the
cities."""
The migrant poor were not aloof from this discourse. Their reaction
was bitter; as some squatters put it:
It is ridiculous that they [the government] are treating us, the tnus-
taz'afin, l ike this, slandering us. They write [in newspapers] that we
keep the water taps r u n n i n g , that we waste water. But then we don't
even have running water! Or that we keep our gates open until very late
at night, or that our hoys refuse going to mil i tary service; whereas my
own son is in the service! As a matter of fact, this community is being
protected by our own hast] boys; the municipality has done nothing tor
the security of this plate. . . . Is this divine and I s l a m i c government not
supposed to protect us, the koukhnishtn, the hashtyenishin, the
weak?""
Beyond the ideological campaign, the state also devised some con-
crete measures to stop the population drift. The Mosque Associations
were instructed to deny food ration cards to migrant families. The gov-
ernment also attempted to restrict the purchase of homes or land by
the migrants in cities by controlling all relevant transactions.1" These
legislative measures had little impact, however, precisely because of the
informal and autonomous way in which the poor tend to operate and
subsist. "These migrants simply need not and do not apply for any per-
mits; as a matter of fact, they do not deal with us at all," the housing
minister acknowledged."2
In the long run the government aimed to improve agriculture and
rural communities as necessary measures to deter cityward migration.
The Construction Crusade achieved considerable success in rural elec-
trification and the construction of roads, which in practice facilitated
traveling to cities. Nevertheless, urban bias remained the practical pol-
icy of the Islamic government despite its ruralist discourse."'
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Formalizing the Informais
Given these conditions, few options remained available to the govern-
ment. One was to formalize or integrate the illegal communities into
the state structure by recognizing their status and incorporating them
in urban collective consumption. This strategy would not only ensure
popular support and state control of the poor, it would also make res-
idents pay for the services that they would otherwise tap informally.
For the poor, informality served both as a means of coping and of
livelihood, and as an end in itself. In the settlements the poor evaded
the institutions of the state and governed their own lives, tacitly reject-
ing bureaucracy, taxation, the discipline of time, and the regulation of
space. For instance, over 80 percent of Islamshar inhabitants did not
see any role for the municipality in regulating their community."4 And
in the surrounding settlements, over half of the people avoided the
state bureaucracy."s Instead, extending kinship through intercommu-
nal marriages served to expand cooperation and mutual responsibility.
"One of the advantages of living here" said a resident of Aliabad,
Khazaneh, "is that I am next to my village fellows \hamshahri]. And
since my work requires me to travel a lot, I always feel relieved that my
family is secure among them."'"' Others felt happy that "everyone is
related in here, and they help each other out."1
The poor contested the dominant spatial policies and perceptions.
They built their dwellings according to their own needs, taste, and
resources (e.g., raising domestic animals), avoiding police control con-
cerning how to appear or assemble in public, and when to pay bills and
return loans. For instance, when relocated to the apartments of the
Shahrak-i Shoush, squatters of the gowd settlements built courtyards
around their apartments by making the alleyways private domain and
erecting a wall or fence around the apartments. A number of them
returned to their old squatter dwellings. Some of the settlers of Pol-i
Mudiriyat and Halabshahr of Tehran Pars, who had been given homes
in new apartments, eventually moved and settled in other squatter set-
tlements."* The relocation project of Kouy-e Nohom-i Aban in South
Tehran before the revolution had a similar problem. Many squatters
who had been relocated into the government housing either sold or
rented out those homes and moved hack into shacks. In Bandar Abbas,
the i,5OO-unit government housing turned after a while into a sponta-
neous settlement primarily because such government housing patterns
did not meet the needs of the poor.'"
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Yet integrating these communities was crucial for the Islamic state.
The populist regime could hardly tolerate diversity, let alone auton-
omy. It was adamant about molding an obedient Islamic umma—a
concept totally in contrast with that of the squatter settlements, which
some officials viewed as bastions of lawlessness, deviance, and poten-
tial dissent. Some marginal neighborhoods in Tehran were granted
official recognition when the government was forced to change the
administrative boundaries of the city. Yet integration was not so sim-
ple, since it could foster further migration; it would also require mas-
sive infrastructural facilities, as well as a reorganization of the cities.
Furthermore, as the experience of Islamshahr in Tehran shows, any
practice of integration with which the subjects could not afford to
cope, sows the seeds of new marginality. In the early 19908 the settlers
of Islamshahr campaigned for the official recognition of their commu-
nity. Once that was achieved, however, new marginal communities
sprang up around the settlement in Akbarabad and Soltanabad
through the illegal construction of agricultural and awqaf lands.120 It
was partly these constraints that would push the authorities to resort
to forced eviction and demolition of unlawful dwellings.
Demolishing Communities
Squatters suffered intermittent attacks by the security forces through-
out the jySos and the early 19905. The intensity and frequency of
assaults shifted depending on national political conditions, the policies
of part icular mayors, and the reaction of the squatters. The earlier
(1979-1984) demolitions seemed haphazard and unsystematic, with
the Pasdaran mainly in charge of urban order. The pressure on the
squatters increased after the summer of 1981, following a widespread
government crackdown on the opposition. From 1984 on, demol i t ion
work became more systematic. In July 1984 the Tehran municipality
built a 3<x>-man task force composed of the army and municipality
agents, who patrolled the streets to catch violations before they actu-
ally occurred. The task force was made up of seventy-six units who
covered mainly the peripheral areas of South and Northwest Tehran
around the clock in three separate shifts.121 By September 1985 the task
force had increased to 1,000 men.1 '"'
Numerous communities were attacked throughout the 19805, often
by paramilitary gendarmes escorted by trucks and bulldozers. The ear-
liest reported attempts in Tehran included those in Dashtak, Shahrak-
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i Mamazan, Shahrak-i Qiam, Shahrak-i Karoun, Shahrak-i Kianshahr,
Qal'eh Hasankhan, Shadshahr, Nizamabad, a community in Varamin
road, all in the south, and Khak-i Sefid in the east of the city. Squatters
i n provincial cities such as Mashad, Arak, Tabriz, Isfahan, Bakhtaran,
Kradj, Khoramabad, Ardabil, and others did not remain immune from
eviction attempts. While selected homes were destroyed, settlements
were under constant surveillance by the vigilant Pasdaran and special
task forces, who drove around in military jeeps to make sure that no
new shacks were put up and that none of the existing ones were con-
solidated.
The total number of homes and business places destroyed is
unknown. But a report quoting the municipali ty of Tehran suggested
that during summer 1992 alone, some 2,000 unlawful homes and busi-
ness places were torn down.12'
In an earlier well-known incident in Khak-i Sefid, in Tehran Pars,
east of the capital city, where illegal housing grew rapidly after the rev-
olution, some i ,000 Pasdars and army soldiers encircled the settlement
from the north on January i i , 1980, intending to level the community
once and for all. At 4 A.M. they halted traffic in the area; the operation
began at 7 A.M. By the end of the day, thirty homes had been destroyed
and more than forty people detained. "The day after when I went
there, the scattered debris pointed to what had happened," recalled an
eyewitness and activist. "It was clear that people had not slept through
the night. They had anticipated the assault. Women with sleepy eyes
were busy taking their belongings out of rubble, while swearing at the
regime, especially the municipality and the Pasdaran."1 "It was also
obvious that the security forces had been unable to destroy them all;
people had resisted."'
Resistance against the destruction of squatter areas was confirmed
repeatedly by the authorities.12'' The Pasdaran's routine warnings and
deadlines were missed, renewed, and invariably ignored. Corruption
among government agents made things even harder. "A few years ago
| 1990], the municipality sent its agents to evict us from here. They
came, got some money, and left."1 7 The intermittent offensives often
entailed bloody confrontations and street unrest. On many occasions
the assaults were offset by women and children refusing to leave their
dwellings, and by others laying themselves down in front of the bull-
dozers. In the Khak-i Sefid incident, once the security forces withdrew,
the inhabi tan ts staged a demonstration, chanting, "We buil t homes
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with our blood, and they destroy them so easily." They marched on to
convey their anger at the local municipality office. The day after, when
the municipal i ty trucks returned to collect the debris, the residents
attacked them, inf l ict ing heavy damages. A new march was orga-
nized,bringing some four hundred people to the municipality office
once again. The demonstrators staged a sit-in and demanded that they
be compensated for the damages to their homes. Three members of the
Neighborhood Council began negotiating with the authorities, agree-
ing on a plan to identify the opportunist developers from the "real
homeless" who deserved to keep their homes.'2*
Noisy resistance of this sort made the government try different tac-
tics, including buying off certain residents and divide-and-rule tac-
tics—as is evident in the case of Shahrak-i Kianshahr. The govern-
ment's attempt to evict over seven hundred households in this shahrak
failed, despite the destruction of some one hundred homes in March
1990.'" When its compensation offer was collectively rejected by the
squatters, the municipality divided the latter by persuading a group of
them (who worked for the municipal i ty) to accept the offer. It then
began to put pressure on the rest to comply, while threatening to cut
off water and electricity and destroy shacks. By December 1992. it suc-
ceeded in evicting about 80 percent of the squatters in exchange for a
payment of Rls i,5oo,ooo-Rls 2,500,000 to each household."" The
squatters of Pol-i Mudiriyat, in Tehran, however, rejected a similar
deal in 1987, arguing that the compensation offered was not sufficient
to purchase new homes. But to offset police provocation, they con-
sciously prevented newcomers from joining the settlement.1"
The prevalent spirit immediately after the revolution contributed to
the militancy of the squatters in defending their gains. The urban riots
some ten years later demonstrate the continuing collective passion
with which the squatter poor defended their communities. During
1991 and 199X5 five major incidents of unrest took place in Tehran,
Shiraz, Mashad, Arak, and Khoramabad, in addition to frequent
minor clashes in many urban centers. In August 1991 the squatters of
Bagherabad, a district in South Tehran, rioted against the municipality
agents who had begun demolishing their i l legal shacks. The protesters
threw stones at police and set the government cars on fire."2 The
Shiraz riots came less than one year later in March 1992, when some
three hundred disabled war veterans staged street protests against the
mismanagement of funds at the state-run Foundat ion of the
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Dispossessed. They were immediately joined by squatters protesting
their forced eviction from their illegally built homes. The protesters
went on a rampage of looting, burning city buses, banks, and police
stations. During this one-day riot, two protesters and six police were
killed, many injured, and three hundred arrested; four were subse-
quently executed by the government."'
More widespread riots occurred in the industrial city of Arak, 2.40
kilometers southwest of Tehran, which lasted for two days and
resulted in "hundreds" of arrests and detentions. The riots broke out
in May 1992. when a dump truck being chased by a municipality
pickup hit and killed a young boy. "Neighbors stopped the truck and
set fire to the municipality pickup." The following day "up to 3,000
people marched on the city center chanting 'down with the mayor,' set-
ting fire to several bank branches and three municipality buildings."1
The city remained under martial law for several days.
The most dramatic of these events took place in Mashad, a holy city
of three million people close to the Afghanistan border. Mashad's dis-
turbances on May 30, 1992., began in a squatter area, Kouy-e Tollab,
where the municipality had refused to grant construction permits to
the illegally built dwellings. When local representatives returned home
from the municipality office where they had made their requests, they
encountered bands of demolit ion squads and security forces with
trucks and bulldozers who had come to destroy the unlicensed homes.
Many inhabitants resisted by assaulting the officers, others by refusing
to leave their dwellings. A temporary lul l in the skirmishes ended when
the local children returned from their schools. The crowd grew larger,
and in the ensuing clashes with the security forces, two young boys
were shot and killed. The indignant rioters then "went on an orgy of
looting and arson, burning the city hall, the main library, several police
stations." "By the evening the city was in the hands of the rioters, with
the police and Islamic guards standing back and letting the crowd get
on with it."1 "The army could not quieten the city, so the government
sent in units of basij (voluntary milit ia)" in the hope that they could
calm the crowd."6 Among the crowd were eight masked gunmen who
led the looting and attacks on the government buildings." In the end
the riot left over one hundred buildings and stores destroyed and
thirty-five cars burnt, with an estimated total damage of Rls 10 bil-
lion."* Over three hundred people were arrested,"1* six police officers
were killed, and 4 rioters were hanged. Government officials blamed
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the "religious hard-liners ousted from the parliament," "foreigners,"
"opportunists," and the Mujahedin for the unrest.14" While it is likely
that some professional activists took part in the incident, it seems evi-
dent that squatter discontent lay at the core of the unrest.
Following each attack, things seemed to go back to normality before
long. In the Khak-i Sefid settlement, "soon after the departure of the
demolition agents, people began to rebuild their homes once again . . .
Women helped their husbands in rebuilding their dwellings . . . And I
pursued my work on a self-help plumbing project to bring running
water to the community."1
Despite the intensity of these riots, they were not extraordinary
political events. Rather, they were the logical corollary to the politics
of the squatter poor in their everyday lives, which maintained no line
separating struggle from life; they represented the vocal facet of the
sik-nt movement of the poor, in the backstreets of the urban periph-
eries, in pursuit of a better life.
Given the resistance of the poor, it seems that the limited available
options made a de facto tolerance of the informal communities an
undeclared state policy, leaving the task of deterrence to "nature"— a
recent method employed by the municipality of Tehran is the foresta-
tion of vacant land around the city as a way to halt the creeping
advance of the squatters. This measure represents the quiet response of
the state to the quiet encroachment of the homeless. Indeed this policy,
along with forceful eviction and economic exclusion, has to a large
extent succeeded. During the late 19805 and early 19905 Tehran expe-
rienced outmigration. However, the people driven from one spot are
likely to end up settling in different, usually more distant places. Not
surprisingly, informal communities, as we saw earlier, spread at an
unprecedented rate not within the big cities but just outside their
administrative boundaries, by turning hundreds of the nearby villages
into low-income urban settlements.14^ The silent movement of the poor
in the backstreets of their insecure communities is likely to continue.
But if and when the captured gains are threatened, the silent movement
of the backstreets is likely to turn into open and audible street action.
Six
Workless Revolutionaries: The Movement
of the Unemployed
The victory of the 1979 revolution resulted in a sudden and "unprece-
dented high level" of urban unemployment in Iran.' Hundreds of com-
panies, businesses, and factories suspended their work. The owners
and managers of these ventures, foreign and Iranian alike, had left the
country months before the insurrections of February lo-n, 1979.
Those who remained in the country shut down their enterprises in the
midst of chaos, waiting to see what economic policy the new revolu-
tionary government would pursue. Labor strikes, which escalated after
October 1978, had almost crippled industry, large-scale services, and
the government offices. Hardest hit was the construction sector, which
resulted in hundreds of projects being abandoned mid-way. Cranes
and tools stood idle on the lots of half-finished building complexes,
and worksites remained deserted. In the end thousands of laborers
who had withdrawn their labor for the victory of the revolution found
themselves without jobs on its morrow.
To these was added a new army of unemployed: those working in
ideologically unfit occupations. Western-type restaurants, cafeterias,
cabarets, liquor stores, red-light district theaters, and brothels were all
closed down, not only because they were incompatible with the Islamic
Revolution but also because they were considered symbols of the deçà-
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dence of the ancien régime. In Tehran alone, an estimated 3,000
employees of such establishments lost their jobs.2 The lottery ticket
company was shut down entirely, laying off 2.00,000 low-income street
ticket sellers. The entry of about 150,000 high school graduates,
diplomehs, gradually added a new weight to the army of the jobless.
Thus in the very first year of the revolution, some 1.5 million Iranians,
2.1 percent of the workforce, were out of work.' About 55 percent of
the jobless, according to an official survey of Tehran unemployed,
were laid off owing to closures; 10 percent were casual laborers who
left their jobs because of low income and hardship; the rest were
migrants and school graduates who sought work for the first time.4 In
short, between 1.5 to 2. million people lost their work within the few
months of revolutionary events.
The preceding two chapters have focused on the politics of the
everyday life of ordinary people in their sphere of living space. In this
chapter, I shift my attention to the domain of work. Here, I show how
the ordinary unemployed utilized the revolutionary situation by resort-
ing to collective action to demand jobs and maintenance. They set the
ground for the birth of a movement of the unemployed in postrevolu-
tionary Iran.
The jobless were not a heterogeneous group. While factory workers
and high school graduates played the leading role in the movement, the
articulation of differing interests and discontent at the extraordinary
conditions, brought many poor unemployed, casual laborers, and
rural migrants into an audible and collective street politics.
In developing countries an unemployed movement that struggles for
jobs and protection is extremely rare, despite high rates of visible and
invisible joblessness. Family, kinship, patron-client relationships, and
especially the informal sector provide essential mechanisms of protec-
tion and survival; in addition, the lack of organization prevents sus-
tained protest movements from developing.' In this chapter, I argue
that what distinguished the Iranian case was a conjunctural articula-
tion of resources and political opportunity that underlay the move-
ment. The resources included the creation, after the revolution, of a
massive and sudden loss of work, along with a revolutionary ideology
among the jobless. The simultaneous sudden decline in the standard of
living and damping of expectations generated a moral outrage. The
movement was perceived as the continuation of a broader revolution-
ary struggle. Expectations among the poor and the unemployed had
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been raised dramatically; in addition, the intense competition of the
ruling clergy and the left opposition to gain the support of the poor
further heightened expectations. This ideological dimension served as
the engine to the massive body of the jobless, who utilized both the
existing relative political freedom and the skills of mobilization they
had learned during the revolution.
The Onset
Some three months prior to the victory of the revolution, over 13,000
seasonal or "project" workers in the city of Abadan, a large oil port
city in the south, were made redundant when their companies ceased
operations. The workers had lost their jobs but they considered their
situation of joblessness insignificant compared to the revolutionary
struggles around them. Even those who had maintained their jobs were
on strike. Yet for these workers the extraordinary days of unity and
sacrifice were coming to an end. The revolution was entering into a
new stage where groups and personalities began revealing their true
colors. The factionalism and struggle for power among the new lead-
ers was growing as the clerical leadership started exhibiting its intoler-
ance of dissenting political voices.
As the days passed, these workers began thinking about their pre-
carious present and uncertain future. During the unsteady premiership
of Shahpour Bakhtiar, the last prime minister appointed by the Shah,
a small number of these workers gathered frequently in local teahouses
to discuss their plight and decide on a course of action to take. Out of
these and subsequent meetings emerged the Syndicate of the
Unemployed Project Workers of Abadan (SUPWA). This marked the
onset of collective actions taken by the unemployed. Within five
months campaigns successfully secured jobs and unemployment bene-
fits." Several demonstrations, all confronted by the Pasdaran, were
organized to secure these objectives. Two months later, on April 13,
1979, as social struggles intensified, some four hundred laborers
resorted to a sit-in in the syndicate headquarters, threatening to go on
a hunger strike.7
An unemployed protest movement was well underway in several big
cities including Tehran, Isfahan, Tabriz, Ghazvin, Gachsaran, as well
as in the province of Kurdistan. In the capital city several laid-off and
expelled worker groups (kargaran-i bikaar-shudeh) had initially been
mobilized by the leftist organizations. Before long they came together
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to form a loosely knit Organization of Unemployed and Seasonal
Workers, which included laborers made redundant in manufacturing,
construction, and other industries.
Campaigns in Tehran
On March i, 1979, a group of laid-off workers gathered in the
Ministry of Labor to publicize their plight. The labor minister, Dariush
Foruhar, a liberal follower of Mosaddeq, spoke. Disappointed with his
response, and due to their small number, the workers ended their
protest action by reading a resolution calling for job creation, a meet-
ing place for a syndicate organization, a forty-hour work week, and
unemployment benefits. The group returned soon, better prepared and
with over z,ooo members. Over the next two weeks they visited the
ministry more than five times. In the subsequent meetings two further
demands were made: that their organization be recognized, and that
the national radio and TV broadcast their grievances." Facing mount-
ing pressure in its first few weeks in office, the Ministry of Labor
decided to establish an "unemployed loan fund."
The plan envisioned granting loans of Rls 7,500 to Rls 9,000
(U.S.$i io-U.S.$i3o) per month for a maximum of six months.
Workers between the age of twenty-five and sixty years who had paid
social security for at least one year, would be eligible,* effectively
excluding casual laborers and recent high school graduates. In the
debate that followed, the unemployed turned down this concession,
demanding that age and contribution to social security requirements
be removed. They further insisted that the payments be based on fam-
ily size and that the program be implemented and supervised by unem-
ployed representatives. Most important, they called for the idea of
"loans" (vaam-i bikaan) to be changed to "benefits" (baqq-i bikaari).
In the meeting, a laid-off employee of Tehran bus services, Sherkat-i
Vahid, echoed the concern of those who considered the loan concept
to be a sell-out for the working-class struggle as a whole:
We are representing all of the suffering Iranian workers. Our demand is
not an individual demand. Unfortunately, it was announced today that
everybody gets one thousand tumans1" and leaves . . . Is it really fair to
spoil the spirit of workers' struggle with these few pennies?. . . How can
they call themselves "workers," those whose character is not worth
more than one-thousand tumans? . . . One hundred thousand were
killed [for the revolution], and still we cannot get what we want?"
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A representative of the unemployed offered his support in rejecting
the plan. Addressing the laborers he said:
You are the source of our power. We will act according to your deci-
sions. I am glad that the group, with a complete awareness, declared its
criticisms and hatred on accepting the offer. By this decision, we proved
that we are not just concerned about our stomach . . . It is your con-
sciousness that must rule. It is your faith, belief, and consciousness that
give us power.12
The issue of loans versus benefits became the fundamental source
of confrontation between the unemployed and the Provisional
Government. Undoubtedly, the left played an instrumental role in
articulating and radicalizing the workers' demands. As people who
had supported and endured hardships during the revolution, this
group of unemployed considered it their right to make demands on
the new leadership. That their movement was influenced by the left
held no bearing on their conviction that their demands were legiti-
mate.
The Provisional Government, however, considered their demands
unacceptable. For the Prime Minister, Mehdi Bazargan, this was con-
nected to Communist currents to undermine his government, espe-
cially after the left had characterized the government as "liberal" and
"precapitalist."" Moreover, the government did not want to bear the
huge burden of permanently feeding the unemployed.14 The Labor
Minister insisted that the term "loan" could not be changed. "I do not
want," he stated to the workers' representatives on March n, 1979,
"to give the impression that this is a grant without a repayment.
Workers' honor is above all this. I want this plan to be understood
merely as a loan."'s Consequently, following a meeting on March 17,
over 3,000 jobless laborers began a sit-in in the labor ministry com-
pound. When nothing came out of subsequent negotiations with the
ministry, some 700 participants went on a hunger strike in the late
afternoon in a state of frustration and anguish.16 To mobilize support
from other citizens, they issued a statement three days later, which was
distributed in Tehran:
We are the unemployed workers who have staged a sit-in in the Ministry
of Labor. Since the authorities have not responded to our demands, we
have been on a hunger strike since March 1 7 ( 1 A.M.), and are prepared
to continue our strike to the point of our death, unless our grievances
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are considered. We request our laboring brothers to distribute this note,
and publicize our situation among the working people, so that they can
all join us. As we write, at the end, |the authorities] have come to us
shooting their guns.17
Immediately after the hunger strike started, the Labor Minister met
with the workers' representatives at i A.M. After negotiating for one
hour, there was still no agreement. According to a strikers' spokesper-
son, the minister had insisted on the loan issue—a point that was unac-
ceptable to the strikers."1 A further attempt was made to appease the
strikers, this time by a clergyman who tried to utilize his religious
authority. His appeals, however, were to no avail, and the sit-in carried
on.lv On the first night, hizhullahis (proregime street thugs) marched
on the ministry to attack the strikers.
Outside the compound leftist students joined groups of unemployed
to express their support of the strikers, despite repeated clashes with
the proregime thugs.2" Inside, however, the mood surrounding the pro-
testers was one of frustration and determination to fight on. Workers
felt as if they had been betrayed and cheated by the new politicians
whom they had trusted. They felt a kind of moral outrage that their
leaders had violated a tacit social contract that had evolved in the
course of the revolution. They expected respect as well as material
rewards. They felt they had gotten neither.21 One of the women strik-
ers, Zahra Dorostkar, angrily echoed this feeling publicly at the com-
pound:
I want to know why the radio and TV do not broadcast our grievances,
so that people can understand how much we suffer, and appreciate how
little (the authorities] are offer ing us. If they broadcast this, the people
will no longer be misinformed |by the government] who pretend that
they are giving us our rights. We have gathered here, and have gone on
hunger strike, because we want unemployment benefits (haqq-i bikaari).
We don't ask for charity. If there are jobs, we are prepared to work.
Otherwise, our living expenses must be secured. We all shouted that we
wanted Mr. Khomeini ; we supported the religious leaders. Now we
expect them to tackle our problems. I have two children; my husband
has worked for the last six months, but has not been paid; they say, "We
don't have any money"! And I myself used to work in the Vitana [bis-
c u i t t . iL to ry in Tehran]. I was forced to resign because they did not
accept my children in their nursery. Now, |the Labor Ministry] tell us
"take one thousand tuman\ for the t ime being"! 1 have not paid my rent
for the last six months; we hardly have any food at home; my children
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are without clothes . . . What can I do with this one thousand tumans?
So, I am telling you, I will not leave this place unless they consider my
life situation. '
While the hunger strike was underway, negotiations with the
authorities continued. The strike leaders had sensed that the
Provisional Government was not prepared to back down. Some pro-
government elements had begun to spread seeds of division. The loan
offer undoubtedly fed into the division between the political and non-
political laborers. Adding to this, sustaining a hunger strike against a
government that had just come out of a victorious revolution was not
easy. On New Year's Day, March 21, 1979, the Pasdaran broke into
the compound, attacking the strikers and terrorizing them by continu-
ously shooting in the air.21 A number of hunger strikers passed out and
were taken to hospitals; others were given glucose.24 The strike leaders
softened their positions and eventually accepted the loan principle.
The remaining differences revolved only around the provisions of the
loan. A compromise was finally reached on March 22, 1979. Accord-
ing to the agreement, each unemployed person was to be granted a
monthly payment of Rls 9,ooo-Rls 12,000, with an advance payment
of some Rls 10,000. The conditionally of the payment was substan-
t ia l ly modified. In addition, the unemployed succeeded in having
Khane-ye Kargar (House of Labor) recognized as their organizational
headquarters in Tehran.2'
The Escalation of Collective Actions
The government hoped that the compromise would bring an end to the
protests of the unemployed. Peace, however, never came in the lifetime
of the Provisional Government. Both the government and the unem-
ployed knew that loans were not a solution to the misery of jobless-
ness. The government made the concession primarily to pacify the job-
less crowd. Privately it assumed that the workers would not pay back
the loans but hoped that the measure would defuse their protests.
Similarly, the unemployed and their left-wing leaders did not consider
the payment as a loan but as a mere piecemeal monetary gain. In addi-
tion, the Tehran agreement had left a large number of casual laborers
and recent high school graduates out of its provisions.26 The agreement
ended the hunger strike in Tehran but failed to halt the protest actions
of the unemployed in general. The campaign would go on.
116 WORK1ESS REVOLUTIONARIES
The following three months saw an escalation in the protest move-
ment of the jobless in different parts of the country. In some regions
the organizations of the jobless flatly rejected the Tehran compromise;
others, notwithstanding their desire to obtain the loan, continued their
protests. In the meantime the migrant poor and the school leavers not
covered by the loan became even more aggressive.
Thus, less than two weeks after the initial agreement, on April i ,
1979, more than 3,000 jobless held an open meeting in Labor House,
the outdoor loudspeakers carrying the debates into the streets. The
meeting condemned the loan plan once again and resolved to continue
the campaign. An unemployed speaker angrily echoed the mood of the
crowd:
Swear by my conscience I would have never accepted the promise of the
[labor] minister; would have never agreed to be on TV even to the point
of death, if I had sensed that [ending our hunger s t r ike] would lead to
this hopeless situation. I would rather die than face this situation. . . .
We don't want a free ride, don't want charity. Give us work."2
The crowd subsequently staged a sit-in within the Ministry of
Justice for five days. It ended only when the liberal Justice Minister,
Asadullahi, promised to take the issue to the cabinet. He also facili-
tated the unemployed's publicization of their grievances on national
radio and TV.28
The Syndicate of the Unemployed Project Workers of Abadan
focused its campaigns on consolidating its position and struggling to
dislodge the rival Union of Workers and High-School Graduates that
had been created by the local authorities to undermine the SUPWA. At
the same time it continued negotiating with local and national officials
to win concessions from the government. Some three weeks after the
Tehran agreement, in the same region, the Unemployed Workers of
Ahwaz and the Vicinity rejected the Labor Ministry's plan and
demanded "unemployment benefits" instead.29
In the southeastern city of Khorram Abad, only a few days after the
Tehran agreement, hundreds of jobless laborers took over the head-
quarters of the Governorate demanding jobs, an unemployment fund,
and a headquarters for their assemblies. The protesters were attacked
by progovernment forces, especially the Pasdaran of Komite-ye Imam,
violently assaulted, and fired upon.'"The unemployed in the industrial
city of Ghazvin began their collective action by electing representatives
to negotiate with city authorities. Demoralised by the response of the
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authorities, who had asked them to "wait for two months," they went
on protest marches and later organized gatherings in local mosques to
discuss their strategy."
In the northwestern Azari city of Tabriz, on March 2.8, hundreds of
unemployed and laid-off workers staged a sit-in of several days on the
premises of the Workers' Club/2 Another group marched on Tabriz's
radio and television station to force the authorities to publicize their
grievances. Some two weeks earlier the jobless had already been mobi-
lized by left-wing activists and had voiced their grievances in a number
of gatherings. One of the meetings issued a resolution calling for an
immediate return to work, the creation of an unemployed benefit fund,
and the assignment of a permanent headquarters." Similar sit-ins and
protest marches took place in Shahr-i Kord and Sari during April and
May.'4
In each city such protest actions would often be prolonged primarily
because the authorities would either reject the demands or delay their
responses to them. The violent reaction of the security forces resulted in
further escalation of protests. The Union of the Unemployed Workers
of Isfahan and Vicinity (UUWIV) established in March 1979, had also
rejected the minister's loan provisions and made a number of other
demands, giving the officials two weeks to respond. When a favorable
response did not come, some 7,000 unemployed and their sympathiz-
ers staged a protest demonstration on March 2.6, 1979. They carried
slogans that read "The burden of the revolution was on the toilers, but
the outcome has gone to others." The banners called for the govern-
ment recognize the Council of the Unemployed Workers and their right
to assemble." The demonstrators were blocked by the Pasdaran and
hizkullahis who were carrying clubs and knives. The governor rebuffed
the demonstrators and Pasdaran arrested a number of organizers. In an
effort to put further pressure on the authorities, another protest march
of some 10,000 marchers gathered in front of Isfahan's House of Labor
less than two weeks later to demand direct talks with the governor. The
talks produced no tangible result, and the marching continued. A
rumor was spread accusing the demonstrators of intending to attack the
police station. In the violent confrontations with the security forces that
followed, one demonstrator, Naser Tawfiqian, was killed, eight others
injured, and nearly three hundred detained.""
These collective protests were not always in vain; at times desirable
outcomes followed. In the Kurdish towns, for example, where the left
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and Kurdish nationalist organizations enjoyed mass support, the
protests were more fierce and more successful. In the capital city of the
Kurdistan Province, Mahabad, the employees of the power and water
supply who had been laid off during the revolution managed to regain
their jobs following a bitter struggle. The Fedaii Organization appears
to have played a crucial part in this success and began appeals to job-
less in other areas.'7 In another town, Sanandaj, following intense
negotiations with various authorities of the city, some temporary mea-
sures were taken to assist the jobless who numbered nearly 7,000,
including the immediate employment of 500, payment of benefits to
those laid off, and loans for others until they found reemployment.38
Toward the end of May 1979 the unemployed of Kermanshah were
mobilized by young socialist activists. Recent high school graduates,
the unemployed poor, some parents' groups, and other sympathizers
joined together in street demonstrations and sit-ins. They organized
some of the largest protest marches in the city, with the participants in
one demonstration reaching 5,000.'''
In one incident in May the demonstrators intended to launch a sit-
in in the Governorate headquarters. Despite opposition from the
guards, the demonstrators broke the gate and seized the building for a
few hours. This forced the governor, who had already fled the build-
ing, to return and listen to the crowd. The protesters agreed to end
their sit-in only when the governor assured them that he would seri-
ously consider their demands. Before long, joint planning by the gov-
ernor and the Union of the Unemployed, an elected body, resulted in
the reopening of a house-building factory, which was able to employ
some one hundred people. The plan also included jobs for another
group of the unemployed at Kashmir Factory. The remaining jobless
were to be compensated between Rls 7,ooo-Rls 15,000 per month
until they found work.4"
Although the unemployed were mobilized in almost every town
where some workers had been laid off, the movement remained dis-
persed and isolated for the most part, but the protest actions of the
unemployed culminated in a massive show of unity and force on May
Day 1979. Some 500,000 people marched in the streets of Tehran, and
many more in other provincial cities. The rally, organized by the
Coordinating Council of May Day, a committee composed of various
socialist and labor organizations, was the biggest independent gather-
ing of lower-class people in years. Groups of men and women, parents
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and children marched hand-in-hand through the city's main streets
chanting slogans. May Day was a show of the strength of the working
class, but even more so of the left. It was their forces who had been
mobilized in such a massive numbers. Young male activists held hands
along both edges of the march, creating a human chain in order to pro-
tect the demonstrators from the occasional assaults of organized
thugs—the informal groupings under the protection of this or that
powerful mullah. A number of state organizations, such as Sepah-i
Pasdaran, Jihad-t Sazandegui (the Construction Crusade), and the
Islamic Republican Party, also made statements on May Day; some
took part in the marches. However, they focused more on the "danger
of Communism," the "agents of the U.S." (referring to socialist
activists), and Wahdat-i Kalameh, or the unity of the Islamic ummah,
and less on specific labor issues.41
The unemployed made up a substantial portion of the demonstra-
tors. The slogans reflected the strategy of the organizers: "The struggle
of the unemployed is not separate from that of the employed work-
ers." The march ended with the reading of a resolution praising
Ayatollah Khomeini and calling for, among other things, the national-
ization of industry and banking, changes in the labor law, and the
expulsion of foreign experts.42
The Variety of Street Protests
As would be expected, jobs constituted the major concern of the job-
less. During the first five months after the revolution, eighty-six major
worker collective actions protested lock-outs and layoffs, and cam-
paigned for their return to work. This made up the largest proportion
(some 2.0 percent) of the industrial actions waged by the working peo-
ple.4' Yet the variety of demands reflected the strategy of the leadership
of the unemployed movement to relate the struggle for jobs to other
political and social concerns of the working class. Socialist leaders
drew attention to such well-known demands as the forty-hour work
week, better working conditions, equal pay for men and women, and
the right to strike. It is not clear if the possible implications of the
demands were well thought out or if they were made simply in order
to radicalize the movement. Certainly the insistence in almost every
campaign on having a headquarters pointed to the urgency of organi-
zational work among the actors. Some of the demands (such as the
expulsion of foreign experts) contradicted the central concern of sav-
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ing jobs; the withdrawal of foreign companies was partly responsible
for many closures and layoffs.
The protest actions mainly assumed the form of demonstrations,
sit-ins, and issuing resolutions. The demonstrations focused on voicing
the plight of the jobless both to fellow citizens and to the authorities.
Some groups forced the local radio and TV stations to publicize their
grievances. Demonstrations were also staged as a method of practicing
collective action and protest. But in the postrevolutionary conditions,
when street marching had become a common practice, the immediate
impact was less than satisfactory. Sit-ins (tahassun and ishghal), or
temporari ly occupying public premises and causing disruptions,
became the most prevalent method of bringing pressure to bear. The
buildings of the Labor Ministry, local labor offices, the governorates,
and the Ministry of Justice served as the major targets. At times the sit-
ins were combined with hunger strikes, which resulted in some imme-
diate gains.
Although tahassun seems to have a long historical tradition in Iran,
it is unlikely that the practices of the unemployed drew on this history.
In the traditional form, bast-nishini, the actors seek refuge in holy
places, such as shrines or mosques, in an attempt to seek forgiveness,
wage a protest, or pursue justice. The act represents a defensive cry for
clemency and justice, normally by one suffering under arbitrary rule.44
Thus those who had committed a crime would seek refuge in a shrine
where they would be immune so long as they remained in asylum.
The connotations of contemporary actions are essentially different.
The unemployed referred to their acts not by the traditional term,
"bast-nishini" but in the terms "tahassun" (s i t- in) and "ishghal"
(occupation, squatting). For the unemployed, the terms had a different
meaning. They signified a form of collective action through which the
actors seek either publicity for a cause or, more often, a method of dis-
ruption to bring publ ic pressure to bear on the authorities.45
Nevertheless, some symbolic elements of the traditional idea remain.
For instance, the unemployed did organi/.e sit-ins in such places as the
headquarters of Workers' Syndicates or House of Labor, which were
not intended to disrupt. Similarly, staging a sit-in in front of the
Ministry of Justice signified a cry for justice in a more traditional sense.
In spite of the large number of sit-ins, there is no evidence of such
direct actions as mob looting or rent riots. In Iran such actions histor-
ically result from a sudden drop in income and a lack of alternative
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sources for survival. Rapid, massive, and unexpected unemployment
may produce such phenomena in any country, as evidenced during the
Depression in the US.4* In Iran, though, as in most developing coun-
tries, people are better prepared to adopt survival strategies in a rela-
tively short time. Kinship, friendship, patronage, and especially infor-
mal economic activities offer the most handy mechanisms. In Iran
those who had already been unemployed were equipped with coping
techniques, and those who were laid off could partially rely on the sup-
port of their kin members while searching for another job.
Although it was quite limited, the unemployed also launched a
fundraising campaign. The contributions came largely from working
people who had not lost their work. Significantly, the bazaar, a major
source of funds during the revolution responded negatively.47
Unemployment loans, however meager, provided immediate relief. So
long as the jobless believed they could gain ground through collective
resistance, they refrained from limiting themselves to individualistic-
acts and survival strategies. And so long as the unemployed poor
lacked any institutional setting in which they could exercise direct
action, such as workplace occupation, they needed to resort to collec-
tive protest. This interest in collective activity, encouraged by the left-
ist groups, paved the way for some degree of associational activities
among the jobless.
Getting Organized
The struggle of the jobless was somewhat chaotic. For one thing, the
unemployed did not constitute a homogenous group. They originated
from different backgrounds, which gave them different capacities for
mobilization and collective action. As I have already pointed out,
three main groups made up the jobless population: laid-off and
expelled workers, recent graduates, and already jobless and casual
laborers. No organizational link between them was conceivable. Laid-
off workers had largely worked in the factories or on construction
sites. Whereas a common workplace gave this group some basis for
communication, the other two groups were generally atomized and
dispersed, lacking even a common physical space. Within these cate-
gories, individuals met each other accidentally and only for a short
while. Leaders of the groups were often chosen spontaneously without
much deliberation or competition. At times excitement outweighed
rational decisions and calculated actions. As one participant com-
122 W O R K L E S S REVOLUTIONARIES
mented, "We had not decided to occupy the Labor Ministry; it just
happened. We were only demonstrating in the streets; chanting slo-
gans; people got very excited, and all of a sudden we found ourselves
jumping over the fences."4
Nevertheless, some degree of organization and coordination could
be observed. Two factors played a key part in this: simple necessity,
and the role of mobilizers.
Organizational Necessity
Before all else, before demonstrations and sit-ins, and instead of loot-
ing or noting, the unemployed relied on the disposition of the new
authorities. They in i t i a l ly preferred to negotiate. This required that
representatives be appointed (as in the cities of Ghazvin, Tehran,
Isfahan, Tabriz, and Kermanshah). If negotiations did not bring a
result, they made sure to maintain some kind of communication and
network in order to continue their campaign. To achieve this, they
needed first a place to assemble and then recognition of their repre-
sentatives by the authorities. Such recognition, they believed, would
serve to protect them from the arbitrary assaults of the Pasdaran and
others. These formal groupings of the unemployed workers were given
different labels depending on the perception of the leaders. Among the
most common names were shura (council), sandika (syndicate), and
kaanun (center).
Some groups went beyond merely appointing representatives,
attempting instead to give a more durable structure to their organiza-
tions. In Isfahan, when the jobless realized that securing jobs was not
as easy as they had in i t i a l ly thought, they began to consolidate their
organization by involving the unemployed workers of the entire city
and its environs in the Union of the Unemployed Workers of Isfahan
and the Vicinity. In Tehran, when the in i t ia l negotiations with the
Ministry of Labor failed, jobless leaders gathered (on March 5) in the
House of Labor to begin plans for a more structured organization.
This was followed by the formation of a Steering Committee of
Casual/Seasonal Workers and (on March 22, 1979) official recogni-
tion of the House of Labor as their permanent headquarters. The lat-
ter became a significant institution for the laboring poor.
The House of Labor was originally taken over quite spontaneously
by the unemployed. Its early meetings, open to all, revolved around
diverse topics. These general meetings were often both dynamic and
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chaotic, drawing crowds of three to four hundred people. To remedy
this problem, separate workshops were sometimes held. As political
groups became more involved, some disciplinary standards were intro-
duced: discussions became more organized, speakers more articulate,
and, simultaneously, ideological divisions more pronounced. Speakers
affiliated to a particular political line were heckled by opponents and
cheered by sympathizers. It was as if the huge slogans hanging on the
background wall—"The Only Solution for the Toilers is Unity and
Organization" and "Workers' Democracy Is Limitless"—had lost their
resonance. The debates introduced by militants tended to center on
such issues as "democratic versus socialist revolution," and "economic
versus political struggles," which seemed less relevant to the daily con-
cerns of the unemployed.4'' Whatever the debates, official recognition
of the House of Labor signified a victory for the laboring poor both in
practical and symbolic terms: it provided a space for their organiza-
tional activities and a symbol of their capacity for independent collec-
tive action. For many it was an intimate shelter: "Some would spend
the nights there; would bring food and share with other fellow labor-
ers. Others spent their lunch break in the House, while discussing top-
ics of interest. In this way so many simple-minded lads experienced
class solidarity. The House had practically turned into a school for col-
lective action. "s
The organized activities of the jobless were not limited to the House
of Labor, however. A number of unemployed associations were also
created. Unemployed workers in the oil and port city of Abadan, in
southern Iran, developed a more elaborate organization known as the
Syndicate of Project/Seasonal Workers of Abadan (SPWA). As I dis-
cussed earlier, the embryo of the syndicate was formed weeks before
the insurrection in the casual gatherings of laborers in the local tea-
houses (Bushehri-ha), where preparatory registering and campaigning
began. These were followed by an assembly of a group of workers in
the Oil Industry College, where they formed a steering committee
(sbura-ye muassess). The committee began recruiting members by
using teahouses as their meeting points. At this time the priority was
to obtain a permanent headquarters. Following intense negotiations
and confrontations with city officials, they succeeded in getting the
state-owned premises of the former Workers Union as their headquar-
ters/' They also registered the SPWA with the Komite-ye Imam, the
local Pasdaran, and the office of the Governorate." The SPWA man-
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aged to organize over 13,000 unemployed workers from twenty dif-
ferent trades, with various skills and income levels/' The steering com-
mittee produced a set of by-laws based on the union experiences in
postindependence Algeria, postrevolution Nicaragua, and Iran during
the 19405. The most pressing tasks comprised negotiations with
employers to require them to reemploy the laid-off workers. They also
included rinding jobs for the rest of its members and securing unem-
ployment benefits/4 In the long run, the SPWA aimed at establishing
unions of unemployed workers in other provinces, and ultimately cre-
ating a unified national union.
During its lifetime the SPWA won a number of concessions through
negotiations with the Provisional Government, including reemploy-
ment of groups of workers and securing unemployment loans." A con-
flict arose between the SPWA and the authorities on the method of
allocating these loans. While the Ministry of Labor recognized the role
of the SPWA in the allocation process, the local clergy and the
Pasdaran refused it, insisting that the loans be distributed through the
local mosques. The SPWA, however, did not give in. In a compromise
solution both sides agreed on schools instead of mosques as the place
of loan payment."
The Role of Mobilizers
Young activists, mainly students with radical Islamic and socialist ori-
entations, played a significant part in mobilizing and organizing the
unemployed. Activists often ini t ial ly targeted recent high school grad-
uates, diplomeha-ye bikaar, who were better prepared for mobiliza-
t i o n ; the revolution had given students much experience in group
work. The activists then linked the concerns of these young job-seek-
ers to those of the general mass unemployed. The social skills, literacy,
and mobility of the high-school graduates made them potential mobi-
lizers in their own right. A socialist organizer described how this tac-
tic was effective in creating an unemployed organization in
Kermanshah, a city in the East of Iran:
We gathered the others (ih/ilomehs) and asked them to express their
views [on matters of protest actions]. We concluded that each of us who
was present there should take a responsibility. We should, for instance,
inform our friends, relatives, neighbors, and classmates of such an
action. We should also th ink of preparing flyers to be distributed
throughout the city."
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The diplomehs in Kirmanshah ini t ial ly insisted on having their own
exclusive organization. They were later convinced, however, that they
had a common cause with other jobless people." Thus their recruiting
began among the unemployed poor, construction workers, and casual
workers in the lower-class neighborhoods. In their first collective effort
they managed to bring one thousand unemployed together. In this
assembly the speakers stressed the importance of setting up an associ-
ation of the unemployed and uniting all the jobless, l-ollowing a street
march, the organizers called for a sit-in on the premises of the
Governorate. It was during this occasion that the crowd appointed
seven representatives, including four diplomehs (two men and two
women), two unemployed laborers, and one representative from
among the parents of the diplomehs. A few days later the representa-
tives met in a public park with a group of fifty participants to adopt an
o f f i c i a l name for the organization and to propose by-laws for discus-
sion and adoption. Thus was the Union of Unemployed People of
Kermanshah created."
Although widespread, the organizational activities of the unem-
ployed remained largely localized and isolated around different parts
of the country. Most were so involved in their daily struggles for sur-
vival that they hardly paid attention to the outside world. The vital
tasks of recruitment, confrontations with the Pasdaran, and sustain-
ing morale consumed much of their energies. Talk of creating a
national coordinating association came by and large from left-wing
activists.60
One crucial attempt was made to l ink these individual campaigns in
a national context. On April 23, 1979, delegates from over twenty
cities and towns gathered in the House of Labor in Tehran. Their aim
was to un i fy their stands and strategies, to create eventually a nation-
wide organi/at ion of the unemployed. Delegates also discussed the
conditions of jobless people in different parts of the country, especially
the ramifications of accepting the unemployment loan.''1 The meeting
lasted three days, and no reporter was allowed into the meeting hall.
A statement issued at its end instructed all unemployed masses in the
country to stage demonstrations on May Day 1979 and to direct their
demands toward the government. The resolution warned that if the
authorities did not respond positively, the nat ional organizers "will
take harsher and more resolute measures to ensure that the Iranian
working people will achieve their just objectives.'"1
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Indeed, the speed with which organizational efforts were carried
out was quite extraordinary. The Tehran Meeting on April 2.3, the cli-
max of the organizational activity, came only two months after the rev-
olution. Setting up a structured association often constitutes the last
stage of a campaign. If mass action, spontaneous protests, and an
unstructured mobilization have not produced results, then a structured
organization is required to ensure continuity. In Iran the line between
mass action and organizational work seemed blurred. For one thing,
people had just come out of a successful revolution and were prepared
to be mobilized. Second, the mobilizers highly valued association-
building and considered it as a measure of success. The left especially
insisted on organizational work, viewing institution-building as an
essential element for creating a sustained working-class base for itself.
Yet for the most part these associations remained loosely structured,
often serving only as ad hoc coordinating committees to mobilize the
campaigns. They rarely employed any elaborate organizational proce-
dures or advocated electoral campaigns and competition in appointing
representatives. Despite intensive efforts, lack of time did not allow
these organizations to develop and confront the test of efficacy. The
unemployed movement soon came to an abrupt halt.
The Demise
The movement withered away as quickly as it had come to life. May
Day marked the climax of the collective action of the jobless. The
slowdown began gradually afterward, until its virtual demise by mid-
autumn 1979. The war in Kurdistan in summer 1979 undermined the
activities of the movement. During its clampdown on Kurdish nation-
alists, the government used the opportunity to quell other dissent.
Although a number of jobless protest marches did take place their
scope remained limited. On October i, a crowd of 1,500 jobless, the
second march of its kind organized within a week, demonstrated out-
side the prime minister's office. Pasdaran fired over their heads and the
government warned of tough action against the protesters.6' In the dra-
matic atmosphere associated with the seizure of the U.S. embassy in
Tehran in November 1979, the concerns of the unemployed were lost
in the noisy campaign of "Islam against the Great Satan." Indeed, on
the very same day that the Muslim students climbed over the walls of
the embassy, a large group of unemployed were marching in the streets
ot the capital. But the desperate voices of these marchers were stifled
WORKLESS REVOLUTIONARIES 127
by the nationalist outcry of the mass demonstrations that began to
unravel from the Embassy compound.
Why did the movement disappear so rapidly? First, political pres-
sure intensified. Progovernment paramilitary organizations stepped up
psychological and physical attacks, raiding and ransacking the head-
quarters of the jobless. The leaders of the movement were stigmatized
as "infidel communists," or "munafiqs" (hypocrites), referring to the
Mujahedin- i Khalq, a left Islamic group. Almost any sit-in by the
unemployed was assaulted violently by the armed Pasdaran, especially
when they were convinced that the radical left and the Mujahedin were
behind the troubles that they believed were aimed at undermining the
revolution. Various attacks were reported in Tehran, Isfahan, Abadan,
Ahwaz, Gachsaran, and Khorram Abad, most within the first two
months after the victory of the revolution. In addition, worker gangs
were set up by employers to harass laid-off workers who voiced their
protests, especially those calling on the government to take over indus-
try.64 Friday prayer leaders would often denounce the unemployed
activists as agents of a counterrevolution, provoking the praying
crowd, often from lower-class backgrounds themselves, to attack and
disrupt gatherings of the jobless. The Islamic leaders were able to
mobilize the poor against the poor. Whatever their differences, the var-
ious factions within the ruling elite all favored ending the unemployed
protest. Radicals and conservatives, liberals and Islamists, all consid-
ered the activists as impatient opportunists who aimed at harvesting
the fruits of the revolution before they were ripe.6S
Second, an internal battle among the leaders, especially those with
strong political convictions, further weakened the movement. Whereas
Muslim activists along with nonpolitical workers tended to compro-
mise for immediate gains, radical left leaders and "political" workers
insisted on prolonging the campaign, making it part of a general strug-
gle to undermine the Provisional Government.66 In addition, despite
the attempts of the mobilizers to unite jobless graduates and unem-
ployed laborers, the rift between the two remained.
Undoubtedly the left played a significant part in publicizing the
plight of the jobless masses. It was particularly adamant that the move-
ment be radicalized and be given a distinctly political character. Most
leftist publications,6" especially those of the Maoist groups, known as
khatt-i sevvum, carried diverse reports on the struggles of the unem-
ployed. They provided analyses of the causes of layoffs, often relating
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them to the "crisis of capitalism," followed by prescriptions for how
to combat joblessness. One particular weekly, Alaihe-i Bikaari
(Against Unemployment) of the Razmandegan Organization,6* was
well known for raising these issues. A number of militant workers,
such as Ali Adalatfam, Hassan l.ur, Asad, and others, mainly with
Maoist tendencies, led the campaign in Tehran; their counterparts
mobilized job-seekers in the provincial cities.69
While the idea of helping out the poor was a prime motive of the left
activists, they nevertheless utilized the campaign for their own politi-
cal ends—first, to undermine the "liberal bourgeois" Provisional
Government and, second, to build popular support for the left. This
meant that the interests of the movement could in practice be sacrificed
to favor the political strategy of the individual socialist groups.
Finally, and perhaps most important, the exceptional conjuncture
and conditions (i.e., sudden and massive loss of work in a revolution-
ary situation) that had fostered the birth of the movement began grad-
ual ly to be transformed. A number of the factories resumed opera-
tions, reemploying some of their labor force. Within the first six
months of the revolution, some 50 percent of industries and small
units had returned to production.7" The labor-intensive construction
sector, which had previously employed some one million laborers, still
needed to be revived. To this end, the p r o v i s i o n a l government
extended Rls 11,000 million credit to contractors to enable them to
pay back wages and to rejuvenate the whole sector.71 Construction
activities began to rise slowly in the second half of 1979 as small and
inexpensive housing units were built.72 By May 1979 some 2.1,000 jobs
were created in this sector.
On occasion laid-off workers took over their workplaces, appoint-
ing a shura to run them. At times they requested that the government
appoint professional managers in order to resume work.74 On May 6,
1979, for instance, ten workers at the Metusak factory attempted to
regain their jobs by staging a sit-in in the factory. They continued their
occupation for twenty-five days, after which they issued a statement:
"2.5 days sit-in with four days hunger strike! The result? . .. Nothing!"
"What could we do?," they went on. "There was only one way left.
And that was: taking over the workshop, operating it by ourselves."
So, "on Sunday 9 Ordibehesht [May i , 1979], we went into the work-
shop and, after repairing the machines and dividing responsibilities,
began to produce and sell the products."7S Similarly, laid-off workers
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in Plastou Masourehkar reopenend their plant and resumed work.76
While these tactics were effective in regaining jobs in some cases, they
were ineffective in many others. The former employees of such "un-
Islamic" occupations as cabarets, nightclubs, and the lottery business,
for example, had no chance of reemployment.
Under intense pressure from the movement, the Ministry of Labor
attempted to create some temporary jobs, including public works such
as road construction and planting trees in public places. Although
Bazargan's government officially banned any further state sector
employment, a number of new revolutionary institutions (nahadha-ye
inqilabi) such as Pasdaran Komitchs (Revolutionary Guards), Jihad-i
Sazandegui (Construction Crusade), Nthzat-i Savad Aamuzt (Move-
ment for Literacy), and Bonyad-i Maskan (Housing Foundation) nev-
ertheless did absorb a good number of the jobless population. For
instance, the Construction Crusade, established in June 1979, had 327
centers in the country, employing 14,800 persons in 1979, with 4,700
volunteers.7^ A small percentage of the 2.00,000 lottery ticket sellers
were hired by the local Pasdaran Komitehs to sell cigarettes in the
streets as a way to combat hoarding. 8 A job creation project for the
high school graduates, ratified in December 1979, involved establish-
ing production cooperatives throughout the country.79
In the end, the unemployment loan offered by the government,
however meager, proved a temporary solution for some poor unem-
ployed. The offer undoubtedly created a rift within the ranks of the
jobless. By July 6, 1979, within three months of its institution, about
181,000 unemployed workers had received an average monthly loan
of Rls 9,500."" But the whole scheme ceased to exist after six months,
at the end of the summer 1979, on the grounds that "industrial invest-
ment has started, and workers are returning back to their jobs gradu-
ally."*1 As for the unemployed diplomehs, the government planned to
extend an "honorary loan" (vaam-i sharafati) from a fund made up of
i percent of the monthly salaries of any citizen wishing to contribute.
The contributions were to be paid back by the state in five years time.82
In the meantime the institutions of family, kinship, and traditional
networks continued to protect the jobless. Young unemployed
depended on their families, and older ones relied on networks of kin-
ship and friendship to secure some sort of work, loans, and assistance.
In the end the traditional method of reliance on informal networks as
opposed to politically oriented associations, coupled with the force of
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political pressure and changes in the economy, resulted in the demise
of the movement. Traditional institutions made the unemployed less
desperate; economic changes eroded the constituency of the move-
ment; and political repression deprived it of its leadership. The begin-
ning of the war in Kurdistan inflicted a heavy blow to the weak body
of the movement, while the euphoria over the seizure of the U.S.
embassy drowned out its presence.
Despite organizational weaknesses, the movement of the jobless in
Iran did make some important inroads. It forced the Provisional
Government to grant loans and aid to over 180,000 unemployed for
six months, and to create a number of temporary jobs. In some
provinces the authorities were forced by the campaigns of the unem-
ployed to reopen shut-down factories. At some point groups of laid-off
workers themselves began reopening their own workplaces without
the consent of the employers. Most important, the movement
prompted the Provisional Government to rush to reconstruct the econ-
omy, especially the crippled industries where most jobs had been lost.
But these very achievements undermined the movement itself. The
laid-off factory workers who were in the forefront of the organi/.ations
and campaigns of the unemployed began to return to work. Others
either found jobs, went back to their old occupations, or began to
search for alternative means of survival . In short, the unemployed
movement began to decline primarily because it was to some extent
successful.
For many of the people without work the problem of joblessness
remained, in particular as new groups of job-seekers entered the labor
market. Concessions neither reduced unemployment significantly nor
ended the plight of many of the jobless. From the start the movement
failed to win unemployment benefits as it had originally demanded,
and accepted an unemployment loan. The loan, although never
expected to be paid back, covered only some 10 percent of the unem-
ployed"1 and was discontinued after six months. )ob creation schemes
remained limited. Not only did thousands of the remaining jobless fail
to find work, but a new wave of rural-urban migration in the follow-
ing years inflated the size of the jobless population even further. In
short, the exceptional circumstances (massive and sudden unemploy-
ment and an ideological element) that facilitated the development of
the unemployed movement began to change, even though unemploy-
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ment persisted. The jobless population needed to adjust their activities
to the new political and economic reality. The Islamic regime began to
stabilize and seize control of popular struggles. The critical mass of
unemployed, the laid-off factory workers, mostly regained their work
and exited the movement. For the remaining jobless, activities in the
informal sector, petty-trade, and street vending served as the most
common recourse.
While involved in their movement, many workless revolutionaries
never stopped their individual search for alternative sources of income.
There were probably many like Ahmad Mirzaii, a diplomeh who
described his position as "owing to unemployment, I take care of the
electrical problems of my neighbors and get paid for it; some times, I
work on my brother's taxi."84 Some were convinced that they could
secure some kind of work if only they would make a little effort. Ali
Golestani, a diplomeh who was on the job market for six months,
believed that "if people are only a bit clever, they can do thousands of
things; they can sell fruits in the streets, do vending, be sales persons,
or engage in part-time and casual work."1" Indeed, thousands of job-
less resorted to street subsistence work, occupying spots on the side-
walks, public parks, and busy thoroughfares of the big cities to erect
kiosks and stalls.
The unemployed movement came to an end, but street politics con-
tinued. It simply shifted from the jobless onto the street subsistence
workers, notably the street vendors. By changing the agency, street pol-
itics assumed a different form and dynamics, involving different polit-
ical ground—the subject of the following chapter.
Seven
Street Rebels: The Politics
of Street Vending
[From the Islamic viewpoint] the occupation of thoroughfares by the vendors is haram
[not permitted].
—Ayatollah Khomeini '
Why does the municipality want to prevent us from our (vending] work? We don't earn
our living in a haram way.
—A women food vendor in Tehran2
The authorities think in such a way as if they have inherited the streets from their fathers.
—A fruit peddler'
By the close of the first year of the revolution, thousands of unem-
ployed urbanités realized that they had to come to terms with the state
of their joblessness. Neither the movement of the unemployed nor the
efforts of the new government were sufficient to ameliorate the situa-
tion. With industry and construction stagnant, recruitment in the state
sector frozen, an annual release of thousands of school leavers and
soaring urban migration all combined to inflate the number of jobless.
In Tehran, open unemployment had jumped from 3 percent in 1976 to
some 14 percent in 1979.* One year later it rose to 16.3 percent/ By
1984 the rate for the whole country was 18.7, or z.z million people
out of work.6 Over 60 percent of the jobless in cities were new
entrants, including high school graduates (30 percent).7
While joblessness grew in the postrevolutionary years, no protest
movement emerged to address the issues of jobs and social protection.
The particular sociopolitical circumstance that had caused the emer-
gence of the unemployed movement in 1979 began to change. The
bulk of the movement's leadership, mainly experienced laid-off work-
ers, returned to work. In addition, the subsequent political restrictions
curtailed independent popular mobilization as well as the activities of
militants who had influenced the earlier jobless collective action.
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The jobless, consequently, resorted to individual and quiet
encroachment strategies. In addition to relying on family, friends, and
patrons, most found opportunities in casual work. The black market,
largely free from the bureaucratic control of the state, offered the only
space in which individuals could exercise their own initiatives to bet-
ter their lots. Despite its own costs, this sector offered such a versatil-
ity that many individuals, even many unskilled rural immigrants, were
able to secure a job, earn a relatively decent income, and enjoy some
degree of autonomy in their working lives. Street subsistence activities
constituted the largest segment of such activities. They were the pro-
ductive, service, and distributive activities that took place in the social
and geographical space of the street corners. Among them, petty-trade,
street vending, and stall-holding (dakkeh-daari, dast-foroushi, basaati
and charkh-daan) proved to be the most flourishing occupations.
In Iran just as elsewhere, street vendors are rarely the subject of seri-
ous scholarship, despite their growing significance. Available studies
focus mostly on their economic activities. For instance, De Soto's well-
known work, The Other Path, is interested not in vendors' politics but
in their perceived enthusiasm for and practice of a free market." On the
other hand, officials often regard street vending as a social problem, a
side effect of "maldeveiopment"; it is rarely considered as a possible
solution to certain economic and social ills. And, finally, sympathizers
often look upon street vendors with pity and patronage, perceiving
them as powerless and wretched.' All of these diverse views share one
thing—they deny any agency to the street subsistence workers.
This chapter attempts to examine street vendors not simply as a by-
product of economic shift but also as agents of social change. It shows
how economic necessity made the poor appropriate public space as
well as (business) opportunities that had been primarily generated by
the rich and powerful. Both the use of public space—physical and
social—and the opportunity cost became the subject of intense contes-
tation. As the vendors spread out their business in the busy alleyways,
public thoroughfares, and corners of the public parks, their activities
inevitably came into conflict with the prerogatives of both the state,
which tends to control the public order and space, and the merchant
class who felt their business opportunities appropriated. While the
state insisted on the passive use of public spaces, the vendors needed to
use them actively and participatively through their own initiatives.'"
The conflict between the street rebels and the state over the use of pub-
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lic space, the meaning of order, and the aim of economic activity char-
acterized the street politics in postrevolutionary Iran. In this conflict,
the state sided with the business class, since both power and profit
were contested.
Spreading Out in the Streets
Street vending was not a novel phenomenon in Iran. Indeed, it was
characteristic of the premodern urban quarters where local street
traders exhibited their merchandise in public thoroughfares, usually in
the vicinity of the established Bazaar." Local norms and local author-
ities regulated the use of the streets, which varied according to the local
culture, and a kind of Durkheimian organic solidarity (reciprocity,
social control, primordial ties, and norms) prevailed in the neighbor-
hoods. If the state seemed to lie far away from the local life, the street
vendors were at its center, performing a highly significant function of
distributing goods in the local markets and providing services for the
communities. Street vending represented perhaps the most salient fea-
ture of street life as it kept capturing the imagination of the writers,
artists, and historians.
Street vending, peddling, and cart-carrying continued throughout
the prerevolutionary years both before and after the establishment
during the 19305 of Reza Shah's centralized state. Along with con-
struction work, street vending offered rural migrants and unskilled
urbanités easy access to urban employment. Indeed, throughout the
century, street life was defined very much by the activities of the chant-
ing peddlers and vendors who operated side by side in the busy thor-
oughfares and local market places. Although the state began as early
as 1896 to regulate their activities,12 nevertheless many hawkers sim-
ply continued to operate unlawfully, often by being scattered, invisible,
and thus tolerable. Nevertheless, bribing and/or befriending the local
police also helped them carry on their work. Indeed, more often than
not, the vendors and the local police were brought together. Although
they diverged in their roles, they nevertheless shared many traits—they
operated and interacted on daily basis in the same geographical area
and shared more or less similar economic needs and probably living
standards. Out of this developed a complex relationship in which the
line between favor and friendship, bribe and assistance, control and
cooperation was often blurred." What underlay this state of affairs
was the small size of the vending population and its apparent invisi-
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hility, which in terms of both state regulation and shopkeepers's inter-
ests made it tolerable if not legitimate. Nevertheless, by the mid-1970s
over 15,000 vendors were spread out both in the southern and central
areas of the capital (especially in the streets of Lalehzar, Ferdowsi, and
Saadi).14 Insecurity, nevertheless, remained a lasting cost of this infor-
mality.
The postrevolution period brought new changes to the vending sec-
tor. In addition to a sharp increase in their size, a new form of politi-
cal vending emerged, thus rendering the group more susceptible to
control by the state. During the period between February 1979 and
mid-1981 political vending enjoyed very high visibility as educated
young men, mainly supporters of the opposition political groups,
traded intellectual merchandise such as books, newspapers, and cas-
settes. Political vending, however, represented only a transitory phe-
nomenon, comprising a small portion of the total number of street
traders. More important were the ordinary vendors, whose main con-
cern was to make a living.
The collapse of the Shah's regime brought with it a temporary halt
in bureaucratic control of economic activities. The breakdown of
police and municipal control opened the way for thousands of young,
educated, unemployed, and rural migrants to utilize their own initia-
tives in economic life. Many conquered new territories in the public
space. Scores of new handcarts, kiosks, and stalls mushroomed in the
busy thoroughfares of the major cities. Between 1976 and 1986 the
informal economy became the fastest-growing sector, second only to
the public sector, attracting over 300,000 new entrants. By 1986 these
activities made up some 18 percent of urban employment, or close to
one million people.15 Of this, about 310,000 were petty-traders and
street subsistence workers, and the rest were workshop workers or
family and domestic laborers.16
The streets of the capital experienced the largest groups of street
workers whose number is estimated to about 40,000 in i98i.17
Between 1981 and 1984, at the height of urban migration when 1,500
persons migrated to greater Tehran every day, street subsistence work
spread like a brush fire in the capital and in other cities and towns. The
authorities were apprehensive of its political ramifications. Within
these three years, about 80,000 new vendors began working in the cap-
ital1* providing support for an estimated 400,000 Tehranis.19 In August
1984 a Tehran daily acknowledged that "Today, vending as the most
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widespread street activity. . . . attracting a major segment of the labor
force. It seems that the mashaghel-i kazib (fake occupations] have in
the long run established themselves, and cannot be dismantled."2
Political Vending
In the late afternoon of one hot June day in 1979, about thirty young
men and women in the garden of the Teatri-shahr in Tehran were
involved in an intense discussion. They had gathered there to explore
ways of dealing with the official threats against street book-sellers.
They discussed the procedures for establishing a street association, and
where it should be, putting its by-laws to the vote. Four men and one
woman were elected as members of the executive committee.2' The
Association of Street Book-Sellers would fight to secure the position of
street book-sellers against the municipality's attacks. It also planned to
put pressure on the authorities to create permanent jobs for its mem-
bers. "In fact, we are seasonal street workers," explained a woman
book-seller. "The municipality and the Labor Ministry must feel
responsibility for our situation. Bad weather does not allow us to work
in the streets during the fall and winter . . . . The municipality must give
us a place [for the Association], and the Labor Ministry should give us
lobs."22
Street vending as a political issue began to unfold from the very first
days of the postrevolutionary period. Politicized young unemployed,
school and college graduates took advantage of the chaotic freedom
and began to set up stalls and kiosks along the sidewalks of the main
streets of the capital city. They filled the pavements with their mer-
chandise, mostly in the better-off central districts—Tehran University,
Park-i Farah, Park-i Mellat, the streets of Kargar and Keshavarz, and
those surrounding the major public parks. Some simply spread their
handful of goods on a piece of newspaper on the ground. Others pre-
ferred to stand by a single table, trading their major items—books,
newspapers, music cassettes, and tapes of political speeches. Some sup-
plemented this merchandise with a variety of sandwiches, hot tea, and
cold drinks. The more ambitious vendors installed permanent struc-
tures, metal kiosks and wooden shacks, and felt free to tap into elec-
tricity from the nearby power lines, which il luminated the surround-
ings with colorful lights. Thus every evening the occupied sidewalks
turned into exotic fun-fairs, with vendor-shoppers and passers-by
browsing amid jeers, jokes, music, and plenty of politics.
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For these young men, vending served multiple purposes. Primarily,
it was a job, serving as a means for the young unemployed to make a
living. A fixed business location provided them with a base to assem-
ble, a place to discuss politics, to socialize, and to have fun with friends
and mates. The dakkeh-daan (k iosk-holding) for them also meant
doing political work. Besides their cassettes and cold drinks, these
young vendors also traded dissenting newspapers, pamphlets, and
books, and distributed tracts and flyers. In this role they were the most
important agents for disseminating, in a relatively open fashion, the
publications of the opposition groups up until June 1981, when the
major crackdown of the opposition began. This role became even
more crucial afterward, as their street businesses acted as covers for
continuing distribution of underground literature and maintaining a
base for public communication between political activists. It was
essential for them to maintain the captured spaces, and to help other
vendors to do so as well. It was under the initiative of the political ven-
dors that the two vendor associations, the Association of Street Book-
Sellers (ASBS) and the Association of the Vendors of Fatemi Avenue
were set up. During the first few months the ASBS gathered some two
hundred vendors together. To prevent obstruction of thoroughfares, it
advised its members to place standard one-by-two-meter stalls on the
edges of the sidewalks.2' But the municipality did not seem to agree to
such a project. The associations were dismantled during the first gov-
ernment attacks against the street vendors later in the summer of 1979.
Ordinary Vendors
Despite its salient political presence, political vending was only a
short-lived phenomenon and made up a small portion of the total
street subsistence activities. More important were those ordinary ven-
dors who continued their prerevolution business, as well as the many
who joined them by thousands following the revolution. The new-
comers were composed of rural migrants, war refugees, young Tehrani
unemployed, and low-income state employees seeking a second
income. While the political vendors centered in more affluent areas,
the typical street squatters spread out in the most heavily trafficked
thoroughfares and big maidans such as Valiye'asre Street, Maidan-i
Inqilab, Maidan-i Imam Hussein, Maidan-i Khomeini, Mawlavi
Street, Maidan-i Shoush, Maidan-i Azadi, Lalehzar, Istanbul,
Imamzade Hasan, and in the vicinity of Park-i Shahr, as well as the
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neighborhoods in lower-class South Tehran. In 1980 over 1,850 stall-
holders were concentrated in Mosaddeq Avenue and 686 along Inqilab
Street.24 Their means of trading ranged from simple carton boxes or tin
plates to wagons, handcarts, and kiosks. Many peddlers carried their
merchandise in baskets that hung down from their necks.
Their business activities ranged from selling goods to providing ser-
vices and producing objects. Their merchandise extended from fresh
produce, old clothing, cigarettes, and washing powder to domestic
appliances, car parts, medicine, stale bread, and their own bodies.
Some ingeniously traded phone coins, Xeroxed car application forms,
and rationed gasoline coupons. Indeed, the wartime rationing of basic
commodities boosted their business, as their genuinely free market
offered almost anything restricted by the state. They produced and
sold food, kitchen appliances, and handicrafts. They offered entertain-
ment, performing as magicians, enacting passion plays, displaying ani-
mals, telling fortunes. Or they remained in silent despair next to their
handcarts, waiting for someone to buy their muscle power. The more
desperate did almost any and everything that they thought would
ensure their survival. This did not exclude begging, theft, drug-dealing,
and prostitution.2' For these men and women, neither their underdog
status nor the morality of their enterprise hindered them so long as
they made a living. "Hawking is a disgraceful \abirourizi] job. You see,
I really get embarrassed when sometimes my relatives or friends pass
by this place. If they [the government] would provide for my liveli-
hood, I would never do this work."2
This panorama of individuals, objects, and activities, this street cul-
ture, marked the social space of the street sidewalks, creating an image
of a social whole that embodied a seemingly harmonious division of
labor—beggars begged; shoppers and traders bargained; the village
traveler ate from the cheap food stands; porters carried heavy loads;
young men flirted, and believers broadcast loud religious chantings. But
these busy thoroughfares became so clogged with screaming traders
and street shoppers that moving through became a troublesome ven-
ture. It was as if this universe of hurrying individuals, shifting events,
and constant noise had turned these streets of Tehran into a boundless
macrocosm of its great old ba/aar, with its densely packed little shops
and narrow alleyways seemingly filled with everyone and everything.
The street subsistence workers came from diverse social and eco-
nomic backgrounds. Political vendors apart, the bulk of them were
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urban youths without work, high school graduates who failed to get
into college or find office positions, war refugees, disabled war veter-
ans, low-income state employees seeking second jobs, and—the largest
group throughout the 19805—rural migrants. Some three-quarters of
the vendors in Shiraz were migrants from other regions; one out of
three was a war refugee.27 Similarly, the bulk (over 80 percent) of
Tehrani street vendors originated from unskilled peasant migrants,
most of whom (about 75 percent) became vendors for the first time
after the revolution.2* Many had migrated from the Turkish-speaking
provinces of Azarbaijan, Zanjan, and Hamadan—the origin of many
of the squatter settlers in South Tehran.'9
Vendors often embarked upon their new venture individually and
quietly. Perceiving it as a natural way to make a living, they
encroached on public spaces by rolling their pushcarts around, spread-
ing their basaats, or setting up their stalls, often without being aware
of the legal implications of their actions. Those who knew the laws jus-
tified themselves both privately and publicly by referring to the moral
principle of necessity. "I don't see this as unlawful. (Because) only the
needy and the poor do this job, not the rich; only those who are embar-
rassed before their families because they cannot afford to provide for
them—these do the street vending. Otherwise, they would have to
resort to theft and pickpocketing.""1 But some viewed the streets sim-
ply as public property. "Look," they often argued "the authorities
have not inherited the streets; have they? It is not their private prop-
erty! They belong to all."" To escape from police control, some
became "invisible" by scattering to the less strategic locations. But
once the vendors gained some degree of security, stalls were replaced
by permanent kiosks. Security could be ensured by the legitimacy of
continual occupancy.
Relatives and friends often offered advice on the quali ty of the
"spot," the desirability of the merchandise, police harassment, possi-
bilities for bribes, and the like. The vendors also thought about the
cost-benefits of travel-peddling (dast-forousht), stall-holding (basaati),
or kiosk-owning (dakkeh-daari). Peddling offered versatility in finding
customers and escaping police harassment, but it required the physical
fitness to walk long distances. Possession of basaats in fixed locations
in the busy thoroughfares was a highly competitive enterprise.
Informal norms among the vendors regulated who possessed which
location. Key money of certain sites was calculated in terms of square
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meter sidewalk tiles and the sites were at times traded for hundreds of
dollars."
On occasion vending began and operated collectively when groups
of relatives and village-mates would take over a public space, a maidan,
or a vacant piece of land by hurriedly constructing stalls, kiosks, and
booths to form collective markets. These group vendors often special-
ized in single commodities. In Tehran, for instance, a large number
bought used clothing and appliances from affluent homes and sold
them in the poor southern districts. Most residents of the poor areas of
Ghal'eh Morghi, Khazaneh, and Darvazehghar purchased their cloth-
ing from the second-hand street markets of Gumrog, Maidan-i Sayed
Ismail, and the Baagh-i Azari neighborhood." This trend continued
after the revolution, but some of these markets moved further north, to
Maidan-i Golha, Maidan-i Fowziyeh, and Amirabad Street.'4 Similarly,
a large number of clothing vendors in the southern part of Inqilab
Square and Khiaban Kargar-i Jonoubi came from the Caspian Sea area.
They benefited from the support of the Caspian-origin merchants of
the Tehran Bazaar." While group vending offered street traders an
established network, mutual assistance, and a high measure of security,
it also made them more visible to authorities and reduced their flexi-
bility in dealing with the local police in times of removal.
Why So Much Growth?
Three major factors contributed to the massive growth of street ven-
dors in postrevolution Iran: unemployment, a possibility of earning
higher income, and autonomy from state regulations and institutions.
Unemployment remained a salient feature of the economy through
the i98os. The total unemployment rate jumped from 10 percent in
1976 to 18.7 percent in 1984'* or some 2..2, million people. From 1976
to 1986, on average, some 301,000 (ten-years-old and over) entered
the job market each year, while about 224,000 jobs were created.'7
More than 64 percent of the unemployed lived in the cities. Of these,
40 percent were previously employed and 60 percent were new
entrants into the job market. In the cities, open unemployment
increased from 5.1 percent in 1976 to 15.2. percent in 1986.'" Rural
migration placed a heavy strain on the urban job market. For instance,
during 1982 to 1983, the twenty districts of the capital were receiving
an average 1,500 daily new immigrants. This excluded those who
migrated to and settled on the margin of the city.'9
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Many of this jobless crowd, including unskilled village migrants as
well as educated Tehranis, moved into the street subsistence sector.40
Muhammad Ali Kehzadi, a young man (twenty-seven years old in
1980) arrived in Tehran immediately after the revolution from a village
around the city of Khorram Abad. He ended up in the streets of South
Tehran, making a living by entertaining children with a toy gun (tufang
baadi):
I used to do farming in the village. It's been now some two months since
I've arrived in Tehran. What made me come here was the pressure of
making a living in the village: unemployment, debt, and the [danger] of
the starvation of my family. Maybe there is a way out here in Tehran.
My brother and I have two hectares of land which we inherited from our
father; and we divided the income between us. ... Swear to God, both
of our families would work the land for over nine months to produce
only two tons |of wheat]. And that, we would consume all [without
being able to sell any portion], . . . At times, toward the end of the year,
we would even be short of that amount; so, we had to buy some extra
flour. In addition to that, we still needed to buy clothes, shoes, sugar, tea,
meat, cooking oil, etc., etc. We barely made i t . . . Now, I am in debt for
15 to 16,000 tumans. . . . I came to Tehran to make this money to pay
my debt back. . . . At the beginning, I didn't want to do this work at all.
I tried the fruit retail markets; I tried the bazaar. No way! nobody wants
to hire labor. There are just no jobs around. So, I borrowed 700 tumans,
and bought this "gun" to make a living with/1
Abbas Ismaili, 40 years old (in 1980), had left his village near the
town of Tawiserkan years before the revolution, in 1973, after the
death of his wife:
In fact, I do not have a regular job. I will do anything that is offered to
me. In the past, when I [was young and) had some energy, I used to do
construction work. I was also a porter for some time. But when my
health deteriorated, I began doing lighter work. I said to myself, "I don't
have [anybody or) anything in this world. So, let's not suffer more than
this in these couple of days remaining of my life." Now, it's been a
month or so since I've begun selling tasbih strings.42 Before doing this, I
was a vendor. If I had enough money, 1 would go to the business of buy-
ing and selling rings or things like this.41
The stories seem to reflect the stereotypical image of the vendors as
a desperate and destitute segment of the urban underclass.
Postrevolutionary developments in fact produced greater diversity
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among the vendors by introducing people with diverse social attrib-
utes of age, income, education, and ambition into this subaltern
group.
Many unskilled as well as skilled men joined street work because it
offered them a relatively high income. In 1990 about 60 percent of
Tehrani vendors, with one out of three being high school graduates,
made between 3,000 to 10,000 rials a day.44 The mayor of Tehran
claimed in March 1984 that some of the street bread traders in the cap-
ital earned as much as Rls 5,000 a day.4' About 2.0 percent of skilled
people preferred the high income from vending to making use of their
expertise.46
Finally, for some the idea of running a business autonomous from
government regulations and bureaucratic discipline made street vend-
ing an attractive option. Despite the low status attached to the trade
(considered as hammali and abirourizi) many street hawkers seemed to
prefer remaining in similar activities.47 As a worker put it in 1983,
"working in large industries like car factories is very draining; one
would always be under someone's thumb. That is why, I think, work
like street vending is more suitable and worthwhile."4* The vendors
did suffer police harassment, income irregularities, low status, and the
physical hardship of working in the streets during the cold winters and
hot summers. High income, autonomy, and easy entry for many, com-
pensated for these costs of informality. Nevertheless, they never
stopped their efforts to offset these costs while maintaining the bene-
fits. This meant demanding security, shops, kiosks, and credit, which
involved the petty business of the street in a major sociopolitical con-
flict.
Consequences and Contradictions
With expansion of street vending, three main areas—urban employ-
ment, urban physical space, and urban social space—became sites of
contestation and conflict between vendors and the state. By engaging
in street subsistence activities, some 32.0,000 people managed to earn
a l iving. Many unskil led migrants, laid-off workers, disabled poor,
recent high school leavers, and even university graduates moved into
these occupations, primarily because they did not see any other alter-
native.49 "What is our fault that we have no other opportunities but
these jobs?," vendors argued when confronted by belligerent offi-
cials.'" As an old man stated:
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Well, this is the way I make my living. I sit here, and some people bring
me goods; I add a percentage to the price and sell them . . . I know the
government has said that we shouldn't cause inflation. The municipality
agents came a few times to stop my work. I told them, "What do you
want me to do instead, go around and beg? Give us opportunity, then
we would stop this kind of work."'
Official discourse perceived street work as a "social disease"
(bimari-ye ijtimaii), an "afflicting malaise" (biman-ye ntosre') "para-
sitic" (mashaghel-i angali), and "fake and pseudo-occupations"
(mashaghel-i kazib)—which caused nuisance and obstruction in pub-
lic sites." Street vendors were represented as opportunists, lazy bums
(tanparvar), political conspirators, military service escapees, and drug
dealers. Those who "have set up food stalls in the streets are in fact
rebuffing the Revolution," stated Tehran's radical mayor, Muhammad
Tavassoli, in 1979. "If the municipality does not stop these activities,
it will practically encourage idleness and indolence."5 ' The terms
"mashagel-i kazib" and "sadd-i ma'bar" became the most widely used
terms in these discursive campaigns/4 "Fake occupations" were
defined as the "unproductive" and "consumptionist" jobs that "create
no value-added."" They were responsible for shortage and inflation.
Ironically, most revolutionary officials, from radical clergy to conserv-
ative and liberal politicians, shared the modernization theory and ide-
ology of urban duality. Their concept of insan-i hashiye-ii (marginal
man) did not diverge much from the cultural type constructed and
shared by many late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Western
urban sociologists/6
On the other hand, street vending had an obvious impact on urban
space. Once the individual vendors established their simple basaats or
kiosks on the street sidewalks, they began gradually to extend their
spatial domain by putting chairs, benches, tables, and plants around
their spots and covering their stalls with shades or umbrellas. Before
long, and often illegally, the kiosks were connected to the city's elec-
tricity supply, allowing colorful lights, fans, and music, which, for
some, had become an inseparable component of vending life. Every
morning and late afternoon, vendors became responsible for sweeping
and wetting down the areas surrounding their lots. When some secu-
rity was achieved, fringe areas were tiled and stalls cemented to the
ground.
Vendors were involved in an active use of the public space by
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directly participating in its utilization, organization, and change. But
such participative use came into sharp conflict with the tendency of the
state to restrict public space for a passive use. The state reserved for
itself the prerogative to determine how the space should be organized.
In Iran, early attempts to regulate public space began in the late nine-
teenth century. In 1896 the state made systematic provisions to police
the movements of hawkers, street workers, pimps, prostitutes, mules,
carriages, loiters, and street children."Darughehs enforced the laws
until 192,6, when it was replaced by modern municipalities and the
police, a policy that has continued to the present.58 All modern states
share this tendency, since the issue of space is simultaneously an issue
of order and ultimately an exertion of power." An active use of space
means, in a sense, the state relinquishing some degree of control over
the activities of the populace.
The Islamic authorities viewed street work as having a destabilizing
effect, threatening the social fabric. They invariably expressed fear
about the "cancerous" spread of street activities, this "contagious
malaise." One can visualize how they saw cities being sunk into the
chaos of an uncontrollable mass of "fake" elements with their quar-
rels, complaints, and rumors.6" Vendors were seen to cause obstruc-
tion, harass women, provide cover for draft dodgers, drug dealers, and
opposition conspirators, and present a squalid and chaotic image of
the capital to foreign visitors.6'
Vendors were also involved in creating a new social space in the
streets, which the Islamic state could not tolerate. The jubilance, jokes,
music, assemblies of youths, colorful lights, and the brisk atmosphere
together created an alternative cultural aura. This generally secular,
cheerful, and colorful street culture was in sharp contrast to the pre-
vailing somber and dark religious mood. Street vendors, in particular
the political breed, had indeed created a highly visible counterhege-
monic street subculture that seemed to challenge the state's notions of
governance and its meaning of order. Beyond this, vendors had appro-
priated the favorable business conditions that merchant class had cre-
ated. Many potential customers of stores were attracted to street ven-
dors who offered more affordable and convenient bargains. Merchants
thus joined the government in combating the street vendors.
In short, what was at stake was the relative autonomy and fluidity
of vending life, outside and against the surveillance of officialdom. In
their capacity as autonomous or informal individuals, vendors were
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seen as promoters of disorder, immoral behavior, and political con-
spiracy.62 For this, they had to be curtailed.
Confrontations
To outmaneuver the street vendors, the authorities resorted to institu-
tional mechanisms, exerted moral pressure, and waged violence.
Several agents and institutions were involved in combating street sub-
sistence activities. Beyond the hizbullahi groups—the Pasdaran and the
municipality authorities—the Anti-Vice Court (Dadgah-i Zedd-i
Munkarat) served to give legal cover to the demolition policies and to
offset the legal struggles of the vendors. The Committee for Guild
Affairs (CGA), a nongovernmental body administering business affairs
in Tehran, also intervened by issuing antivending warnings and
instructions on professional and legal grounds. In June 1980 for
instance, the committee refused to recognize street vending as a legiti-
mate trade by "those who have taken advantage of the revolution by
setting up tents, basaats, and trading ventures in the public thorough-
fares."63 On many occasions the attorney general and the General
Commands of the Revolutionary Committees directly authorized the
Pasdaran to intervene, as in Karadj in November 1984 and Shiraz in
December i984-M
Despite the operations of these agents, there was still a need for a
central authority to manage the crisis systematically. Increasing rural
migration and urban unemployment made this task even more urgent.
In May 1983 the mayor of Tehran, Engineer Seifian, formed the
Committee Against Obstruction of Thoroughfares (CAOT)(Sitad-i
Raf'-i Sadd-i Ma'bar), an interdepartmental group composed of repre-
sentatives from the central municipality, police, revolutionary com-
mittees, traffic, and a few others." Authorized by the attorney general,
the CAOT instructed its special agents to evict the street vendors.6'' The
CAOT created special antiobstruction squads, which, in cooperation
with the Pasdaran, replaced the street thugs. By May 1984 six mobile
units were set up to provide surveillance over the twenty-one districts
of the capital city. Agents drove around in their vans and pickup
trucks; any illegal vendor they encountered was evicted and his prop-
erty confiscated. The merchandise might be returned or not, depend-
ing on certain procedures, including the extent of illegality and the
payment of fines.67
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Yet even this proved inadequate to contain the crisis. In September
1985, some eighteen months later, CAOT became the Committee for
Continuing Mobilization Against the Obstruction of Thoroughfares
(CCMAOT) (Sitad-i Bastj-i Payguirt va Raf'-i Sadd-e Ma bar}. The
change of name pointed to an emphasis on long and sweeping cam-
paigns, with antiobstruction squads stationed permanently in the
major trading locations, including the maidans of Inqilab and Tajrish
in the north, and those of Imam Hussein, Khorasan, Shoush, Rah-i
Aahan, Gumrok, 15th Khordad Avenue, Serah-i Azari, and streets off
Laleh/.ar, in the poor neighborhoods of South Tehran.6*
In addition to systematic institutional mechanisms, many politi-
cians resorted to religious leaders to exert moral pressure on the ven-
dors.^ Urban migration, squatter settlement, and street vending were
discussed in Friday prayers and local mosque sermons. Preachers often
instigated their audience into violent actions against vendors."" The
mayor of Orumieh proclaimed that "obstruction and unemployment
are hararn [unacceptable] according to shari'a." ' Attorney General,
Ayatollah Muhammad Gilani requested Ayatollah Khomeini to issue a
fitwa, forbidding street vendors from "causing obstruction."72 The
fitiva was sought not only to put moral pressure on the street vendors
but also to silence the few officials who cast doubt on the viability of
violent crackdowns. ' The resort to violence pointed to the fact that
institutional and moral pressure was having little practical effect.
The early antivending policies and actions were directed largely
against the political vending. On March 17, 1980, only one month
after the revolution, "the Tehran central municipality instructed all
other districts to remove as soon as possible all the recently erected
stalls."74 This was followed by harsher instructions. The warnings in
part functioned as a green light to the informal street thugs, the hizbul-
lahts, to get on with the dissenting vendors. Groups of thugs, often
escorted by the Pasdaran, went around kicking down stalls and
basaats and confiscating merchandise and other belongings.7'
Subsequent scuffles and fistfights resulted in many injuries and deaths.
In the first year of the revolution, demolitions tended to be random,
concentrated mainly in the streets around Tehran University,
Mosaddeq (then Valiye'ahd), and Inqilab avenues in the capital city.
Large-scale violence also took place.
The largest antivending operation in Tehran coincided with the first
widespread attempt to quell the Kurdish autonomy movements in the
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late summer of 1980. In the late afternoon of one of those days, I ven-
tured to the area around Tehran University. The locality, once cele-
brated for its brisk and energetic feeling, had turned into a lonely and
joyless area. Pasdaran and the hizbullahi thugs were patrolling on foot
or in military jeeps, driving victoriously up and down the deserted
streets. The pavement and the streets resembled a battle zone, with
piles of scattered newspaper sheets, ripped books, torn flyers, broken
tables, and wrecked vending stalls littering the ground. The occasional
passers-by looked bewildered, resigned, and silent; among them were
local vendors who had returned with dismay, anguish, and anger to
learn the fate of their spots.
Small-scale and random attacks, demolitions, and the removal of
the street traders became an everyday practice, one that continued
through the late 19805. Almost any national crisis was used by the gov-
ernment to crack down on street enterprises. On May 15, 1981, in the
midst of the clerical confrontation with President Bani Sadr and the
Mujahedin, a group of fifty hizbullahit attacked the kiosk holders of
Fatemi Avenue in Tehran. The thugs turned on the stall holders, using
iron clubs, knives, and similar objects. Some thirty kiosks and stalls
were badly damaged or totally destroyed, and seven vendors were seri-
ously injured. The attackers returned the following day to finish off the
remaining dakkeh-daars, this time leaving ten to fifteen wounded.76
There were similar, though not as devastating attacks in the provin-
cial cities. Between 1981 and 1984 the authorities in Shiraz, Tabriz,
Urumiyeh, Khorram Abad, Masjid Soleyman, Ghazvin, Langroud,
Kirmanshah, and Karadj gave the go-ahead to both Pasdaran and
club-wielders to destroy kiosks and remove the peddlers. Everyday
surveillance seemed to have a marked impact in reducing street activi-
ties. In April 1984 officials announced they had removed over 90 per-
cent of the 12.0,000 illegal vendors and kiosk holders from the streets
of Tehran. "The remainder," they promised, "will be dealt with
harshly in accordance with law."77 Some 1,865 street cigarette sellers
were arrested by July 1985 in Tehran alone.78 In the words of the
mayor "the obstruction of thoroughfares which could have major
social and political ramifications is on the verge of total resolution."7
Although street violence did force some vendors to retreat, the
removal policy in the capital affected mainly those centered in Maidan
Azadi, the margins of Valiye'asr Avenue (a major shopping center of
the well-to do), and Inqilab Avenue. Four years into the campaigns a
STREET REBEIS 149
mood of resignation replaced the language of aggression. In March
1983 the mayor of Shiraz pleaded with the citizens to "offer us a solu-
tion."1"1 In Tehran the head of the CCMAOT, Muhammad Malayeri,
acknowledged that "our [demolition) agents are operating in the most
difficult and dangerous conditions. Every day a number of them get
beaten up and injured by the vendors, and after a while they get tired
and worn down."1" Some vendors stood and defended their enterprise;
many owners of the less versatile kiosks moved to less noticeable loca-
tions; the more flexible peddlers took up a guerrilla-type tactic of resis-
tance.
Resisting the Eviction Policy
Vendors resisted the eviction policy in different ways. They organized
street demonstrations, withstood the eviction agents on the spot, took
legal actions, and publicized their plight in the press. The most endur-
ing method was the everyday guerrilla-type tactic of "sell and run."
What determined these diverse tactics had to do with the differing
types of vending and the changing political circumstances. Vendors did
not rely solely on informal association or active mobilization; these
tactics were less useful after the state repression began. The enduring
factor was the operation of "passive networking" among vendors.
Passive networking is the instantaneous and silent communication
established among atomized individuals with common interests by
virtue of a visibility that is facilitated through common space. Those
individual vendors who worked in the same street and saw one
another on a daily basis could develop latent communications merely
by the fact of their common interest, even though they might not know
or speak with one another. When a common threat arrived, they came
together spontaneously to act collectively.
Demonstrations and sit-ins were organized largely by the political
and immobile vendors. They took place in the early years of the post-
revolution, 1979 to 1981, when this method of protest enjoyed a wide
legitimacy. The vendors demonstrated either in order to hinder their
forced removal or to publicize their plight and express their anger after
an eviction had already occurred. Thus, on December 16, 1981, a
small group of Tehran! vendors responded to a demolition raid by
assembling in front of the municipality. A representative was sent to
plead with the mayor, who pledged to provide them with a space to set
up an off-street market. Similarly, in Kirmanshah (Bakhtaran), some
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three hundred vendors staged a march on the city hall to protest
against an attack by the Pasdaran who two weeks earlier had
destroyed their kiosks. They asked the authorities to allow them to sell
all their merchandise and establish a permanent off-street market for
them. The mayor agreed to both their claims.82
For most part, however, demonstrations remained isolated, small-
scale, and loosely organized. They occurred mainly during 1979 and
1981 , when a freer political climate allowed left-wing activists to
mobilize street dissent. They often encountered violent reactions from
the Pasdaran, who considered such activities as a ploy to delegitimize
the revolution. A joint march organized by the Union of the Street
Book-Sellers and the Union of the Kiosk Holders of Mosaddeq Avenue
in July 1980 was dealt with very harshly. It lasted a few days, involved
marching to the presidential office and city hall, and resulted in many
injuries and the ki l l ing of one demonstrator by the Pasdaran.*'
Because of their mobilizing role, political vendors were more sus-
ceptible to violent reactions than others. They were not only defending
their jobs, they were also exposing the government's violation of free-
dom of expression. While their forms of resistance tended to be more
elaborate and loud, their successes proved limited. By the summer of
1981 the political vendors had been driven off the streets, leaving the
ordinary vendors on their own, with some resorting to on-the-spot
defense of their enterprises.
On December 15, 1985, CCMAOT squads, along with groups of
Pasdaran, raided a f ru i t market located in the Falake-ye Dovvom-i
Khazaneh, a poor neighborhood in South Tehran. They began to col-
lect handcarts, scales, and similar belongings, throwing fruits into the
sewage ditches running through the market. The vendors responded
with their fists, inciting the Pasdaran to shoot into the air. One cart
owner reacted by throwing a heavy scale weight at the agents, knock-
ing one down. They beat him up and dragged him to the Security
Komtteh. Reportedly, the women present defended the vendors,
screaming at the agents and blaming the troubles on them."4
Despite open resistance of this sort, the outcome for the vendors
was not always favorable. On-the-spot resistance certainly made the
removal policy very costly and slow. In particular, the involvement
during each confrontation of scores of sympathizers and passers-by
would frustrate police operations, leaving the agents embarrassed and
indignant. Yet the vendors also felt the cost of their constant vigilance
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and the insecurity of everyday clashes with the demolition agents. One
vending stronghold around Tehran University resisted the eviction pol-
icy until April 1990; despite their bitter resistance—eighty were
detained—they were eventually driven off the streets by Pasdaran and
by local shopkeepers.1" The scattered nature of street work, the local-
ized nature of their operation, and the fact of self-employment ren-
dered a large-scale resistance (similar to that of the factory workers or
the squatters) difficult. As the threat of demolition persisted, vendors
had to think of alternative solutions. From mid-1981 they turned to
other forms of struggle. Some took legal action against the CCMAOT,
bringing complaints to the courts, the Committee of Act 90 of the
Majlis, the Presidential Office, the speaker of the Majlis, and the
Administrative Justice Court (Divan ldalat-i Idaan). Lawsuits piled up
to the extent that the head of the CCMAOT expressed his frustration
at the time and energy they consumed.8''
Others resorted to a campaign of publicity and appeal in the press.
The two major Tehran dailies, Ettilaat and Kayhan, carried letters of
the vendors that combined cries for justice with desperation and
urgency. Ahmad Islami, a vendor from the city of Karadj wrote:
For the last eighteen years, I have been making a living and supporting
my seven-member family by selling daily papers in a kiosk. But some
time ago, the municipality in the city of K a r a d j began to collect the
kiosks on the ground that they obstructed the public thoroughfare and
they are doing this in the conditions where the cold winter is on its way.
We, the newspapers sellers, cannot do our business in the streets with-
out shelters. So, we appeal to the honorable mayor to allow us to carry
on our work through this winter. Otherwise, we will have no recourse
but to stay at home [doing nothing].*7
Rahim Rezaii, a peddler from Tehran, appealed:
I am a faludeh"* hawker, a tenant, and a breadwinner for a family of five.
I would like to request the honorable mayor to think of the families of
the vendors when he orders their eviction from the streets. If they [the
municipality! allocate us a market site anywhere in the city, we will
remove our business off the streets promptly and without any hesita-
tion.8'
Although these nonconfrontational campaigns proved effective in
changing the attitude of some policy-makers, they failed to deter the
immediate danger of eviction. These struggles represented largely the
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tactics of the kiosk holders and immobile vendors, whose fixed loca-
tion had become a liability. The method served as the last attempt to
which the kiosk holders could resort under the conditions of repres-
sion. The situation for the mobile and more versatile vendors, how-
ever, seemed quite different.
To survive the immediate threat of removal, the more versatile and
mobile vendors turned from an open confrontation to a war of attri-
tion through a hidden and everyday resistance. The f lu id i ty of the
operation of the hasaatis, peddlers, hawkers, wagon holders, lorry
keepers, and van owners made it possible for them to pack up their
merchandise once the antiobstruction squads appeared, and to resume
their operation as soon as the agents left the scene. The passive net-
work, which is facilitated by mere visibility and proximity, as well as
the active informal communication among the street vendors rendered
this quiet form of resistance highly successful. The vendors often
appointed a few peers to guard the vicinity of their work by informing
the others of the arrival of eviction agents, by shouting: "the agents are
coming, run away."*
On many occasions even the immobile kiosk holders followed sim-
ilar tactics. In the course of the six months following their first removal
in summer 1980 from Fatemi Avenue in Tehran, a group went back
several times to build their stalls, after being driven away each time.
On one day in February 1981 a number of them returned and hur-
riedly erected some seventy-five kiosks in a few hours.91 Ettilaat con-
cluded that, given this guerrilla-type campaign, the activities of the
demolition squads "have no outcome, except to waste time and
energy."'2
The antiobstruction vans and trucks drove around in the streets,
supposedly clearing away the unauthorized vendors. But as soon as
they moved away, "in a few minutes, everything gets back to normal
as if nothing had happened ... It appears that the Municipality is sim-
ply unable to do away with this highly extensive network."91 A large
number of the vendors individual ly went "invisible" by scattering to
less noticeable and less strategic positions. Some vendors stood by in
strategic locations where they displayed not merchandise but a piece of
cardboard that carried a list of potential items. Prospective customers
would then be guided to backstreets where the actual merchandise
were stored. This method reduced the risk of losing capital by enhanc-
ing vendors' ability to confront the police.
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To be more agile and mobile, vendors had to transform from kiosk-
owning to stall-holding, push-cart vending, and to simply carrying
cardboard signs. While this maneuver reduced vendors' active use of
both public space and business conditions, it ensured their continuing
presence in the street economy and politics.
In the end, the antiobstruction operations did not reduce the num-
ber of the venders as mush as they redistributed them. The problem
remained. In 1984 an Azari vendor, commenting on antivending poli-
cies, stated: "I have been a vendor for the last twenty years. Different
governments have been trying to remove us since the time of General
Razmara [1950-1951]. But they couldn't. I think, this regime also
won't be able to force us off the streets."<M As late as April 1990 a new
mayor of Tehran, Gholam Hussein Karbaschi, summed up the state of
affairs. "The problem of vending and obstruction in the large cities,"
he stated, "has always existed and will continue to persist. But the
approach to this problem should not be 'sitadi' [what the CCMAOT
adopted]." He then disclosed the new strategy of the government to
incorporate the more mobile vendors by establishing off-street collec-
tive markets throughout the city. 's Having failed to end street activi-
ties, the authorities decided to bring them under their own control.
Incorporation, Diffusion, and Back to the Streets?
By early 1986 the authorities had acknowledged that street activities
were there to stay. Their hope that at least the "seasonal" street ped-
dlers would return to their villages'" also appeared to be a fantasy. It
was widely accepted that the remedy to this "disease" must be sought
not in the cities but in the countryside, by tackling the development
problems in the rural areas. The official press carried articles, reports,
and debates on the predicament of street trade, wondering where these
desperate people would go if and when the removal policy succeeded.97
The question now was how to accommodate them without letting the
situation to get entirely out of hand.
In October 1985 the Tehran municipality began a survey of street
activities to identify those "who deserved to continue their activities,"
including the old, sick, and disabled, and those with at least ten years
in the business. Lawful vendors were required to get official permits,
to be issued by the Union of the Kiosk Holders and Ice Traders of
Tehran (UKHITT), which cooperated with the CAOT. This method
replaced an earlier policy whereby the "deserving vendors" would
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have to apply through and be recommended by the local mosques.98
According to the new directives, street activities were restricted to sell-
ing flowers, fresh fruit juice, machine-made bread, and foreign news-
papers. " The rest, the unlawful kiosk holders and peddlers, were to be
removed within forty-eight hours.
Municipality plans to construct formal street and off-street markets
had been entertained, two years earlier, to accommodate some 30,000
to 40,000 vendors and stall-holders in Tehran, placing them in such
street markets as Tangeh Chezabeh in Valiye'asr Avenue; Bazaarche-ye
2.2. Bahman in Nizamabad, which had about 200 stalls; and similar
units in Maidan-i Inqilab, Naser Khosrow Street, and especially in dis-
tricts in South Tehran."1" The plan barely got off the ground until the
early 19905, as street vending kept growing undeterred.""
With the coming to office of Karbaschi, a young, Western-educated
mayor, incorporation overcame confrontation. In the winter of 1992,,
seven flea markets began operating at different localities in the capital
city."'2 Each of these "traditional markets," as they were called, was
organized on a different day of the week. They accommodated up to
three hundred vendors. The markets were located in places such as
parking lots and blocked streets for a limited time, and no fees were
charged. In addition to professional vendors, households were also
allowed to sell their used items, and a special market was set up for
artists to exhibit and trade their creations. Some thirty-five markets
were planned to operate during 1992,. The vendors were encouraged
to establish shuras with the elected representatives serving the general
interests of the trade, negotiating with the authorities, and supervising
the tagged prices. The shura issued a special I.D. card for the "com-
mitted" vendors, recognizing them as members of the lawful vending
community.
(.overnment officials stated that their objectives in setting up the
markets were to coordinate the activities of the street vendors and to
reduce city traffic by localizing the supply of goods available to the
public at fair prices. Whatever the true aim, the project served to inte-
grate the scattered street vendors into a controllable structure by reg-
ulating the time and space of their operation. Both the place and the
timing of the markets were ad hoc, rotating in different parking lots or
blocked streets for a limited period of time. By bringing the vendors
collectively into designated places, officials could maintain surveil-
lance more efficiently. They could also prevent the vendors from devel-
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oping any sense of territoriality by moving them around to different
locations at different times."" Newspaper sellers also came under sur-
veillance through the standardization of their space. The municipality
relocated them into fixed kiosks, which it designed and that were given
only to licensed vendors. More than 650 of these official kiosks were
installed throughout Teheran.'"4 Nonstandard kiosks, easily recog-
nized, remained illegal.
Vendors nevertheless asserted their determination to remain in their
occupations, albeit in different settings. They won recognition, but had
to function in a controlled structure. How long can such a bargain
last? It depends probably upon the extent to which the markets wil l
respond to the long-term needs of the street's economic activities—to
secure a competitive income and to respond to the possible increase in
the size of street work. Otherwise, as it often happens in many places
such as Cairo, a return to the original patterns is a likely scenario.
Already by the mid-1990s, indications were that the flea markets in
Iran had begun to wither away, and many street rebels were on their
way back to the streets.
Eight
Grassroots and State Power: The Promise
and Perils of Quiet Encroachment
This book has been about the struggles of ordinary people to survive
and improve their lives. I have been concerned with a type of informal
politics, which I have termed the quiet encroachment of the ordinary—
the lifelong, everyday, small-scale, and often silent strivings of the
Third World poor, which at certain historical moments assume a col-
lective character, giving rise to major conflicts in society. At a different
level I have attempted to explore the relationship between social move-
ments and social change. In this concluding chapter I would like to
assess the significance of this type of grassroots activism, exploring its
implications both with reference to the specific case of Iran and more
broadly in relation to a number of theoretical issues.
Significance
The preceding chapters discussed in detail how the urban poor in Iran
strove to extend their social and economic space both where they lived
and in their working lives. The chapters chronicled the way in which
squatter migrants brought urban land under development both long
before the Islamic revolution and after, creating new communities; the
way in which they demanded urban amenities from the authorities, or
acquired them unlawfully. Street subsistence workers took over the
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main public thoroughfares, putting up stalls, driving pushcarts, and
erecting kiosks. Taking advantage of the opportunities provided by the
revolution, poor families appropriated vacant homes and hotels and
the unemployed strove to secure jobs or else demanded social protec-
tion. The justification for action was based invariably on the moral
principle of necessity. Nevertheless, rational calculation was also part
of the game.
Many of these efforts involved organizing, marching in the streets,
and scuffling with security forces. Others involved community mobi-
lization, identity politics, and struggles for communal and cultural
autonomy. Undoubtedly the Islamic Revolution of 1979 provided the
poor with an exceptional opportunity for collective and audible mobi-
lization. Yet, for the most part under normal circumstances, the actors,
these "informal people" without any institutional structure, were indi-
viduals and families who made their advances steadily, individually,
and without much clamor.
From these considerations alone a number of simple but important
conclusions emerge. First, given the limited opportunities available to
the poor (in terms of income, education, skill, and connections), such
direct actions constitute the most viable method for their self-develop-
ment. Most commentators, focusing on the structural processes of
social exclusion and poverty, neglect those on the receiving end of the
process—the excluded—or else regard them as victims. However, I
have looked at the everyday life and social activities of the excluded
groups in terms of a particular type of grassroots movement, showing
that the poor are not simply passive recipients of change but are also
actors in its making. I have shown that, contrary to the prevailing
stereotypes that portray them as "passive poor," "fatalistic Muslim
masses," or "disoriented marginals," the disenfranchised do not sit
around to wait for their fate but are actively engaged, within their con-
straints, in shaping their own destiny. In this context the Muslim
Middle Easterners, despite cultural differences, are no different from
other low-income groups in the developing world.
This raises a second point. There is a widespread assumption that
the appeal of political Islam is to the masses, especially the recent poor
migrants to cities. A deep religiosity, along with shared language and
institutions, are said to bring the masses and the clergy together, ren-
dering them close allies. The accounts in this book (and my current
research in Egypt) show that the relationship between the poor on the
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one hand and the Islamic movements and the Islamic state, on the
other, is much more complex. There is no such a thing as a natural ally
for political Islam. The activities of Egyptian Islamists among the
urban poor are very scattered and pragmatic, and so is the reciprocal
support of the poor; the underclass in urban Egypt is left predomi-
nantly on its own. In Iran, on the other hand, the ruling clergy never
established total hegemony over the poor, despite its pro-mustaz'afin
discourse. Rather, the disenfranchised were polarized. Some seg-
ments—including groups within the revolutionary guards, Basijis, the
Construction Crusade, and the like—were incorporated into the state
structure. Others remained outside, and their struggles for self-devel-
opment brought them into conflict with the Islamic state. These
include those hybrid elements whose ideological a f f in i ty with the
Islamic government did not deter their daily struggles against the same
government's agents (Pasdaran, the municipality and so on).
The fact is that the disenfranchised cannot afford to be ideological.
As the historical narratives in this book evidence, the political ideo-
logical class par excellence is not the poor but, as usual, is the class
made up of students, teachers, and other sectors of the intelligentsia,
who seem to be initiators and leaders of most radical and oppositional
politics, including the Islamic. Most of the poor seem to be uninter-
ested in any particular form of ideology and politics, whether govern-
mental (e.g., Islamic as in Iran) or oppositional (e.g., leftist). Their
interests lie in those strategies and associations that respond directly to
their immediate concerns. Their attachment to informal primary rela-
tions and solidarities seems to be the best form of protection. This, I
should emphasize, is not meant to imply an essential lack of interest on
the part of the poor in abstract thinking or planning for distant futures.
On the contrary, many poor people live on the dream of a better future.
In the Middle East the particular attention that poor families pay to the
well-being and education of their children is a proof of their foresight.
My point is that such forethoughts may be internalized only if they are
immediately concrete and meaningful in the poor's cul tural world-
views.
Of course, when opportunity arises, as in multiparty democracy or
under political patronage, attempts are indeed made to articulate the
politics of the state and/or oppositional groups and the interests of the
poor. However, this articulation of interest does not usually last long,
since the poor's stake in the immediate and the concrete distracts them
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from the abstract ideology and long-term program of both the opposi-
tion and the state. Perhaps more than any other social groups, the poor
tend to rely on themselves to survive and improve their lot.
Yet in their endeavors to survive—and this is my third point—these
ordinary people with their ordinary ways bring about significant social
change—the kind of changes that at times are comparable to those a
revolution may (or may not) produce for them. Beyond affecting their
lives, these localized practices, meanwhile, entail critical social changes
at the broader level—in national demography, urban structure, law
and order, and public policy. The actors' efforts in redistributing social
goods and opportunities, together with their struggle for autonomy,
tend to lay a heavy economic and poli t ical cost on the dominant
groups, t i l t ing the balance of power in society.
Some may equate these localized struggles with desperate acts of
survival in conditions where a nationwide reform movement is lack-
ing. Thus a revolution sympathetic to the poor is expected to end their
quiet encroachment. However, such a formulation raises some difficult
questions. To begin with, why is a nationwide reform movement lack-
ing in the first place, and how can one be brought about? How often
does a revolution sympathetic to the cause of the poor take place, and
what are the poor to do in anticipation of such a reform or revolution?
After all, the Islamic revolution in Iran did not entirely end the quiet
encroachment of the poor. What it did was alter its dynamics by facil-
itating collective mobilization and extrakinship association. Yet when
the revolutionary uproar subsided and the Islamic regime consoli-
dated, the disenfranchised returned to the same strategy that they had
pursued in the years before the revolution. This was not because the
Islamic regime was anti-lower class. In fact, its pro-mustaz'afin lan-
guage was clear. Furthermore, the state based its legitimacy on Islam
as a religion of justice, and on its ardent support of the downtrodden.
Rather, for the poor, localized struggle, unlike an abstract and dis-
tant "revolution," was both meaningful and manageable—meaningful
in that they could make sense of the purpose and have an idea about
the consequence of those actions, and manageable in that r/7t'y,rather
than some remote national leaders, set the agenda, projected the aims,
and controlled the outcome. In this sense, for the poor, the local was
usually privileged over the global/national. In addition, the flexibili ty
and perseverance associated with such grassroots activism enabled the
poor to extend their social space and to respond to political constraints
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more effectively. In authoritarian political conditions, family-centered
and free-form activism often substitute for and prove more durable
than structured and formal organizations.
More broadly, and precisely because of this largely silent and free-
form mobilization, the current focus on the notion of "civil society"
tends to belittle or totally ignore the vast array of often uninstitution-
alized and hybrid social activities—street politics—that have domi-
nated urban politics in many developing countries. To be sure, there is
more than just one conceptualization of civil society, and of course it
is crucial to understand what one means by the term. Julian
Schwedler's review of the literature on the Middle East reveals the
tremendous diversity of perceptions not only between the classical and
contemporary variants but also within the latter. Some perceive of civil
society as organized life that lies outside the state. Others exclude from
this, family, tribe, and clan; others, religious institutions; others, by
attributing moral qualities to the concept, leave out violent groups.'
Yet all seem to agree that an associational core constitutes an integral
element of civil society and is therefore essentially privileged over other
forms of social expression.
Without intending to downgrade the value of "civility"2—central to
the notion of social capital—my point is that the reductionism of the
debates on civil society excludes and even scorns modes of struggle and
expression that, in some societies such as those in the Middle East, are
more extensive and effective than conventional independent institu-
tions.
Shortcomings and Costs
Recognizing the merits of grassroots activities associated with quiet
encroachment, however, should not blind us to their costs and failures.
Some have already reminded us of the danger of "the romance of resis-
tance."' The sad truth is that not everything in the life of the poor is
rosy, and that the poor face enormous obstacles in bringing about fun-
damental change in their lives. Nor, on the other hand, is a lifelong
struggle necessarily a virtue, even if it eventually yields the desired
results. The recent history of the poor in Iran is witness to this. The
unemployed, despite a powerful show of force and visibility in the
streets, failed to realize fully their demands for jobs or social security
benefits. Many homeless families failed to retain the homes and hotels
they had seized and were forcefully evicted. Squatters faced violent
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counterattacks by security forces; water and electricity supplies were
cut, hundreds of informal homes were demolished, communities were
dismantled, independent neighborhood councils fell apart, and
activists were arrested and jailed. Street vendors endured similar set-
backs. After some ten years of confrontations, it was as if they had dis-
appeared from the streets. Of course, these contenders were not elim-
inated altogether. Yet although most of them resisted, they had to bear
with constant insecurity and despair. Indeed, for some time in the late
i y8os it was as if street politics had simply waned. What caused these
costs and setbacks? What do they all mean?
Some obstacles had to do with the poor's own dynamics, and some
were structural—notably those relating to the role of the state. But
before elaborating on these, let me make it clear that, despite occa-
sional overlaps among the actors, each of these particular grassroots
activities (i.e., home/hotel occupation, informal home construction,
unemployed protests, and street vendor struggles) had their own speci-
ficities, which affected the degree of their success. The composition of
the actors, the internal organization, the nature of demands, and the
identity of the enemies were the most salient factors. For instance,
unlike in land-squatting and street vending, radical students also par-
ticipated in both home takeovers and the unemployed protests. This
was both a strength and a liability—a strength because of their sup-
port, and a l iabil i ty in that it would make the movement more suscep-
tible to government suppression. On the other hand, such radical
demands as seizure of private homes and hotels, or unemployment
benefits had a highly political dimension; the state's reactions against
them were much more swift than against the unemployment loan or
the squatting on state land or on properties belonging to agents of the
past regime. Furthermore, the Islamic regime showed a greater hostil-
ity toward the political vendors, the students occupying hotels, and the
rich developers squatting on urban lands than toward their urban poor
counterparts. And finally, the movement of the unemployed was more
a protest movement, whereas the squatters' and the vendors' direct
actions served as the solutions to their problems.
Specificities apart, the internal shortcomings of the movements
expressed themselves in various ways. First, as a lifelong, sustained,
albeit silent encroachment, they were broadly independent and largely
unlawful and thus constantly involved the risk of suppression. Second,
quiet encroachment is a f luid, scattered, and unstructured form of
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activism. Surely this feature overrides Piven and Cloward's concern
about the danger of "organizational oligarchy" that, according to
them, defeated the poor people's movements in the U.S. during the
19305." Yet, while quiet encroachment may have the advantage of
decentralization, flexibility, and endurance, it suffers from the lack of
structured organization as well as legal and technical support. In addi-
tion, both the scattered individual initiatives (rather than collective
action) and the repressive conditions under which they usually operate
are detrimental to solidarity and democratic association. Loyalties are
restricted primarily to families and kinship. Hxtrakinship mobilization
and campaigning do not usually develop under repressive conditions,
unless the actors feel a common threat to their gains.
When the possibility of organized struggles and association imme-
diately surfaced in postrevolution Iran, the urban poor generally found
themselves lacking the experience of modern organization and group
work; they therefore relied heavily on local student or professional
activists. I lon/ontal links among the contenders remained scattered
and feeble. Thus the major associations concerned with the mobiliza-
tion of the urban poor—i.e., those set up in the occupied homes/hotels,
in neighborhoods, among the unemployed, and among the street ven-
dors—were considerably influenced by the leftists or radical Muslims.
At times political investment as well as rivalry among these largely-
middle class agitators distorted both the local organizations of the
poor and the process of democratic decision-making. And eventually
the Islamic government's crackdown on the professional activists seri-
ously curtailed much of the organized mobilization of the poor.
The wrath of repression also subsumed the poor's independent
associations by either forcefully dismantling them or incorporating
them into the ruling groups. As the regulator of urban land, public
space, and order, the state forged a tacit alliance with the "legitimate
property owners," shopkeepers, and bazaaris in confronting street pol-
itics. Here the ruling clergy mixed a policy of repression with populis-
tic reforms. Evicting home squatters, bulldozing informal settlements,
and removing street vendors went almost hand in hand with job cre-
ation schemes, resettlement projects, urban land allocation, and the
creation of flea markets. However, these reform measures proved
insufficient to respond to the growing demands of the urban disen-
franchised.
Given these internal weaknesses, it was the state that in the end
164 GRASSROOTS AND STATE POWER
posed the major challenge to street politics throughout the 19805. The
crackdowns on the independent movements became more systematic
and widespread when, following a short period of revolutionary
chaos, normality returned and the Islamic regime was consolidated.
The seizure of the U.S. embassy in 1979, and the escalation of the war
with Iraq during the 19805 facilitated the suppression of internal com-
plaints, including those of the urban poor, in the name of national
unity, national security, and the anti-imperialist campaign. Thus open,
collective, and audible mobilization was seriously undermined, and the
disenfranchised withdrew into backstreet politics, only to reappear in
the streets once again in the early 19905.
Foucault's insistence that power is everywhere, that it "circulates,"
and is never "localized here or there, never in anybody's hands"5 is
surely instructive in transcending the myth of the powerlessness of the
ordinary and in recognizing their agency. The stories in this book are
a testimony to this. Yet, this "decentered" notion of power, shared by
many poststructuralists,6 underestimates state power, notably its class
dimension, since it fails to see that although power circulates, it does
so unevenly; in some places it is far weightier and more concentrated
than in others. In the context of our discussion, this means simply that
like it or not the state does matter: despite the current prevalence of
neo-liberal ideas, it continues to be the major political player.
The role of the state is not limited to control. It also undertakes the
responsibility of coordination, of which national, regional, and local
planning is a principal function. It is, indeed, an old question as to how
far the quiet or even open encroachment of the poor can proceed given
the omnipresence of the state and the market. John Friedmann is right
that although alternative development must begin locally, "without
the state's collaboration, the lot of the poor cannot be significantly
improved."7 The fact is that if grassroots development initiatives and
direct actions are to succeed, they cannot remain isolated from plan-
ning systems. Beyond simple shelter, the poor also want (and struggle
for) schools, roads, and public parks; in addition to a spot in the street,
vendors also need security, credit, and market information. These, plus
jobs and social security, can hardly be achieved without the coopera-
tion of the state.
However, planning as such is not a neutral territory; rather, it is a
matrix of conflicting interests and struggles. Development plans tend
not only to ignore local diversity and difference but also to overlook
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the particular needs and concerns of the low-income population."
Perhaps a concept of a democratic planning might accommodate mul-
tiplicity and specific concerns within a broad planning mechanism.
Democratic planning is projected and implemented with effective par-
ticipation from those who are affected, in particular, the poor. It is only
through struggle that the interests of the poor may be effectively
asserted. Quiet direct actions and grassroots movements are likely to
continue so long as the needs of the disenfranchised are not met. A
continuous grassroots activism of this sort, despite its costs, not only
ensures that some basic necessities are fulfilled but in the long run may
compel the state to take account of the concerns of the poor in its
broader policies.
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an average of 17 percent. In this year the unemployment rate reached 12. per-
cent in Latin America (19 countries), 17 percent in Asia (14 countries), and 2.1
percent for n African countries; (statistics compiled from CIA, The World
f act Book 1992).
60. See Leeds and Leeds, "Accounting for Behavioral Differences"; al-
Sayyad, "Informal Housing in a Comparative Perspective"; Lessinger,
"Nobody Here to Yell at Me"; Cross, "Organization and Resistance in the
Informal Economy."
61. See al-Sayyad, "Informal Housing in a Comparative Perspective";
Nelson, Access To Power and "The Urban Poor."
62. See Nelson, "The Urban Poor"; Geisse and Sabatini, "Latin American
Cities and Their Poor," p. 327; Cross, "Organization and Resistance in the
Informal Economy"; De Soto, The Other Path.
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63. For a detailed discussion of this point see Piven and Cloward, Poor
People's Movements.
TWO Mapping Out the "New Poor"
i . I draw this from the way Peter Worsley has identified the urban poor in
his Three Worlds, pp. 195-196.
i. The protoganists include Park, "Human Migration and the Marginal
Man"; Stonequist, "The Problem of Marginal Man"; Wirth, "Urban Way of
Life"; and, more recently, Oscar Lewis, "Culture of Poverty."
3. This is how Janice Perlman and Manuell Castells use the term; see
Perlman, The Myth of Marginality; Castells, Cities and the Grassroots.
4. For operational purposes, in this study I take the category urban poor
as consisting of urban squatters, the unemployed, and street subsistence work-
ers, who all seem to share similar residential conditions. Some of them might
be involved in all of the four movements—of squatters (homes and land), the
unemployed, and street vendors—1 examine in this book.
5. See Katouzian, The Political Economy of Modern Iran.
6. See Shahri, Tehran-i Qadtm, 1:9—10; Ashraf, "Marateb-i Ijteman dar
Dowran-i Qajariye"; Marcus, The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity.
7. See Floor, "Political Role of Lutis in Iran," pp. 84-85; and
Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 2.2..
8. Ashraf, "Marateb-i Ijtemaii dar Dowran-i Qajariye," p. 84; Saidnia,
"Sakhtar-i Tehran," p. 32.4.
9. Takiyeh represents ad hoc Islamic gatherings; Ta'ziyeh is religious pas-
sion play, and Muharram, an Arabic month when Imam Hussein, the second
Imam of the Shi'ites, was killed in the battle of Karbala. There are numerous
forms of commemoration by the Shi'i community during tins month.
10. See Ashraf, "The Roots of Emerging Dual Class Structure."
i i . Banani, The Modernization of Iran, p. 144; Saidnia, "Sakhtar-i
Tehran," pp. 314-42.8.
12,. See Khosrowkhavar, "Nouvelle banlieue et marginalité."
13. For a useful review of comprehensive urban planning see The Iranian
Center for Urban and Architectural Studies (Markaz-i Motali'at va Tahqiqat
Shahrsazi va Me'mari-ye Iran), Hashiyenishim dar Iran: Elal va Rah-i Hal-ha,
report on phase 4, vol. i, "Housing, Informal Settlements, and Spatial
Development Planning." In the same series, see also the report on phase 5,
"Recognizing the Low-Income as Citizens," pp. 16-2.1.
14. See Amirahmadi and Kiafar, "Tehran: Growth and Contradictions,"
p. 173.
15. Saidnia, "Sakhtar-i Tehran," p. 319.
16. See Hussemzadeh Dalir, Tarh-i Tahqiqi-ye Hashiyemshinan-i Tabriz,
pp. i 3 and 14.
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\j. See Danesh, Rural Exodus and Squatter Settlements in the Third
World, p. 129.
i 8. Mashadizadeh, Tahlilt az Vizheguiha-ye Barnameh Rtzt-ye Shahri dar
Iran, p. 12.9.
19. Iranian Center for Urban and Architectural Studies, Hashiyenishini dar
Iran, report on phase 5, "Recognizing the Low-Income as Citizens," pp. 49-
50.
2.0. See Kazemi, Poverty and Revolution in Iran, p. 48.
21 . Ibid, p. 50.
2.2. See Danesh, Rural Exodus and Squatter Settlements, pp. i 31-132,.
13. See Jalili, 1356, cited in Piran, "Alounaknishini dar Tehran," in
Ettilaat-i Syassi-lqtisadi, no. 19, p. 52..
24. On Zoorabad see Tehran University, Institute of Social Studies and
Research, Mutale'e-yi Muqaddamati Darbare-ye Zoorabad (Islamabad)
Karadj.
2.5. It is notoriously difficult to give a precise figure on the number of the
slum-dwellers. But if we take the density of people per room (five to ten peo-
ple living in two rooms) as an important measure of slum dwelling, then it
becomes clear that at least one million poor, accounting for 12.4 percent of the
total households, inhabited these neighborhoods (Tehran Census,
l3S9[ll98o]). This criterion fits well, for instance, with Khazane-i Fallahi slum
in Southeast Tehran. According to a survey, 46 percent of the houses in this
neighborhood had only one room and another 45 percent two rooms. The typ-
ical household in this area had between six and seven resident members (cited
in Kazemi, Poverty and Revolution in Iran, p. 78). In addition, the relation-
ship between density and poverty in Tehran is documented by Connell,
"Tehran," and Bahrambeygui, Tehran: An Urban Analysis. See also
Amirahmadi and Kiafar, "Tehran: Growth and Contradictions," p. 173.
2.6. According to the Tehran census, well over 80,000 units (9 percent) had
been constructed with scmidurable materials including a mixture of bricks and
wood, mud, bamboo leaves, and similar materials. Perhaps of these, more than
48,000 settlement units (5 percent) lacked drinking water, instead depending
on such sources as river, wells, underground water, and public street taps
(Tehran Census, / 3 W|/i 98 11, p. 4 i ). If one views these as informal units that
housed five-member households, then some 400,000 people of Tehran lived in
the informal settlements.
As I stated earlier, squatter settlements also grew in other main cities,
among which Tabriz, Bandar Abbas, and Ahwaz had the highest ratio of
squatters to total population; see Husseinzadeh Dalir, Tarh-i Tahqigi-ye
Hashiyenishinan: Tabriz, pp. 13-14.
2.7. The Iranian Center for Urban and Architectural Studies, Hashiyenishini
dar Iran, report on phase 5, "Recognizing the Low-Income as Citizens,"
pp. 49-50.
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18. See Amirahmadi and Kiafar, "Tehran: Growth and Contradictions,"
p. 171.
19. See Planning and Budget Organization, Census of Population, tor
1956; 1966; 1976.
30. See Saidnia, "Sakhtar-i Tehran," p. 334.
5 1 . Sir I n s t i t u t e of Social Studies and Research, Motale'e-yi Muqaddamati,
p. 6.
31. This information is based upon a recent comprehensive study, spon-
sored by the Ministry of Housing, on informal settlement in Iran, published in
7 volumes so far; see The Iranian Center for Urban and Architectural Studies,
Hashiyemshint dar Iran, Report of phase 4, "Housing, Informal Settlements,
and Spatial Development Planning," z:i9~35.
33. The Iranian Center for Urban and Architectural Studies, Hashiyenishini
dar Iran, report on phase 4, 1:2.5-33.
34. Kazerouni and Qal'egolabi, "Tasvir-i Aamari-ye Hashiyenishinan."
Mashadi/.adeh also gives similar picture of the occupations of squatters; see his
Tahlili' az Vizhegwha-ye Barnamehnzt, p. 133.
35. Ka/.emi, Poverty and Revolution in Iran, p. 53-56.
36. According to a survey, over 90 percent of Tehran's squatters expressed
t heir satisfaction with their existing situation when comparing it to their past;
see Mashadi/.adeh, Tahlili az Vizheguiha-ye Barnamehnzi, p. 145.
37. For instance, industrial workers seemed to distinguish themselves from
the new poor whom they regarded as belonging to a fourth class. See Ashraf,
Iran: Imperialism, Class and Modernization from Above, p. 345.
38. Interview with a squatter of Ali Abad, Khazaneh, in South Tehran; con-
ducted in 1995 by sociology students, University of 'Allame-ye Tabatbaii.
39. Golesorkhi, a poet and journalist, was charged with plotting to assas-
sinate members of royal family during the mid-1970s and was subsequently
executed.
40. His short stories include "14 Hours in Dream and Awakening" (Beest-
o-Chahar Saa'at dar Khab va Bidaari), and "The Sugar Beet Seller Boy"
(Pesarak-i Labou-Foroush).
41. Such as "The Beggar" (geda), and "The Best Father in the World"
(Behtann ßaba-ye Donya).
41. This theme is quite vivid in Ale-ahmad's well-known essay
Gharbzadegui, translated into English as The Plague of the West.
43. See Akbari, Lumpemsm, pp. 80-89.
THREE The Disfranchised and the Islamic Revolution:
"Our Revolution and Theirs"
i. Jumhun-ye Islami, Farvardin 17, 1360/14X1.
i. Quoted in Faryad-i Gowdnishm, no. 14, i Aban 1358/1979, p. i.
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3. This background section on the Iranian revolution is based on Bayat,
"Revolution Without Movement, Movement Without Revolution: Comparing
Islamist Activism in Iran and Egypt," memo, 1996. For a historical back-
ground to the Iranian revolution see Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two
Revolutions (Princeton, 1982.) and Homa Katouzian, The Political Economy
of Modern Iran (London, 1981). For literature on the Islamic Revolution,
reflecting different perspectives, see Abrahamian, Iran Between Two
Revolutions; Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown (Oxford,
1988); Mansoor Moaddel, Class, State, and Ideology in the Iranian
Revolution (New York, 1993); and Mohsen Milani, The Making of the Islamic
Revolution in Iran (Boulder, 1988). The best account may be found in Misagh
Parsa, The Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution (New Brunswick, 1989).
4. On the antidemocratic nature of the Shah's regime and its political
implications see Fred Halliday on SAVAK activities in his Iran: Dictatorship
and Development (London, 1977) and Habib Lajevardi, Labor Unions and
Autocracy in Iran (Syracuse, 1985).
5. On guerrilla activities in Iran see Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and
Development, and Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions.
6. Eric Hooglund, for instance, asserts that the land reform of 1963
destroyed the traditional rural social structure without offering a workable
alternative. Rural masses were thus forced to migrate to major urban centers
such as Tehran where they became available for mobilization on behalf of the
revolution; see Hooglund, Land and Revolution in Iran.
j. For an example see Rahnama and Nomani, Secular Miracle. In addi-
tion, Mohammad Amjad asserts: "The rural migrants' active participation in
the 1977-1979 movement against the Shah eventually resulted in the over-
throw of the Monarchy. . . . The populist ideology of Islam played a crucial
role in mobilizing the masses"; see Amjad, "Rural Migrants," p. 35.
8. See Kazemi, Poverty and Revolution in Iran; Mottahedeh, The Mantle
of the Prophet; Denoeux, Urban Unrest in the Middle East.
9. See Bauer, "Poor Women and Social Consciousness in Revolutionary
Iran," p. 160. Mehdi Bazargan, the first Prime Minister of the Islamic
Republic, who participated in most of the demonstrations in Tehran and
recorded his observations, also arrived at similar conclusions; see Bazargan,
lnqilab-i Iran dar Dow Harakat, p. 39.
IQ. See Amraaii, Barrasi-ye Moqe'iyyat-i ljtimai-ye Shohada-ye lnqilab-i
Islami, pp. 178-179. This unique work—"A Study of the Social Background
of the Martyrs of the Islamic Revolution: August 13, 1977 to February 19,
1978"—reveals the socioeconomic background of those who participated in
the Revolution, with a focus on the city of Tehran.
11. For the basis of this observation see my analysis in chapter i of this
book. See also Banuazizi, "Alounaknishinan-i Khiaban-i Professor Brown,"
and Organization of People's Fedaii Guerrillas of Iran (OPFGI), Mubanzat-i
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Daliraneh-ye Mardum-i Kharej az Mahdudeh. I have also utilized my own
direct experience and observations for many years among the poor families
that I grew up in and with. On this see the preface to this book.
ii. See Banuazizi, "Alounaknishinan."
i ?. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels.
14. See the text of interviews in OPFGI, Mubarizat-i Daliraneh, pp. 38
and 34; see also Banuazi/i, "Alounaknishinan," pp. 61 and 6z.
To dramatize his story, the writer of the above letter seems to exaggerate
about borrowing 100,000 tumans, which at the time was a relatively large
sum.
Like the urban poor, the peasants and the rural poor would also make sim-
ilar appeals to the pedar-i taajdaar, whom they considered as the benevolent
monarch. During my student years in Iran, and as a part-time employee of the
Ministry of Higher Education, I came across hundreds of similar appeals, or
letters, which a mission of the Ministry brought back after a visit to the poor
province of Sistan and Baluchestan. They had been sent by the poor to the
Shah, asking for variety of assistance, including debt payment, b u i l d i n g
homes, and compensation for crop failure. One fine sunny morning the letters
were disposed in a dustbin.
i 5. Taaj-o-takht refers to the crown, and royal leadership.
16. Interview with a poor resident of Serah-i Azari in South Tehran, in
Autumn 1980.
17. See OPFGI, Mubanzat-i Daliraneh, pp. 10, 11 ,11 ,18 ,31 ,33 ,35 ,43 ,
and 88.
i 8. In the same reports from which these statements are drawn, there
were also a number of statements from younger inhabitants in the squatter
communities, which directly referred to the Shah and the government as
sources of their misfortune. If "political insurance" was a concern of the poor
squatters, one would expect these residents also to pretend that the Shah was
innocent, which they in fact did not. My reading is that no one acted tactically
h e re. Most of the poor considered the Shah above politics; while only a few
found him responsible for their poverty. Both groups expressed their position
clearly.
19. For Chile see Castells, "Squatters and the State in Latin America"; for
Peru, Stokes, "Politics and Latin America's Urban Poor," pp. 98-99; Burt,
"Popular Struggles in Peru," and De Soto, The Other Path; for Turkey, Karpat,
The Gecekondu. For Egypt I rely on the sample survey—"Social Response to
Environmental Change in F'gypt"—on four major Cairo poor neighbor-
hoods—Kafr al-Elow (Helwan), Dar al-Salaam (South Cairo), Sayyida Zeinab
(central Cairo), and the village of Abkhaz (about 50 kilometers north of
Cairo), conducted by Social Research Center, the American University in
Cairo, with the principal researchers, Sohair Mehanna and Nicholas Hopkins,
1996.
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As for Iran, it seems that the class composition of the informal housing sec-
tor after the revolution is changing. That is, the members of the industrial
working class and lower-middle classes are increasingly joining the marginal-
ized poor in territorial terms; sec chapter 5.
20. See Bauer, "Poor Women and Social Consciousness in Revolutionary
Iran," p. 107.
21. This sharply contrasts with the pattern in Cairo where numerous
squatter communities and slums (e.g., Imbaba, Boula' Abul-Alaa, Sayyida
Zeinab, Dar Essalaam) are attached to wealthy neighborhoods (e.g., Zamalek,
(r.irden City, and Maadi).
22. A general review of squatters' literacy states that "squatters are of low
m literacy. Most of the older people are illiterate. Children are sent to work
instead of school. Mainly boys attend school"; sec N. Mashadizadeh, Tahlili
az Vtzheguiha-ye Barnamehnzi, p. 132.
23. See Bayat, Workers and Revolution in Iran.
14. See Portes and Walton, Urban Latin America, pp. 73-74.
25. See Hur t , "Popular Struggles in Peru."
26. My survey of i 50 factory workers in Tehran in i yX i showed that over
60 percent lived in the slums; see Bayat, "Poverty, Urbanizat ion, and
Development."
27. See Lajevardi, Labor Unions and Autocracy in Iran.
28. See Bayat, Workers and Revolution in Iran.
29. See Vieille, ]aygah-i Kargaran-i Tehran, pp. 38 and 39; Banuazizi,
"Alounaki i i s l i inan ."
30. See Banuazizi, "Alounaknishinan," pp. 59-60; see also Piran,
"Alounaknishmi dar Tehran."
31. Ramadan refers to the month of fas t ing when Ali, the first Imam of the
Shi'ites was kil led. Muharram is the month in which Hussein, Ali's son, the
second Imam was martyred.
32. Both the Hussemiyeh and Hey'at are ad hoc Is lamic sermons orga-
nized mostly in the months of Muharram and Ramadan. Janet Bauer has doc-
umented some of these activities in a poor South Tehran neighborhood during
the revolution; see Bauer, "Poor Women and Social Consciousness in
Revolutionary Iran."
33. See for instance Kazemi, Poverty and Revolution in Iran, pp. 90-96;
Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet, pp. 350-356; Dcnoeux, Urhtin
Unrest in the Middle hast, pp. 157-58.
34. The terms he used to describe the poor included badbakhtan (unfor-
tunate), mellat-i bichareh (desperate people), mustamandan (the needy),
tabaqat-i bichareh (unfortunate classes) and Kargaran (workers); see
Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini, Sahtfe-ye Nour, collected works compiled
and edited by the Ministry of National Guidance.
35. He stated that: "It is intrinsic to the character of the lay people to
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adhere to the past and the way that they are accustomed to; they do not dis
tinguish between right and wrong. Common people usually label any new phe-
nomenon as heresy or carnal desire; they do not understand the principal law
of creation and the circumstances ot n a t u r e and therefore they object to any
new ideas and endorse the status quo." See Anonymous, ed., Bähst Darbare-
ye Marja'iyat va Ruhaniyat, p. 183. The translation is by Professor Ali
Mirsepassi.
36. See Shariati, Jahatguiri-ye Tabaqati-ye Islam. On the middle-class
constituency of the Left and the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organizations, see
Abrahamian, "The Guerrilla Movement in Iran, 1963-1977" and his Radical
Islam: The Mujahedin of Iran.
37. See Ayatollah Khomeini, Sahife-ye Nour, ibid.
38. See OPFGI, Mubarizat-i Daltraneh; Bakhash, The Reign of the
Ayatollahs.
39. Cited in Banuazizi, "Alounaknishinan," p. 59. The above cited state-
ment by the young squatter—"Nothing brings us together more than the love
of Imam Hussein; my personal view is that these hey'ats have a positive role in
uniting us and keeping us informed about each other's affair"—is quoted in
many major writings on the Islamic Revolution to establish the ideological role
of Islam in the revolution and to prove how the hey'ats acted as the mobiliz-
ing medium between the clergy and the poor (see for instance: Kazemi, Poverty
and Revolution in Iran- Mirsepassi-Ashtiani, "The Crisis of Secularism," p.
59; Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet; Arjomand, Turban for the
Crown, p. 92..) None of these writers, however, have paid attention to the
remainder of the statement made by the same squatter who suggests that what
the clergy preached in these hey'ats were, in fact, far from political educa t ion
and agitation; rather they focused on s t r ic t ly religious prescriptions and
mournings.
40. Khaleh Fatimeh, an old resident of Halabiabad, the Community of
Tins, cited in Kayhan, Esfand 12., i ^6 1/1982., P- i-
41. The demands are discussed in Kazemi, Poverty and Revolution in
Iran, pp. 77-80.
42.. Cited from interviews in OPFGI, Mubarizat-i Daliraneh, p. 42..
43. These reports were part of the activities of the Marxist-Leninist
OPFGI. Although produced by an ideologically committed organization, the
content of these rare interviews does seem to reflect the mood of the field. The
politics of this organization does not seem to have influenced the outcome of
the interviews.
44. Cited in OPFGI, Mubarizat-t Daliraneh, pp. 98 and 118.
45. From interviews in OPFGI, Mubarizat-i Daliraneh, p. 19.
46. See OPFGI, Mubarizat-i Daliraneh, p. 34.
47. Ibid.
48. See Ettilaat, Shahrivar 2,3-17, 1357/1978.
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49. Ettilaat, Shahrivar z6, 1357/1978.
50. It is worth noting that demonstration in Maidan-i Zhaleh (later
known as Maidan-i Shuhada, or the Martyrs Square), was initiated by the
activists who came largely from Gholhak area in north Tehran. The day before
the "black Friday" a large collective prayer had followed a demonstration that
had been stopped by the police. On that occasion a middle-aged, bazaari-look-
ing activist had said "Tomorrow Morning, at 8 A.M., at Maidan-i Shuhada";
interview with Akbar Askari, a participant in the event, December 1983.
51. See Ettilaat, Shahrivar zo, 1357/1978.
5z. Ibid.
53. It refers to the urban areas beyond the boundaries of the municipality
provisions, where most informal settlements have been located.
54. Ettilaat, Shahrivar 30, 1357/1978.
55. Ettilaat, Mehr 5, 1357/1978.
56. Ettilaat, Mehr X, i 357/1978.
57. See the interviews in OPFGI, Mubartzat-i Daliraneh.
58. Interview with an eyewitness, February 1993.
59. Ibid.
60. Ayandegan, Dey 19, zz, and 2.7, 1357/1978.
61. Ayandegan, Dey 19, 1357/1978.
6z. Ayandegan, Dey 2.5, 1357/1978.
63. Ayandegan, Dey 2,0, 1357/January zo, 1979.
64. Ayandegan, Dey 10, 1357/1978.
65. Ayandegan, ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Ayandegan, Dey 13 and 30, 1357/1978.
68. Ayandegan, Dey 30, 1357/1978.
69. Ayandegan, Dey 2.5, 1357/1978.
70. Ayandegan, Dey Z5, 1357/1978.
71. Ayandegan, Dey 14, 1357/1978.
71. The spread of formal education system during the Shah's rule also cov-
ered the poor classes. Indeed, by 1980 the ratio of male secondary schools to
population in the poor districts of Tehran was not very different from that in
the well-off areas (only zo percent less). But this difference was much higher
with respect to the girls secondary schools (60 percent less); see Census of
Tehran 1 359[/i980], Tehran 1981. In 1980, in Zoorabad squatter community
in Karadj , 50 percent of boys attended school and zo percent of girls; see
Institute of Social Studies and Research, Mutale'e-yt Muqaddamati Darbare-
ye Zoorabad, Karadj, p. 64.
73. This theme was taken up in the 19705 by a number of writers and film-
makers; see, for instance, Gholam Hussein Sa'edi's short story, Ashghaldoum
(Garbage Place), which in the late 19705 was turned into the movie Dayere-ye
Mtna, directed by Daryoush Mehrjouii .
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74. Cited in Banuazizi, "Alounaknishinan," p. 63; and in Kazemi, Poverty
and Revolution in Iran, pp. 12.9-130.
75. A great number of speculations exist about the social profile of the
Pasdaran and Baseeji groups. However, empirical examination is scarce.
Farhad Khosrowkhavar's study seems to support the prevailing view that
members of these groups come largely from urban poor families; personal
communication, April 1995, Paris; see also his L'utopie Sacrifiée.
76. Interviews in OPFGI, Mubarizat-i Daliraneh, p. 98.
77. Ibid.
FOUR The Housing Rebels: The Occupation of Homes and Hotels,
1979-1981
i. These names are all fictitious to preserve the anonymity of the actors.
2.. Based upon interviews with Naser, a leading organizer of the operation,
December 1994.
3. Kayhan, Aban 30, i 362.71983.
4. Ayandegan, Bahman 2.8, 1358/1979.
5. Kar, no. 6 (Farvardin 2.3, 1358/1979): 7.
6. For a detailed description of this incident see Hourcade, "Conseillisme,
classes sociales, et espace urbain"; also see Bassri and Hourcade, "L'Expérience
conseilliste."
7. Etttlaat, "Az Gowdnishini ta Hashiyenishini dar Tehran," Bahman 3,
1371/1993.
8. Rah-i Kargar, no. 8 (Aban 1363/1984)^0. 13 (Farvardin 1364/1985):
19-
9. Interview with Naser, a leading activist in home takeovers, December
1994.
i o. Interview with Naser, ibid.
ii. Etttlaat, Khordad 9, 1363/1984; also interview with participants in
home takeovers in Kermanshah; news from the opposition publications.
12.. Khabar, no. 5 ( 1 6 Esfand 1357), published by the Organization of
People Fedaii Guerrillas of Iran.
13. Interview with Reza, a leader of the operation, February 1993.
14. Middle East Economic Digest (November i, 1979): 33.
i 5. Interview with Fateh, a participant in the raid, February 1993.
16. Etttlaat, Dey 2.4, 1358/1979; also my interviews with one of the par-
ticipants in the takeovers, October 1993. Karrubi in addition extended some
Rls loo million (U.S.$2..8 million) in loans to the homeless and the small busi-
ness-holders; see Ettilaat, Dey 2.4, 1358/1979.
17. Interview with an anonymous participant, October 1993.
i 8. Interview with Fateh, a participant in the operation.
19. Interview with a squatter leader of the Royal Garden Hotel, February
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1993-
id. Interview with Fateh, a participant.
il. Ayandegan, Khordad 2.3, 1358/1979.
il. Piran, "Zaghehnishini dar Tehran."
2.3. Ayandegan, Ordibehesht 18, 1358/1979.
24. Ibid.
2.5. Pirouzi, "Gozaresh-i Nafarjam az Mas'ale-ye Maskan," no. i (Mehr
1359/1980): 55-58.
26. Interview with a Hotel Royal Garden squatting leader, February 1993;
Also interview with Fateh on the occupation of the Hotel Sina.
2.7. Interview with a Pasdar, in Ayandegan, Ordibehesht 18, 1358/1979.
28. Interview with Naser, a leading mobilizer of home takeovers,
December 1994.
2.9. See Pirouzi, "Gozaresh-i Nafar jam az Mas'ale-ye Maskan," no. i
(Mehr i 359/1980): 55-58; See also Bassri and Hourcade, "L'Expérience con-
seilliste."
30. Interview with Naser, a leading organizer.
31. See Bassri and Hourcade, "L' expérience conseilliste."
32. See Hourcade, "Cooteillisme, classes sociales, et espace urbain."
33. See Davis, Contested Ground, p. 6.
34. See Bayat, Workers and Revolution in Iran.
35. Interview with Fateh an occupation leader of the Hotel Sina in Tehran.
36. Ibid.
37. A shanty dweller, cited in Ayandegan, Khordad 2.3, 1358/1979.
38. Ayandegan, Khordad 13, 1358/1979.
39. Khabar, no. 5 (Esfand 16, 1357/1978), published by OPFGI; see also
Kar, no. 72 (Mordad 29, 1359/1980): 7.
40. A shantytown dweller, cited in Ayandegan, Khrdad 23, i 358/1979.
41. Cited in Kar, Ordibehesht 2.7, 1358/1979.
42. Ayandegan, Ordibehesht 18, 1358/1979.
43. See Mujahid, no. 237 (Esfand 2, 1363/1984); see also Rah-i Kargar,
no. 13 (Farvardin 1364/1985).
44. Kar, no 72 (Mordad 28, 1359/1980): 7.
45. See Bassri and Hourcade, "L'Expérience conseilliste," on how the
shuras were undermined.
46. Ibid.
47. In Portugal the occupation of housing was very organized; it was
coordinated not by individual families but by a Neighborhood Commission
(NC). The NC had a list of empty apartments and a list of people in need of
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3. Cited in Ayandegan, Ordibehesht, 1358/1979.
4. Plan and Budget Organization, Barrasi-ye Bikaari dar Tehran, Tabestan
1358.
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"Neighborhood Social Change in the West European Cities."
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East on the l:i'e of Modernity; Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions.
n. SIT document "E'laan-e Vezarat-e Nazmieh" (Declaration by the
Ministry of Order) printed in Willem Floor, "Les premieres règles de police
urbane à Tehran," p. 174.
13. A study in 1974 showed that vendors in Tehran paid between Rls 10
and Rls 100 daily in bribes to police officers for their illegal operations; see
Fallah and Khameneh, Barrasi-ye Ejmalt-ye Dast-foroushan dar Tehran, p. 13.
14. The figure is drawn from Bahrmbeygui, Tehran: An Urban Analysis,
p. 84.
15. See Far jadi , "Harrasi-ye Bazaar-i Kar," p. 76.
16. According to official figures, the total number of urban trading enter-
prises with one workman was 414,000; of these workmen, 3 18,000 were petty
traders, or khordeh foroush; see Goudar/.i, "Vi/heguiha va Tahavvolat-i
Bazaar-i Kar dar Iran," p. 86.
17. See Mujahed, no. 137, 1363/1984, p. 13.
i 8. The Tehran Municipality, cited in Ettilaat, Farvardin 6, 1363/1984.
19. Assuming 60 percent married with three children and 40 percent sin-
gle. The ratio is drawn from a sample survey of street vendors in Shiraz and
Tehran; see Sheikhi, "F.lal va Payamadha-ye Dast-foroushi (Tehran)," and
Sheikhi, Elal va Avamel-i Dast-foroushi (Shiraz).
2.0. See Ettilaat, Tir 4, 1363/1984. A Ministry of Planning report in 1985
reached a similar conclusion, stating that "Informal activities—productive or
unproductive—will persist in our society in full force." See Danesh, "Elal va
Avamel-i Gostaresh-i Mashaghel-i Kazib," p. 32.
2i. Their names: Torabi, Sardoubi, Mughaddasi, Islahi, and Oskouii; see
Abazari, "Donya-ye Bozorg-i Kitab-foroushan-i Kouchak," pp. 40-41.
2.2.. Abazari, ibid.
2.3. Ayandegan, 12 Tir 1358/1979, p. 5.
24. See Plan and Budget Organization, Barrasi-ye Ijmali-ye Dakkeh-daari
dar Inibat ba Ishtighal va Eikaan, p. 13.
25. See Ettilaat, Mehr 16 and 17, r 363/1984 for reports on begging and
drugs; see especially Khosrowkhavar, "Nouvelle banlieue et marginalité."
26. Interview with a street knife-seller, Tehran, Maidan-i Tajrish, 1995.
27. From a sample of one hundred vendors in the city of Shiraz; see
Sheikhi, Elal va Avamel-i Dast-foroushi dar Shiraz.
28. Based upon a sample survey of one hundred street vendors in Tehran;
see Sheikhi, "Elal va Payamadha-ye Dast-foroushi (dar Tehran)." A survey of
lnqilab-i Islami carried out ten years earlier put the rural background of the
vendors at 60 percent; see lnqilab-i Islami, "Gozaresh-i Tahqiqi Darbare-ye
Dast-foroushan-i Tehran," Khordad 14 1359/1980.
29. See Sheikhi, "Elal va Payamadha-ye Dast-foroushi (dar Tehran)";
lnqilab-i Eslami, "Gozaresh-i Tahqiqi Darbare-ye Dast-foroushan-i Tehran,"
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Khordad 14, 1359/1980. A study in 1974 came to similar conclusions con-
cerning the ethnic background of Tehran vendors. It concluded that the
"majority of vendors spread throughout the city seem to come from
Azarbaijan province, in particular, areas around Ardabil, Ahar, Meshkin
Shahr, and so on"; see Fallah and Khameneh, Barrasi-ye Ejtnali-ye Dast-
foroushan dar Tehran, p. 15.
30. Interview with a food vendor, Maidan-i Tajrish, 1995.
31. Statement of vendor in Ettilaat, Shahrivar 10, 1363/1984.
32.. See Jihad, "An Interview with the Mayor of Tehran," Jihad 4, no. 61
(Esfand 1361/1983): 16. Jihad is the publication oftheJihad-iSazandegui,the
Construction Crusade Organization.
33. See Harnshahn, "Bazaar-i Sayyed Ismail," Dey z8, 1371/1991, p. 5.
34. In a similar action, a group of no vendors, all from a village near
Malayer, established their stalls collectively in Maidan-i Fawziyeh, but were
removed by the Pasdars. They then moved to another Maidan, Golha, but
were harassed by the residents who complained to the police. Eventually
evicted from there also, they ended up on a vacant piece of land along
Amirabad Avenue; see Ayandegan, Tir 16, 1358/1980.
35. See Sheikhi, "Elal va Payamadha-ye Dast-foroushi (dar Tehran,"
p. 69.
36. See Amirahmadi, Revolution and Economic Transitton, p. 187.
37. Ibid., p. 188.
38. Athari, "Faqr va Ishtighal dar Iran," p. 76; see also Pujadi, "Barrasi-
ye Bazaar-i Kar," p. 69.
39. Interview with the mayor of Tehran, Habibi, in Jihad, no. 62, Esfand
i 361/1983, p. 14.
40. According to a survey, close to half of the vendors in Tehran cited
street trading as an alternative to unemployment; see Sheikhi, "Elal va
Payamadha-ye Dast-foroushi (dar Tehran)," p. 68; see also Ayandegan, Tir 11,
1358/1979, p. 5, for interviews with the street vendors.
41. In Ayandegan, 3 Ordibehesht 1358/1979.
41. Prayer beads.
43. See Ayandegan, Khordad 19, 1358/1979.
44. See Sheikhi, "Elal va Payamadha-ye Dast-foroushi (dar Tehran)." A
survey of lnqilab-i Islami conducted in 1980 estimated that vendors made a
daily average earning of Rls i,5Oo-Rls 3,000, while about 80 percent of them
earned Rls 5OO-Rls 1,000; see lnqilab-i Islami, Khordad 14, 1359/1980.
Another study provided an estimated income of between Rls 500 and Rls
3,000 a day for 1981; see Plan and Budget Organization, Barrasi-ye ljmali-ye
Dakkeh-daari dar Irtibat ba Ishtighal va Bikaari, p. 14.
Shcikhi's survey showed that over half of the vendors were between ten and
thirty years of age, some i i percent below eighteen, and some 10 percent over
forty-five.
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45. See Jihad 4, no. 62. (Esfand 1361/1983): 16. A schoolteacher earned
about Rls 1,500 a day at that time.
46. See Sheikhi, "Elal va Payamadha-ye Dast-foroushi (dar Tehran)." A
similar survey was conducted by the University of Shiraz for the city of Shiraz
in 1985. The general results seem to be very similar to that carried out for
Tehran. See Sheikhi, Elal va Avamel-i Dast-foroushi. My interviews with ven-
dors support this.
47. Indepth interviews with twenty street vendors in different parts of
Tehran, 1995. While in Sheikhi's survey the vast majority of vendors said they
disliked their job due to its low status, insecurity, and to the fear of police
harassment, about three out of five stated that they would continue working
in trade if they had sufficient capital; see p. 69.
48. Cited in Danesh, Elal va Avamel-i Gostaresh-i Mashaghel-i Kazib,
p. 19.
49. My interviews; see also interviews with street vendors and officials in
Ayandegan, Tir n, 1358/1979, p. 5; Ayandegan, Tir 2.5, 1358/1979, p. 5.
50. See Ayandegan, Tir 15, 1358/1979, p. 5.
51. Interview with an old cheese vendor, Maidan-i Tajrish, 1995.
51. See Ettilaat, Khordad 17, 1361/1983; Ettilaat,TiT 4, 1363/1984.
53. In Ayandegan, Tir il, 1358/1979, p. 5.
54. See Ettilaat, Mehr 13, 1364/1985.
55. Nateq Nouri, Interior Minister in Ettilaat, Dey 18, 1363/1984;
Ettilaat, Tir 4, 1363/1984.
56. These urban sociologists range from George Simmel to Robert Park,
Everett Stonequist, and the rest of the Chicago School such as Louis Wirth.
57. See the very interesting Persian document in Floor, "Les premieres
règles de police urbane à Teheran," p. 174.
58. Floor, "The Market Police in Qajar Persia."
59. Fora perceptive elaboration of the issue of space as power see Foucault,
Power/Knowledge. For a more recent discussion, see Davis, City of Quartz.
60. This fear of chaos can be sensed in statements by officials, for instance
the Minister of Interior, Natiq Nouri, in Ettilaat, Dey 18, 1363; see also
Ettilaat, Tir 4, 1363/1984.
( .1 . Muhammad Malayeri, the head of the CCMAOT in Ettilaat,
Shahrivar 10, 1364/1985. The left also shared some of these negative repre-
sentations by terming the phenomenon "hidden unemployment"; Kar,
Bahman 6, 13 60/1981, p. 10.
61. Ayatollah Khameneii, the then leader of Tehran Friday prayer, accused
vendors of promoting fahshaa and fisaad (moral decadence); see also
Ayandegan, Tir n, 1358/1979, p. 5.
63. See lnqilab-i Islami, Khordad 16, 1359/1980.
64. See Keyhan, Azar 14, 1363/1984; Mujahid, no. 137, 1363/1984,
p. 13.
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65. Ettilaat, Khordad 17, 1361/1983, p. 15.
66. Keyhan, Farvardin 5, 1363/1984.
67. Ettilaat, Farvardin 6, 1363/1984.
68. Ettilaat, Shahrivar 10, 1364/1985.
69. For the case of Shiraz see Ettilaat, Esfand 7, 1361/1983.
70. On one such occasion, in November 1984, Hojjat El-Islam Ramazani
in Shiraz warned: "I have given the authorities fifteen days to do away with the
obstruction of thoroughfares. If the job is not finished by the deadline, I will
ask the ummat-i hizbullah to deal directly with them," cited in Khabar-i
Jonoub, Aban 14, 1363/1984.
71. Ettilaat, Farvardin 25, 1363/1984.
72. See Pasdar-i Islam, no. 34 (Mehr 1363/1984).
73. Natiq-Nouri, the Interior Minister, warned that "the officials must
obey the laws, even if they think they help out the mustaz'afin. . . . To be a
hizbullah means to comply with the laws of the land"; cited in Ettilaat, Dey
18, 1363/1984.
74. Ayandegan, Esfand 28, 1357/1978.
75. Interview with an anonymous eyewitness, October 1993.
76. See Kar, no. 11 2 (Khordad 29, 1360/1981): 9.
77. Committee Against the Obstruction of Thoroughfares (CAOT) in
Ettilaat, Farvardin 6, 1363/1984.
78. Kayhan, Tir i i, 1363/1984.
79. Ettilaat, Ordibehesht 5, 1363/1984.
80. Cited in Ettilaat, Esfand 7, 1362/1983.
81. I ttilaat, Shahrivar 10, 1364/1985^. 2. Habibi, the Mayor of Tehran,
admitted four months after Ayatollah Khomeini's verdict and ten months after
claiming the removal of 90 percent of the vendors, that "Pseudo occupations
\mashaghel-t kazib\ in Tehran must be eliminated only gradually"; cited in
Ettilaat, Dey 18, 1363/1984. Emphasis mine.
82. Kar 3, no. 145 (Bahman 6, 1360/1981): 10.
83. See Kar, no. 67, Tir 24, 1359/1980, p. 1 1 .
84. See the story in Rah-i Kargar, no. 23, 1364/1985, p. 24.
85. See Ettilaat, Farvardin 25, 1369/1990.
86. See Ettilaat, Shahrivar 10, 1364/1985, p. 2. He justified his actions by
referring to the first amendment of Act 5 5 of the Municipality Law, which pro-
hibits obstruction of public thoroughfares; see Ettilaat, Shahrivar 10,
1364/1985, p. 2.
87. Cited in Ettilaat, Aban 10, 1363/1984.
88. Faludeh is a kind of desert made of starch, sugar, and lemon.
89. See Kayhan, Ordibehesht 12, 1362/1983, p. 4.
90. See Ettilaat, Tir 4, 1363/1984.
91. Two days later, however, the demolition agents eradicated them in a
midnight raid; see Kar 2, no. 95 (Bahman 9, 1359/1980). Others, however,
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continued to resume operation.
91. Ibid.
93. Ibid.
94. Cited in Danesh, Elal va Avatnel-i Gostaresh-i Mashaghel-i Kazib,
p. 31.
95. See Ettilaat, Ordibehesht i, 1369/1990, p. 5.
96. Ettilaat, Esfand 11, 1361/1981.
97. Ettilaat, Shahrivar 10, 1364/19X5.
98. For instance in Shahr Rey and District 11 of Tehran, 1,130 basaats
and stall-holders were removed. Of these, 800 applied to get back to their busi-
ness through the local mosques. Some 155 were recommended and began their
operation in specified locations; Ettilaat, Farvardin 6, 1363/1984.
99. See Ettilaat, Shahrivar 10, 1364/1985.
100. Ettilaat, Esfand 11, 1361/1981; Ettilaat, Khordad 17, 1361/1983.
101. As late as October 1985 (Mehr 1364), the city officials in Tehran
were still warning the "unlawful" street vendors in Maidan-i Shohada,
Beryanak Street, and Sarcheshmeh, all in South Tehran, to evacuate, this time
with a new justification. Among the vendors, there are those who, warned the
head of COAT, "are escapees from public duty and are engaged in drug-deal-
ing and profiteering"; Ettilaat, Mehr 13, 1364/1985.
loi. These localities were in Jannat Abad, Pounak, Olympic Village,
Shahrak-i Parvaaz, Shahrak-i Azadi, Paykanshahr, and the Bayhaqui parking
lot.
103. Officials just if ied this by suggesting that this was a tradition in
Iranian history and was practiced in many developed countries today; see
Hamshahri, Bahman 16, 1371/1991, p. 9. For reference to the flea markets,
see Hamshahri, Dey il, 1371/1991; Bahman 14, 1371/1991; Bahman 16,
1371/1991; Esfand 5, 1371/1991; and Esfand 8, 1371/1991.
104. See Hamshahri, Esfand 5, 1371, p. 4.
EIGHT Grassroots and State Power: The Promise and Perils of
Quiet Encroachment
i. See Schwedler, "Civil Society and the Study of Middle East Politics."
i. By which I mean people with different ethnic, religious, and class back-
grounds, consistently associating with one another according to a set of
accepted norms.
3. See Abu-Lughod, "The Romance of Resistance."
4. See Piven and Cloward, Poor Peoples' Movements.
5. Foucault, Knowledge/Power, p. 98.
6. See for example, Rahnema, "Power and Regenerative Processes in
Micro-Spaces" and "Participation," p. 113. Also Escobar, Encountering
Development.
200 8. GRASSROOTS AHD STATE POWER
7. See Friedmann, Empowerment, p. 7.
8. For a good critique of planning—its history, rationale, and language,
see Escobar, Encountering Development and "Planning."
9. A comprehensive report, sponsored by the Ministry of Housing and
Urbanization, recommends not only that the informais be formalized but also
that the poor should be considered as "citizens" with their share in compre-
hensive planning. But it falls short of asking for the participation of the poor
in the planning of their own environments. See Iranian Center for Urban and
Architectural Studies, Hashiyenishini dar Iran, report on phase 5: "Regarding
the Low-Income as Citizens," p. 4.1.
Bibliography
Abazari, Farshideh. "Donya-ye Bozorg-i Kitab-forousha-ye
Kouchak" (The wide world of small-scale book vendors). Tehran
Musavvar (Tir 8, j 358/1979): 40-41.
Abdel Taher, Nadia. Social Identity and Class in a Cairo Neighbor-
hood. Cairo Papers in Social Science 9, no. 4 (Winter 1986).
Abrahamian, Ervand. "The Guerrilla Movement in Iran, 1963-
1977." Merip Reports, no. 86 (March/April 1980).
. Iran Between Two Revolutions. Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1982..
. Radical Islam: The Mujahedin of Iran. London: Tauris,
1989.
—. Khomemism. Berkeley: California University Press, 1993.
Abu-Lughod, Lila. "The Romance of Resistance: Tracing Transfor-
mation of Power Through Bedouin Women." American Ethnologist
17, no. i (February 1990).
Adle, C. B. and Bernard Hourcade, eds., Tehran: Capitale bicente-
naire. Tehran: Institut Français de Recherche en Iran, 1992,.
Ahmadian, M. A. "Hashiyenishini"(Squatter settlement). Majalle-
ye Daneshkade-ye Adabiyat va L/lum-i Insani, no. 3 (1371/1993):
82.6-833.
202 BIBLIOSEAPHY
Akbari, Ali Akbar. Lumpenism. Tehran: Markaz-i Nashr-i Sepehr,
1973-
'Alam, Asadullah. Yad-dashtha-ye 'Alam, 1349-1351 ('Alam's
mémoire, 1970-1972). i. vols. USA: Swan Overseas Pic., 1993.
Al-Adly, Mona and M. Morsy. "A Study of Street Vendors in
Cairo." Unpublished graduate term paper, the American University in
Cairo, Spring 1995.
Ale-Ahmad, Jalal. Plagued by the West (Gharbzadegi). Delmor,
N.Y.: Caravan, 1982.
Amirahmadi, Houshang. Revolution and Economic Transition: The
Iranian Experience. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990.
Amirahmadi, Houshang, and Ali Kiafar. "Tehran: Growth and
Contradictions." Journal of Planning Education and Research 6, no.
3 ( '987)-
Amjad, Mohammad. "Rural Migrants, Islam, and Revolution in
Iran." Social Movements, Conflicts, and Change 16 (1993): 35-51-
Eds., L. Kriesberg, M. Dobkowski, and I. Walliaman.
Amraii, Sohbatollah. Barrasi-ye Moque'iyat-i Ijtimaii-ye Shohada-
ye lnqilab-i Islami: Shahrivar i, i^jj-Bahman 30, 1357 (Social back-
ground of the martyrs of the Islamic revolution, August 23, 1978-
February 19, 1979). Unpublished Master's thesis, University of
Tehran, 1982,.
Anonymous, éd. Bahsi Darbare-ye Marja'iyat va Ruhaniyat (A dis-
cussion about marja'iyat and the clergy). Tehran: publisher unknown,
n.d.
Arjomand, A. Said. The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolu-
tion in Iran. Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.
Ashraf, Ahmad. Iran: Imperialism, Class, and Modernization from
Above. Ph.D diss., New School for Social Research, 1971.
—."The Roots of Emerging Dual Class Structure in Nine-
teenth-Century Iran." Iranian Studies 14, nos. 1-2 (Winter/Spring
,981) .
."Marateb-i Ijtimaii dar Dowran-i Qajar" (Social status dur-
ing the Qajar period). Kitab-i Aagah, no. i, Tehran: Intisharat-i
Aagah, 1360/1981.
Athari, Kamal. "Faqr va Ishtighal dar Iran" (Poverty and employ-
ment in Iran). Ettilaat-t Syassi-Iqtisadi 5, nos. 43-44 (1370/1991).
Bahrambeygui, H. Tehran: An Urban Analysis. Tehran: Sahab Book
Institute, 1977.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 203
Bakhash, Shaul. The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic
Revolution. New york: Basic Books, 1984.
Banani, Amin. The Modernization of Iran. Stanford: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 1961.
Bank Markazi Iran. Annual Economic Report, 1359. Tehran: Bank
Markari Iran, 1980.
Banuazizi, Ali. "Alounaknishinan-i Khiaban-i Professor Brown"
(The shanty dwellers of Professor Brown street). Alifba 2, no. 3
(Summer 1362/1983).
Barriga, Miguel. "Necesidad: Notes on the Discourse of Urban
Politics in the Ajusco Foothills of Mexico City." American Ethnologist
23, no. 2 (1996): 291-3 io
Bassri, Hassan and Bernard Hourcade. "L' Expérience conseilliste."
Peuple Mediterraneans 29 (October/December 1984).
Bauer, Janet. "Poor Women and Social Consciousness in Revolu-
tionary Iran." In G. Nashat, ed., Women and Revolution in Iran,
pp. 141-170. Boulder: Westview, 1983.
Bayât, Asef. Workers and Revolution in Iran. London: Zed, 1987.
—."Poverty, Urbanization, and Development: The Case of
Tehran." Unpubl ished memo, the American University in Cairo,
1987.
—. "Why Don't the Unemployed Rebel? Or Do They?"
Mimeo, The American University in Cairo, 1996.
—. "Cairo's Poor: Dilemmas of Survival and Solidarity,"
Middle East Report, no. 202 (Spring 1997).
Bazargan, Mehdi. Masa'el va Mushkilat-i Sal-i Avval-i Inqilab (The
problems and difficulties of the first year of the revolution). Tehran:
Self-Published, 1362/1983.
—. lnqilab-i Iran dar Dow Harakat (The Iranian revolution in
two stages). Tehran: Self-Published, 1363/1984.
Behrangui, Samad. Beest-o-chahar Saa'at dar Khab va Bidaari
(Twenty-four hours in a sleep and awake). Tehran: 1353/1974.
Bienen, H. "Urbanization and Third World Instability." World
Development 12, no. 7 (1984): 661-691.
Bosworth, Clifford. The Medieval Islamic Underworld. Leiden: E.
J. Brill, 1976.
Bourdieu, Pierre. "The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups."
Theory and Society 14, no. 6 (November 1985).
. "What Makes a Social Class? On the Theoretical and
204 BIB1IOGÎUPHÏ
Practical Existence of Groups." Berkeley Journal of Sociology 32.
(1987).
Bramwell, B. "Public Space and Local Communities: The Example
of Birmingham, 1840-1880." In G. Kearns and C. Whithers, eds.,
Urbanizing Britain: Essays on Class and Communities in the Nine-
teenth Century, pp. 31-54. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
'991-
Bromley, Ray and Gerry, Chris, eds., Casual Work and Poverty in
Third World Cities. Chichester, N.Y.: John Wiley, 1979.
Brown, Kenneth, et al., eds. Middle Eastern Cities in Comparative
Perspective. London: Ithaca Press, 1986.
Brown, Kenneth, et al. Etat, ville et mouvements sociale au
Maghreb et au Moyen-Onent/Urban Crises and Social Movements in
the Middle East. Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 1989.
Burt, C. "Popular Struggles in Peru." Paper presented at Conference
on Inequality and New Forms of Popular Representation in Latin
America, Columbia University. New York, March 3-5, 1994.
Castells, Manuel. "Is There an Urban Sociology?" In C. Pickvance,
ed., Urban Sociology. London: Tavistock Press, 1976.
—. "Squatters and the State in Latin America." In J. Guglcr,
ed., Urbanization of the Third World. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1982..
—. Cities and the Grassroots. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1983.
Central Intelligence Agency. The World hact Book, 1992. USA:
CIA, 199*.
Colburn, F.D., ed. Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New
York: Sharpe, 1989.
Connel, J. "Tehran: Urbanization and Development." Discussion
paper. Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex: 1973.
Cornelius, Wayne. "Urbanization and Political Demand-Making:
Political Participation Among the Migrant Poor in Latin American
Cities. American Political Science Review 68 (1974): 1115-1146.
—. Politics and the Migrant Poor in Mexico City. Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1975.
Crompton, Rosemary. Class and Stratification: An Introduction to
Current Debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Cross, John. "Organization and Resistance in the Informal
Economy: Historical Parallels in the 'Formalization' of Street Vendors
BIBLIOGRAPHY 205
in Mexico City." Unpublished memo, the American University in
Cairo, 1995.
Danesh, Abul-Hassan. Rural Exodus and Squatter Settlements in
the Third World: Case of Iran. Lanham, Md.: University Press of
America, 1987.
. Elal va Avamel-i Gostaresh-i Mashaghel-i Kazib dar
Shahrya-ye Bozorg (The causes of the expansion of parasitic occupa-
tions in large cities). Tehran: Planning and Budget Organization, i^6^/
1984.
Davis, John. E. Contested Ground: Collective Action and the Urban
Neighborhood. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991.
Davis, Mike. City of Quartz. London: Verso, 1990.
Daunton, M. J. "Public Place and Private Space: The Victorian City
and the Working-Class Household." In D. Fraser and A. Sutcliffe, eds.,
The Pursuit of Urban History, pp. 112-233. London: Edward Arnold,
1993-
Denoeux, Guilain. Urban Unrest in the Middle East. Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1993.
De Soto, Hernando. The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in
the Third World. New York: Harper and Row, 1989.
Draper, Hal. Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution: The Politics of
Social Classes. Vol. 2. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978.
Durkheim, Emil. The Division of Labor in Society. New York: Free
Press, 1971.
Eckstein, Susan. The Poverty of Revolution: The State and the
Urban Poor in Mexico. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977.
Escobar, Arturo. "Imagining a Post-Development Era? Critical
Thought, Development and Social Movements." Social Text 31/32.
(1992-)-
—. "Planning." In W. Sasch, ed., The Development Dictionary.
London: Zed, 1995
. Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of
the Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.
Ettilaat. "Isti 'fa-ye Ra'is-e Bonyad-i Maskan va Mushkel-i
Maskan" (The resignation of the director of the Housing Foundation,
and the problem of housing) (Esfand n, 1363/1984).
—. "Dar Rousta-Shahrha-ye Tehran: Bagherabad" (In the
urban villages of Tehran) (Kardad 5 and 6, 1364/1985).
. "Bilan-i Fa'aliyatha-ye Bonyad-i Maskan dar Dah Sal-i
206 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Gozashteh" (An overview of the activities of the Housing Foundation
in the past ten years) (Farvardin 20, 1369/1990): 4.
—. "Barrasi-ye Tajrube-ye Bazsazi-ye Manatiq-i Zaghehnishin-
i Tehran" (An overview of the experience of the reconstruction of
Tehran shanty-settlements) (Bahman 3 and 5, I37Z/I994).
Ettilaat-i Syassi-lqtisadi. "Tehran: Yek Tasvir-i Amari" (Tehran: A
statistical view) no. 17 (Esfand 1366/1989): 43-45.
Fallah, Jamal and Ali Khameneh. Barrasi-ye Ijmali-ye Dast-
foroushan dar Tehran (A brief study of street vendors in Tehran).
Tehran: Tehran University, Department of Urban Planning: I353/
1974-
Fanon, Frantz. The Wretched of the Earth. London: Penguin, 1967.
Farjadi, Gholamali. "Barrasi-ye Bazaar-i Kar, Ishtighal va Bikaari
dar Iran" (A survey of the labor market, employment, and unemploy-
ment in Iran). Barnatneh va Tawse'eh z, no. 3 (Fall 1991).
Ferdows, Kmad. "The Reconstruction Crusade and Class Conflict
in Iran." MERIP Reports 13, no. 113 (March-April 1983).
Firoozi, Frydoon. "Tehran: A Demographic and Economic Analysis."
Middle Eastern Studies 10 (January 1974): 60-76.
Floor, Willem. "The Market Police in Qajar Persia." Die Welt
Islams 13 (1971).
. "Political Role of Lutis in Iran." In M. Bonine and N.
Keddie, eds., Modern Iran: The Dialectics of Continuity and Change.
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981.
. "Les premières règles de police urbane à Teheran." In C.
Adle and B. Hourcade, eds., Teheran: Capitale bicentenaire. Tehran:
Institut Français de Recherche en Iran, 1992.
Foucault, Michèle. Power/Knowledge. New York: Panthéon,
1972.
Frank, Andre Gunder and Martha Fuentes. "Nine Theses on New
Social Movements." Newsletter of International Labour Studies 34
(July 1987).
Freud, Sigmund. Civilization and Its Discontents. New York:
Norton, 1961.
Friberg, M. and B. Hettne. "Local Mobilization and World System
Politics." International Social Science Journal 40, nos. 1-4 (1988).
Friedmann, John. "The Dialectic of Reason." International Journal
of Urban and Regional Research 13, no. 2 (1989): 217-244.
. "The Latin American barrio Movement as a Social
BIBLIOGRAPHY 20?
Movement: Contribution to a Debate." International Journal of
Urban and Regional Research 13, no. 3 (1989): 501-510.
- . Empowerment: The Politics of Alternative Development.
Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992..
Garreton, M. A. "Popular Mobilization and Military Regime in
Chile: The Complexities of Invisible Transition." In S. Eckstein, ed.,
Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements,
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.
Ghannam, Farha. "Relocation and the Creation of 'Modern'
Subjects: Urban Planning and Identity Formation in Cairo, Egypt."
Unpublished paper, 1991.
— . "Relocation, Gender, and the Production of Urban Space in
Cairo." Middle East Report, no. 2.02., (Spring 1997).
Geisse, G. and F. Sabatini. "Latin American Cities and Their Poor."
In M. Dogan and J. Kasarda, eds., The Metropolis Era, vol. i (A World
of Giant Cities), Newbury Park: Cal.: Sage, 1988.
Gilbert, Alan and Joseph Gugler. Cities, Poverty, and Development.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982..
Gilbert, Alan and Peter Ward. "Community Action by the Urban
Poor: Democratic Involvement, Community Self-Help, or a Means of
Social Control." World Development 12, no. 8 (1984).
Goudarzi, Mohsen. "Vizheguiha va Tahavvolat-i Bazaar-i Kar dar
Iran, 1355-1365" (The characteristics of and developments in Iranian
labor market, 1976-86). Ettilaat-i Syassi-Iqtisadi 5, nos. 43-44 (i3?o/
Gramsci, Antonio. Prison Notebooks. New York: International
Publishers, 1971.
Habibi, Mohsen. "Islamshahr: Yek Majmou'e-ye Zisti-ye Kamel va
ya Yek Majmou'e-ye Zisti-ye Tarkibi?" (Islamshahr: A complete com-
munity or a composite one?). Goft-o-gou i (Tir 1 372.71 973).
Hammond, John. Building Popular Power: Workers' and Neigh-
borhood Movements in the Portuguese Revolution. New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1988.
Hamshahri. "Bazaar-i Sayyed Ismail" (The Sayyed Ismail market).
(Dey 1371/1992.): 5.
Hamsou (Engineering Consultants). Tarh-i Tawse'eh va Umran, va
Hawze-ye Nufuz-i Islamshahr (Islamshahr, a development plan).
Tehran: Ministry of Housing and Urbanization, 1987, vol. 6.
Hinton, James. "Militant Housewives: The British Housewives'
208 BIBLIOGRAPHY
League (BHL) and the Attlee Government." History Workshop
Journal 38 (Fall 1994).
Hobsbawm, Eric. Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of
Social Movements in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. New
York/London: Norton, 1959.
. "Cities and Insurrections." In E. Hobsbawm, Revolution-
aries. London: Quartet, 1982.
Hoodfar, Homa. "Devices and Desires: Population Policy and
Gender Roles in the Islamic Republic." Middle East Report 24, no.
190 (1994)-
Hooglund, Eric. Land and Revolution in Iran. Austin: Texas Uni-
versity Press, 1982.
Hopkins, Nicholas, ed. Informal Sector in Egypt. Cairo Papers in
Social Science 14, no. 4 (1992).
Hourcade, Bernard. "Conseillisme, classes sociales et espace urbain:
Les squatters du sud de Teheran, 1978-1981." In K. Brown étal., eds.,
Urban Crises and Social Movements in the Middle East. Paris: Editions
L' Harmattan, 1989.
Hourcade, Bernard and Farhad Khosrowkhavar. "L'Habitat revo-
lutionaire: Teheran, 1977-81." herodote 31 (October/December
1993): 62-83.
Huntington, Samuel. Political Order in Changing Society. Ithaca:
Yale University Press, 1968.
Huntington, Samuel and Joan Nelson. No Easy Choice: Political
Participation in Developing Countries. Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1976.
Husseinzadeh Dalir, Karim. Tarh-i Tahqiqi-ye Hashiyenishinan-i
Tabriz (A Research plan of Tabriz squatters). Tabriz: Tabriz University,
Institute of Urban Studies, 1361/1982.
lnqilab-i Islami. "Gozareshi Tahqigi Darbare-ye Dast-foroushan-i
Tehran" (An investigative report on Tehran street vendors) (Khordad
14, 1359/1980).
. "Bilan-i Kar-i Bonyad-i Maskan" (A balance sheet of the
Housing Foundation) (Ordibehesht 7, 1359/1980).
Institute of Social Studies and Research. Mutale'e-yi Muqaddamati
Darbare-ye Zoorabad (Islamabad) Karadj: Mowredi az Hashiyenishini
(An introductory investigation about Zoorabad (Islamabad) Karadj:
A case of squatter settlement). Tehran: Tehran University, 1360!
1981.
BIBLIOSKAPHY 209
Iranian Center for Urban and Architectural Studies. Hashiyenishini:
Aasar va Payamadha-ye Aan bar Shahrha (Squatter settlement: Its
effect and implications on the cities). Report on phase 2. Tehran:
Ministry of Housing and Urbanization,, 1373/1994.
—. Hashiyenishini dar Iran: Elal va Rah-i Halha (Squatter
Settlement in Iran: The causes and solutions). Report on phase 3: "The
dynamics of life in informal settlements." Tehran: Ministry of Housing
and Urbanization, 1374/1995.
—. Hashiyenishini dar Iran: Elal va Rah-i Halha. Report on
phase 4: "Housing, informal settlements, and spatial development
planning," 2 vols. Tehran: Ministry of Housing and Urbanization,
1374/1995.
—. Hashiyenishini Dar Iran: Elal va Rah-i Halha. Report on
phase 5; "Recognizing the low-income as citizens." Tehran: Ministry
of Housing and Urbanization, 1374/1995.
Jihad. "Musahebeh ba Shahrdar. (An interview with the mayor of
Tehran) 4, no. 62 (Esfand 1362): 16.
El-Kadi, Galilah. "Le Caire: La ville spontanée sous contrôle."
Monde Arabe i, spécial issue (1994).
Karpat, Kemal. The Gecekondu: Rural Migration and Urbaniza-
tion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.
Katouzian, Homa. The Political Economy of Modem Iran, 1926-
1979. London: Macmillan, 1981.
Kazemi, Farhad. Poverty and Revolution in Iran. New York: New
York University Press, 1980.
—. "Urban Migrants and the Revolution." Iranian Studies 13,
nos. 1-4 (1980).
—. and Wolf, R. "Urbanization, Migration, and Politics of
Protest in Iran." In M. Bonine ed., Middle East Cities in Crisis. Miami:
University Press of Florida, forthcoming.
Kazerouni, M. R. and Qal'egolabi, H. "Tasvir-i Aamari-ye
Hashiyenishinan" (A statistical exposition of the squatters, Iran).
Kitab-i Jum'eh 12(1979) .
Khalesi, Abbas. Tarikhche-ye Bast va Bastnishini (A short history of
Bastnishini). Tehran: publisher unknown, 1987.
Khomeini, Ruhollah. Sahife-ye Nour (Collected works of Ayatollah
Khomeini). 19 vols. Tehran: Ministry of National Guidance, 1982.
Khosrowkhavar, Farhad. "Nouvelle banlieue et marginalité: La cité
Taleghani à Khak-e Sefid." In C. Adle and B. Hourcade, eds., Teheran:
210 BIBilOGHAPHÏ
Capitale bicentenaire. Tehran: Institut Français de Recherche en Iran,
1992-
—. L'Utopie Sacrifiée, Paris: Press FNSP, 1993.
Kiafar, Ali. "Urban Land Policies in Postrevolutionary Iran." In C.
Bina and H. Zangeneh, eds., Modern Capitalism and Islamic Ideology
in Iran. New York: St. Martin's, 1991.
Lajevardi, Habib. Labor Unions and Autocracy in Iran. Syracuse:
Syracuse University Press, 1985.
Lapidus, Ira. Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1984.
Leacock, E. ed. The Culture of Poverty: A Critique. New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1971.
Leeds, A. and E. Leeds. "Accounting for Behavioral Differences:
Three Political Systems and the Responses of Squatters in Brazil, Peru,
and Chile." In J. Walton and L. Magotti, eds., The City in Compara-
tive Perspective. London/New York: John Willey, 1976.
Leiva, K I. and James Petras. "Chile: New Urban Movements and
Transition to Democracy." Monthly Review (July/August 1987).
Lessinger, Johanna. "Nobody Here to Yell at Me: Political Activism
Among Petty Retail Traders in an Indian City." In S. Peattaer, ed.,
Markets and Marketing: Monograph in Economic Anthropology 4
(Boston, 1985).
Lewis, Oscar. Children of Sanchez. London: Penguin, 1961.
. "The Culture of Poverty." In O. Lewis, Anthropological
Esssays. New York: Random House, 1970.
Majalle-ye Me'mari va Shahrsazi. "Editorial." no. 8 (1369/1990).
—. "A Seminar on Cities and People: Interview with two
Participants." No. 2.1 (Khordad 1371): 49-50.
I . is , Catharina and H. Soly. "Neighborhood Social Change in West
European Cities: Sixteenth to Nineteenth Centuries." International
Review of Social History 38, no. i (April 1993).
Marcus, Abraham. The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity:
Aleppo in the Eighteenth Century. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1989.
Mashadizadeh, Naser. Tahlili az Vizheguiha-ye Barnamehnzi-ye
Shahn dar Iran (An analysis of the specificities of urban planning in
Iran). Tehran: University of Ilm va San'at, 1373/1995.
McGee, T. G. "The Poverty Syndrome: Making Out in the
Southeast Asian City." In R. Bromley and C. Gerry, eds., Casual Work
BIBLIOGRAPHY 211
and Poverty in Third World Cities. Chichester, U.K./New York: Wiley,
1979-
Melucci, Alberto. "The New Social Movements: A Theoretical
Approach." Social Science Information 19, no. z (1980): i99-zz6.
Milani, Mohsen. The Making of the Islamic Revolution in Iran.
Boulder: Westview, 1988.
Ministry of Planning and Budget. Census of Households and
Housing, 1)65 (Ostan-i Tehran). Tehran: Statistical Center, 1986.
—. Census of Households and Housing, 1365 (Nationwide).
Tehran: Statistical Center, 1986.
Mirsepassi-Ashtiani, Ali. "The Crisis of Secularism and Political
Islam in Iran." Social Text iz, no. 3 (Spring 1994), pp 51-84.
Mitchell, Timothy. Colonizing Egypt. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1988.
—. "Everyday Metaphors of Power." Theory and Society 19
(1990): 545-577-
Moaddel, Mansoor. Class, State, and Ideology in the Iranian
Revolution. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
Moore, Barrington. Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and
Revolt. White Plains, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1978.
Moorhouse, Bert, M. Wilson, and C. Chamberlain. "Rent Strikes:
Direct Action and the Working Class." Socialist Register, 1972
(1972.)-
Morrison, M. and P. Gutkind, eds., Housing Urban Poor in Africa.
Syracuse: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, 1981.
Mottahedeh, Roy. The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics
in Iran. New York: Pantheon, 1985.
Nelson, Joan. Access to Power: Politics and the Urban Poor in
Developing Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.
—. "The Urban Poor: Disruption or Political Integration in
Third World Cities." World Politics zz (April 1970): 393-414.
Oldham, Linda, Haguer El Hadidi, and Hussein Tamaa. Informal
Communities tn Cairo: The Basis of a Typology. Cairo Papers in Social
Science 10, no. 4 (Winter 1987).
Oncu, Ayse. "Street Poltics." In A. Oncu, C. Keyder, and S. Ibrahim,
eds., Developmentalism and Beyond: Society and Politics in Egypt and
Turkey. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1994.
Orgam/.ation of the Peoples Eedaii Guerrillas of Iran (OPFGI).
Mubarizat-i Dalirane-ye Mardum-i Kharej az Mahdudeh (Courageous
212 BIBLIOGRAPHY
struggles of the people of the squatter settlements). Tehran: OPFGI,
1357/1978.
. Gozareshi az Mubarizat-i Kargaran-i Bikaar-shudeh (Rah
va Sakhtiman, Ta'sissat, va Karkhanijat (A report about the struggles
of the laid-off workers (in construction, power, and factories)).
Tehran: OPFGI, 1358/1979.
—. Gozareshi az Tashkil-i Sandika-ye Kargaran-i Prozhe'ii
(Fasli) Abadan (A report about the formation of seasonal workers'
union in Abadan). Tehran: OPFGI, 1358/1979.
Palma, Diego. "Comments on John Friedmann's 'The Dialectic of
Reason.' " International journal of Urban and Regional Research \ 3,
no. 3 (1989).
Park, Robert. "Human Migration and the Marginal Man."
American Journal of Sociology 33, no. 6 (1918): 881-893.
Parsa, Misagh. The Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution. New
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1989.
Perlman, Janice. "Rio's Favelas and the Myth of Marginality."
Politics and Society 5 (1975): 131-160.
. 'The Myth of Marginality. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1976.
Piran, Parviz. "Zaghehnishini dar Tehran" (Shanty-dwelling in
Tehran). Ettiiaat-i Syassi-lqtisadi 17-12. (1366/1987).
Pirouzi. "Jang, Kar, Bikaari" (The war, work, and unemployment),
no. 3 (Azar 1359/1980): 30-35.
Piven, Frances and Cloward, Richard. Poor Peoples' Movements:
Why They Succeed, How They Fail. New York: Vintage, 1979.
Plan and Budget Organization. Barrasi-ye Bikaari dar Tehran:
Tabistan 1358 (An overview of unemployment in Tehran: Summer
1979). Tehran: Statistical Center, 1358/1979.
—. Tehran 59: Aamarguiri-ye Tehran, 1359 (The Tehran of
1980: A Statistical profile). Tehran: Statistical Center, 1360/1981.
. Barrsi-ye ljmali-ye Dakkeh-daan dar Irtibat ha Ishtighal va
Bikaari (A brief overview of street vending in the light of the unemploy-
ment problem). Tehran: Tehran Planning Organization, 1360/1981.
. Statistical Yearbook, 1361. Tehran: Statistical Center,
1982.
Portes, Ale jandro and Walton, John. Urban Latin America: The
Political Conditions from Above and Below. Austin: Tezas University
Press, 1976.
BIBLIOSRAPHY 213
Portes, Alejandro, Manuel Castells, and L. Benton. eds. The
Informal Economy: Studies in Advanced and Less-Developed
Countries. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989.
Power, J. World of Hunger: A Strategy for Survival. London:
Temple South, 1976.
Rahnama, Ali and and Nomani, Farhad. Secular Miracle: Religion,
Politics and Economic Policy in Iran. London: Zed, 1990.
Rahnema, Majid. "Power and Regenerative Processes in Micro-
spaces." International Social Science Journal 117 (August 1988):
36I-375-
. "Participation." In W. Sachs, ed., The Development Dictio-
nary. London: Zed, 1995.
Razzaqui, Ebrahim. Iqttsad-i Iran (The Iranian economy). Tehran:
Nashr-i Ney, 1367/1988.
Rezaii, Behjat. "Iran: The Wash-house to All Households." Spare
Rib 115 (February 1982): 2.3.
Roberts, Bryan. "Comments on John Friedmann's 'The Dialectic of
Reason.' " International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 13,
no. 3 (1989)-
Sa'edi, Gholam Hussein. Dandil: Stories from Iranian Life. New
York: Random House, 1981.
Saidnia, Ahmad. "Sakhtar-i Tehran" (The structure of Tehran). In
Y. Kiani, ed., Shahrya-ye Iran (The Iranian cities). Tehran: Chapkhane-
ye Sahab, 1370/1991.
Al-Sayyad, N. "Informal Housing in a Comparative Perspective:
On Squatting, Culture, and Development in a Latin American and
Middle Eastern Culture." Review of Urban and Regional Develop-
ment Studies 5, no. i (1993): 3-18.
Schuurman, Frans and van Naerssen, Ton. Urban Social Move-
ments in the Third World. London: Croom Helm, 1989.
Schirazi, Asgar. The Problem of Land Reform in the Islamic
Republic of Iran. Berlin: Free University of Berlin, 1987.
Schwedler, Jul ian. "Civil Society and the Study of Middle East
Politics." In J. Schwedler, ed., Toward Civil Society in the Middle East?
A Primer. Boulder, Colo./London: Lynne Rienner, 1995.
Scott, James. "Everyday Forms of Resistance." Journal of Peasant
Studies 13, no. 2 (1986).
—. Weapons of the Weak: Everday Forms of Peasant
Resistance. New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1985.
214 BIBLIOGRAPHY
. Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden
Transcripts. New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1990.
Sethuraman, S. V., ed. The Urban Informal Sector in Developing
Countries. Geneva: ILO, 1981.
Shahri, Ja'far. Tehran-i Qadim (The old Tehran). 5 vols. Tehran:
Amir Kabir, 1368/1989.
Shariati, Ali. Jahatguri-ye Tabaqati-ye Islam. Tehran: Dafter-i
Tadvin va Tanzim-i Asar-i Ali Shariati, 1359/1980.
Sheikhi, Muhammad. "Elal va Payamadha-ye Dast-foroushi
(Tehran)" (The causes and implications of street vending, Tehran).
Ettilaat-i Syassi-Iqtisadi 35 (Farvardin-Ordibehesht 1369/1990).
. Elal va Avamel-i Dast-foroushi dar Shiraz) (Factors behind
the street vending in Shiraz). Shiraz: Shiraz University, 1364/1985.
Shorter, Frederic. Cairo's Leap Forward: People, Households, and
Dwelling Space. Cairo Papers in Social Science 12,, no. i (Spring
1989).
Simmel, Georg. "The Stranger." In Kurt Wolff, ed., The Sociology
of George Simmel. New York: Free Press, 1950.
Singerman, Diane. Avenue of Participation: Family, Politics, and
Networks in Urban Quarters of Cairo. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1995.
Smelser, Neil. Theory of Collective Behavior. New York: Free Press,
1971.
Soliman, Ahmad. "Government and Squatters in Alexandria: Their
Roles and Involvements." Open House International 10, no. 3 (1985):
43-49-
—. "Informal Land Aquisition and the Urban Poor in
Alexandria." Third "World Planning Review 9, no. i (1987): 2.1-39.
. "Housing Consolidation and the Urban Poor: The Case of
Hagar F.I Nawateyah, Alexandria." Environment and Urbanization 4,
no. 2. ( 1992): 184-195.
Spodek, Howard. "The Self-Employed Women's Association
(SEWA) in India: Feminist, Gandhian Power in Development."
Economic Development and Cultural Change 43, no. i (October
1994)-
Stiefel, M. and Wolfe, M. A Voice for the Excluded: Popular
Participation in Development, Utopia or Necessity? London: Zed,
1994.
Stokes, S. "Politics and Latin America's Urban Poor: Reflections
BIBLIOGRAPHY 215
from a Lima Shanty Town." Latin American Research Review 2.6, no.
z (1991).
Stonequist, Everett. "The Problem of the Marginal Man,"
American Journal of Sociology 41, no. i (1935): 1-12,.
Tadros, Helmi, Mohamed Feteeha, and Allen Hibbard,. Squatter
Markets in Cairo. Cairo Papers in Social Science 13, no. i (Spring
1990).
Taliqani, Mahmoud. Mutali'at-i Jame'e Shinasi-ye Shahr-i Tehran
(Sociological Studies of Tehran). Vol. 3, "Housing." Tehran: Institute
of Cultural Studies, 1369/1990.
Tarrow, Sidney. Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective
Action, and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
Tawfiq, Inaz. "Discourse Analysis of Informal Housing in Egypt."
Graduate term paper. The American University in Cairo, Department
of Sociology, 1995.
Tehran Musavvar. "Gozareshi az Khane-ye Kargar va Sokhanan-i
Kargaran-i Bikaar" (A report from the House of Labor and what the
unemployed workers said) 37, no. 2. (Khordad 18, 1358/1979): 24-2.5.
—. "Bar Bikaaran-i Mutahassen dar Nowrooz Che Gozasht?"
(What went on to the unemployed during the sit-in on the new year's
day?) io(Farvardin 10, 1358/1979).
Thompson, Edward. "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in
the Eighteenth Century." Past and Present 50 (February 1971).
. Customs in Common. London: Merlin, 1991.
Thompson, Tom. "Petty Traders in Iran." In M. Bonine and N.
Keddie, eds., Modern Iran: The Dialectics of Continuity and Change.
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981.
Tilly, Charles. From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, Mass.:
Addison-Wesley, 1978.
Touraine, Alain. The Voice and the Eye: An Analysis of Social
Movements. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
—. "Comments on John Friedmann's 'Dialectic of Reason.' '
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 13, no. 3
(1989).
Vandemoortele, Jan. "The African Employment Crisis of the
19805." in C. Grey-Johnson, ed., The Employment Crisis in Africa:
Issues in Human Resources Development Policy. Harare: African
Association for Public Administration and Management, 1990.
Velez-Ibanez, Carlos. Rituals of Margtnality: Politics, Process, and
216 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Culture Change in Urban Central Mexico, 1969-1974, Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1983.
Vielle, Paul. Jaygah-i Kargaran-i Tehran (The status of workers in
Tehran). Tehran: University of Tehran, 1359/1980.
Wignaraja, Ponna. ed. New Social Movements in the South:
Empowering the People. London: Zed, 1993.
Wirth, Lewis. "Urbanism as a Way of Life." American Journal of
Sociology 44 (1938): 1-2.4.
World Bank. World Development Report, 1995. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1995.
Worsley, Peter. The Three Worlds. London: Weidenfeld and
Nicholson, 1984.


































































































A kind of desert.
Poor.
Poor and wretched.





A south Tehran squatter district.
Settler of the gowd.





Literally, living on the margin; squatter
settlement.
Islamic seminary.
Occasional religious sermons, often ethnically
based.
Tales.
Member of progovernment informal groups

















































The Third Line (referring to Maoist groups).
Nonagricultural rural settler.
Committee (refers to postrevolutionary urban
security force).
Alleyway.





Informal settlements (in Kgypt).
1 iterally, people on the stage; refers to the




Arabic month, during which Imam Hussein,
grandson of the Prophet, was killed.
Warrior; here refers to members of the
Mujahedin-i Khalq organization.
An oppositional radical Islamic organization
in Iran.
Literally "hypocrite"; used by the Islamic gov-








The crowned father (referring to the Shah).































Third-class people (referring to the poor).
Sit-in, seeking sanctuary.
Prayer beads.
Refers to the culture and people associated
with the Shah's regime.
Iranian money, equivalent to Rls 10.
Learned men; scholar-theologian.
Masses (Arabic).
Tacky, shoddy, squalid, sleazy.
Unemployment loan.




Page numbers in italics indicate illus-
trations.
Abadan, unemployment in, 1 1 1 , 113
acquisition of collective consump-
tion, 10
activism, 161, 163; see also grass-
roots activism
acts of survival, 160
acts of transgression, 13






Akbari , Ali Akbar, 32.




ancien régime, 51, 53, no
antiobstruction squads, 152.
Anti-Vice Court, 146
Arak: riots in, 107; running water
in, 86
Arda bil, revolutionary committees
in, 51
Asadullahi (Justice Minister), 116
ASBS. See Association of Street
Book-Sellers
Association of Street Book-Sellers
(ASBS), 137, 138
Association of the Vendors of Fatemi
Avenue, 138
.issociations and community net-
works, i; in poor communities,
89-98; see also committees;
neighborhood councils; network-
ing
atomized individuals, 16-17, i#, 19,
2.0
autonomy, 10, 15,71, 141, 145,
158, 160; alternative community
222 INDEX
autonomy. . . (continued)
construction and, 76; of disen-
franchised poor, 11-I2, 45-46;
squatters and, 98
Ayandegan newspaper, 3 8
Azarbaijan: revolutionary commit-
tees in, 52; rural-urban migration
and, 30
Azmoun, Manucher, 49
Bagherabad (Tehran satellite com-
munity), 79
Bakhtaran, 81, 82.
Bakhtiar, Shahpour, 51, i i i
Bandar Abbas, 103; squatter settle-
ments in, 26, 31
Bani Sadr, Abul-Hasan, 99, 148




Bazargan, Mehdi, 64, 67, 99, 113
beggars, 15, 31, 139
Beheshti, Ayatollah, 63, 67
Behrangui, Samad, 32
bill paying, 11, 103-4
black Friday massacre, 49, 180^50
Bombay, self-employed women in, 9
Boulaq El-Dakrour, 3
Bourdieu, Pierre, 17
Bousher, squatter settlements in, 26
bribes, 13, 14
bullies (laat), 64
Cairo, 3, 155, i67«n4~5, 178«!!
cancerous process, 14





Carterite breeze (nasseem-e Carteri),
Castells, Manuel, 7, 10
CCMAOT. See Committee for
Continuing Mobilization Against





CGA. See Committee for Guild
Affairs
Chicago School sociologists, 10, 24,
197^56
City Councils (Shura-ye Shahr), 89
civil society, 161
class hierarchy, 24, 25-26, 65
clergy, i 58, 163; anti-Shah cam-
paign and, 43; and downtrodden,
99; hierarchy of, 37-38;
Neighborhood Councils and, 54;
occupied buildings and, 67-68,
69; populism of, 73; unemploy-
ment and, i i i
Colburn, F. D., 5
collective action, 7-10, 19, 172^153;
passive networks and, 17; in
satellite communities, 83; unem-
ployment and, 119
collective activities, 110; squatters
and, 41, 51; unemployment and,
1 1 5-19, 125; see also labor
strikes; sit-ins; union organization
collective consumption, 7, 10, 57; in
Iranian cities, 23




Committee Against Obstruction of




(CCMAOT), 147, 148, 150, 151
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(.onimittee for Guild Affairs (CGA),
146
Committee for Housing for the
Downtrodden, 63
committees (shuras), 154; in occu-
pied buildings, 63, 65-66; unem-
ployment and, 12.1-2.3; see a^so
Neighborhood Councils
communication and meetings, 16
communist movement, 37, 43, 68,
113, 119, 12.7
communities, outside cities, 75-76
community-building struggle, 7
community organizations, 41-42.
community participation, in Third
World countries, 87
community solidarity and coopera-
tion, 55-56
concealing failures, 13
conflicts: between state and disen-
franchised, 15; between vendors
and state, 143-45
Construction Crusade (Jihad-i
Sazandegui), 66, 71, 81-83, 102,,
119, 119, 159
construction laborer (amaleh), 32,
construction sector unemployment,
109, 118
consumer cooperatives, 51, 52-55,
76, 96-98, 187^88
Coordination Council of May Day,
i i 8, i 25, 116
Council for the Resettlement of the
( iowd People (Shura-ye Aali-ye
Eskan-i Gowdmshinan), 91-95
Council of the Apartment (shura-ye
aparttmaan), 70-71
Council of the Unemployed
Workers, 117




crises of legitimacy, n
cultural autonomy, 10
cultural identity, 13
culture of paying (masakhane), 4
culture of poverty, 5, i68ni5
dangerous classes, 4
darughehs, 145
Davis, John E., 66
defensive resistance, 6
demolition: of homes, 40, 162.; of
squatter settlements, 104-8; in
Tehran, 50
demonstrations, 19; occupied build-
ings and, 70; street vendors and,
149; in Tehran, 49-50; unem-
ployment and, i i i-ii, 117, no;
water supplies and, 86; see also
labor strikes; sit-ins
De Soto, Hernando, n, 134
destabilizing force, poor as, 6
destitute (faqir va bichareha), 39
dignity (abirou), 8, 11-13, 3*
disenfranchised people, 158-59;
autonomy and, 11, 45-46;
dichotomies and, 75; integration
and, 11; marginalization and,
40-41; parallel struggles of,
44-48; in satellite communities,
83-84; urban poor as, 14, 56
distribution of social goods, alterna-







drug dealers, 31, 199^101
dual class structure, 14-15
dualism: post-revolution, 60; street
vending and, 135
dual power, during revolution, 5 i
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Durkheim, Emil, 135
dwellings, 13, 2.5; in Tehran, 14-2.5
education, i 59, 180/172; clergy in
Iran and, 43; in occupied build-
ings, 65






ethnic sermons (hey'at), 38, 55
ethnic variation, in squatter settle-
ments, 30
Ettilaat newspaper, 36, 38, i s r
everyday forms of peasant resis-
tance, 5, 6
everyday life, disenfranchised and,
IO
evictions, 106-7, '61, 163; from
occupied buildings, 65, 67-72.;
street vendors and, 149-53
executive committees (EC), 55, 97
Factory Committees (Shura-ye
Kargaran], 89






Fedaian Guerrilla Organization, 37,
4 3 , i i S
floating social clusters, 8-9
food cooperatives, 51-53
food distribution, 52-53
forced rentals policy, 49
formal associations, 41
1-oruhar, Dariush, i 12.
Foucault, Michèle, 15, 164
Foundation of the Dispossessed
(Bonyad-i Mustaz'afin), 60,
106-7
Friedmann, John, 7, 11, 164
Fund 100 program, 72.
gang-like groups (laats), 42, 63
"Garbage Place" (Sa'edi), 32
Ghana, urban migration and, 20
Ghazvin: unemployment in, 116;
violent eradication in, 46
Gilani, Ayatollah Muhammad, 147
Gilbert, Alan, i 2.
Goethe Institute, 36
Golesorkhi, Khosrow, 32
government as patron, 39
gowds, 29, 77, 87, 90-95, loi,
103-4
Gramsci, Antonio, 5, 8
grassroots activism, 157, 165
group action, 19
guerrilla organizations, 37, 176/15
Halabiabad, 45
Hamadan: rural-urban migration




high school graduates (dtplotnehs),
140; unemployment and, 115,
125, m
Hobsbawm, Eric, 7
homelessness, 72, 161 ; loss of honor
and, 13
home-squatting, 2, 72; in Tehran,
61-62
honor (abtrou), 13, 32.
hopelessness, 5
Hotel Royal Garden, 64
Hourcade, Bernard, 66
Housing Foundation, 82, 99, 100,
i 29, 184/124
housing issues, 99-100; in Iranian
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cities, 23; post-revolution, 81-82;
struggle and, 7; in Tehran, 49-50,
59-74
hunger strikes, 114-15, I9 i«2 i
hypocrites (munafiqs), 117






illegal construction (qachaqui), 2,
79, 81, 104
illegal electricity, 2., 4, 45, 81, 86;
paying bills and, i i
illegal encroachments, 88; justified
on moral grounds, i 3
illegal housing, in Tehran, 50
illegal water, 2-4, 45, 86
illiteracy of squatters, 4 i
linbaba, 3
INC;. See Islamic Neighborhood
Councils
income levels, 141; in Iran, 24; of
squatters, 3 i
individual action, versus collective
action, 19




indus t r i a l workers, 41-41
informal housing, 162, 184^7
informal lives, 10, 100719
institutional mechanism for griev-
ances, 9
institutional power, 9
integration, squatter settlements and,
i i-i z, 103-4
intergroup division, 19
internat ional migrants, 8-9
intersections (sar-i kouchehs), 27, 56
invis ibi l i ty exploitation, 14
Iranian Center for Urban and
Architectural Studies, j /
Iranian Revolution, 33, 55, 176^3
Iran-Iraq War, 91, 164
IRP. See Islamic Republican Party
Isfahan: communal differentiation
in, 24; shuraism and, 91; unem-
ployment in, II7-I8, 122
K l a m i , Ahm.id, 151
Islamic Constitution: recognition of
cooperatives, 97; shuraism and,
91
Islamic Consumer Cooperatives
(ICC), 51, 51-53, 54, 55, 187^88
Islamic movements, 158-59
I s l a m i c Mujahedin, 37, 69, 71, 90
Islamic Neighborhood Councils,
95-96
Islamic Republican Party, 94, 95,
119
Islamic Revolution, 2, 158;
described, 35-38; poor people
and, 23, 33; squa t t e r s movements
and, 60; unemployment and, 109
Islamshahr (Tehran satellite commu-
nity), 79, 98, 103-4, 1837710; set-
tlement of, 12, 29; water supply
and,83-84
Ismaili, Abbas, 142
Ivory Coast, urban migration and, 20
Kaleh Fatimeh, 45
Karadj, 30, 77; squatter communi-
ties in, 29, 31; street vendors in,
146; violent eradication in, 46;
water supply in, 85
Karbaschi, Gholam Hussein, 153,
'54
Karrubi, Hassan, 99-100
Karrubi, Sheikh Muhammad, 63, 67
Kayhan newspaper, 38, 151
Kehzadi, Muhammad Ali, 142
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Kermanshah: squatter settlements in,
2.6; unemployment in, 124-15
Karrubi, Mehdi, 63
Khak-i Sefid, 38
Khansari, Hojjat al-Islam, 69
Khazaneh, 103-4
Khomeini, Ayatollah, 43, 51, 52, 99,
147; criticism of, 36
Khorram Abad: street vendors in,
142; unemployment in, i i f>
Khosrowkhavar, Farhad, 25
Khosrowshahi, Hojjatal-Islam Hadi,
63, 67, 82, 99-100
kiosk-owning (dakkeh-daari), 134,
138, 140, 144
kiosks, 45, i 36, i 58
Kurdish Province war, 118, 130
labor strikes, 109, 1 1 3 ; see also sit-
ins; union organization
Langroud, revolut ionary committees
in, 52
language backgrounds, 29-30
language ot survival strategies, 5
latent communication, 17
Latin America: community partici-
pation in, 87; mobilization and,
21; squatters in, 41-42; street
vendors in, 4
lawsui ts , street vendors and, i 5 i
LCC. .See Local ( .onsumer
Cooperatives
left-wing activists, 117; unemploy-
ment and, 1 2 5
Left-wing organization«, i i i
left-wing publications, 127-28
Lima, street vendors in, 9
loans, unemployment and, 115,
129-30




Local Resistance Groups (LRG), 92
locus of change, 5
locus ot collective expression, i 5




1 Rd. .See 1 uc.il Resistance Groups










margmality, 10-11; poor people and,
14; squatter settlements and, 104
margmality (hashtyenishini), 24, 76,
11
marginali/.ation: disenfranchised
and, 40-41; in Iran, 24; in
Tehran settlements, 25; of urban
underclasses, } i
marginal persons, 10-11, 168^15
marginal poor, Islamic Revolution
and, 44
Martyr's Square, 180^50
Marxism, 37, 69, i68wn
Mash.ul: refugees in, 82; riots in,
107; satellite communities and,
8 i ; squatter settlements in, 26
mass on the stage (mardum-i dar
sahneh), 56
May Day rally, 11 8, 125, 126
medical care: Iranian Revolution
and, 55; in satellite communities,
87, 92-93




middle-class jobless people, 2.
Middle Eastern culture, dignified life
and, 11-13
migrant poor, 16, 39-40, 102.
migration, i, 8; alternative commu-
nity construction and, 76; halting
of, 101-2; multi-ethnic, 30;
squatters and, 98; see also rural-
urban migration
mil i tan t youth, 54; revolutionary
committees of, 51-52.; see also
young revolutionaries
mobilization, 53, 90-91, 100, 160;
authoritarian rule and, 2.1; in
communities, 158; of disenfran-
chised groups, 60; hindrances to,
19; and kinship, 163; occupied
buildings and, 68; passive net-
works and, 17; poor against
poor, 127; street politics and, 16;
street vendors and, 150; unem-
ployment and, 113, 118, 12.4-25
modernization in Iran, 24
modernization in Tehran, 25
modern man, 10-1 i
Montazari, Ayatollah, 70
morality, street vending and, 139
moral politics, 13; evictions and, 70;
rational use of political space, 13
Mosque Associations (shura-ye
masajtd), 95-96, 102
mosques, ad hoc (husseimeh), 92
Moussavi-Ardabili, Ayatollah, 82
Muhammad Reza Shah, 24, 35-36
mujahed, 63
Mujahedin , 92, 94, J08, 148; see
also Islamic Mujahedin
Mujahedin-i Khalq, 127
Municipali ty Law of Tehran,
Provision looof (1966), 25
Mutahhari, Ayatollah, 43
mythology about monarch, 40
Nairubi, informal communities in, 29
Naqadeh, squatter settlements in,
26, 31
NC. See Neighborhood Councils
necessity: as driving force, 8; moral
principle of, 83, 158
neighborhood associations (anju-
man-i mahalli), 41, 162; see also
committees
Neighborhood Councils (Shura-ye
Mahallat), 51, 53-56, 76, 89-92
neo-community (khosrowkhavar),
»J
networking, 16-17, ^#, 45
new poor, described, 23-25
NGO. See nongovernmental organi-
zations
night raids, on occupied buildings, 70
noisy resistance, 106-7




notion of necessity, 12-13, X3, ' 5 X
Nowrooz (Iranian new year), 42
occupations: of migrant families, 83;
of satellite communities, 79; of
squatters, 30-31; see also unem-
ployment
Office of Housing for the Disposses-
sed, 99
Oil Industry College, 123
opulent royalists (tawghouties), 69
Oqb.i Mosque, Islamist gatherings
in, 36
Organization of Unemployed and
Seasonal Workers, J 1 2
The Other Path (De Soto), 134,
1707138
outside city boundary (kharej-t mah-
dudeh), 49-50
ownership titles (sanad), 57
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parallel struggles, of disenfranchised,
44-48
Pasdaran Committees, 64, 66,
67-68,70, 89,95,99-100;
Council of Resettlement and, 94
Pasdaran (revolutionary militia),
35, 67-68, 70, 71; and démoli
tions, 105; street vendors and,
146-48; unemployment and,
115, ii6, 12.5, 12.6; water sup-
plies and, 86
passive networks, 18; street politics
and, 16-19
passive revolution, 5, 8




peddlers, 3, 134, 135, 140
Perlman, Janice, 10
petty thieves, i s
petty traders, 134, 194*18
Plastou Masourehkar, 119
police authority, 54; post-revolution,
60, 146, 152; during revolution,
51-51
political party rivalry, 41
political strategies, 40; disenfran-
chised groups and, 8; during
Islamic Revolution, 39; mobiliza-
tion and, 2,1; quiet encroachment
and, 8; revolution and, 71; urban
poor and, T, 8
politics of redress, 10
politics of the poor, i 58-60;
dichotomies and, 75; as revolu-
tionary/passive dichotomy, 6
politics of the state, i 59
poor communities: conflicts in, 41;
Islamic Revolution and, 37
poor people (faqir), 31; as offensive
to dominant groups, 6; political
restrictions and, 95; political
threat to existing order, 6; resist
oppressors, 5; as victims, 5-6
poor urban shantytown dweller
(koukhnishhun), 38
populace versus the Authority, i s
popular orgam/ations, 55-56; for
squatters, 41
population increases, urban unem-
ployment and, 19-2.0
populism (avaam-zadegui), 43
populist modernization, in Third
World countries, 2.0
populist regime, squatter settlements
and, 104
porters (hammal), 30, 31, 139
postmodernist movement, Brazilian
barrio as, i i
poverty and misery (istiz'af), 101
power: and politics, 44; and profit,
135; space as, 15, 164, i97«59
power centers, in occupied build-
ings, 66, 68
powerlessness, 9
prostitutes, i 5, 31
protest movements, 162.; versus indi-
vidual direct action, 10; street
vendors and, i 50; unemployment
and, i i 6
pseudomodernization, in Iranian
cities, 2.3
public space: contests in, 15; streets
as, 19; use of, 46, 134-35
pull and push factors, 19
pushcarts, 3-4, 158
Qomi, Ayatollah, 69
quiet encroachment, 7-10, i 2, 45,
58, 60, 157, 160, 163; history of,
19-2. i ; unemployment and, i 34
Qum, demonstration in, 37





rational choice theory, 6, 170/119
Ray: bombing of buildings in, 43;




redistribution: and autonomy, n; of
goods, 88; of resources, 71
redistribution of public goods: as
burden on state, 15; squatters
and, 98
redistribution of social goods, 10,
160
reform movements, 160, 176^6
refugees, 8-9
religious beliefs, shared, 14-15
religious issues: homogeneous cul-
tural and behavioral patterns
and, 14-15; Islamic Revolution
and, 36; in poor communities,
41; see also clergy
religiously prohibited (haram), 70
religious sermons (rowze-khani), in
underclass neighborhoods, 43
relocation projects, 103-4
repressive state policies, 5, 19, 163;
mobilization and, n
resilience, and hardship, 44
resistance, 6
revolutionary committees, 146; dur-






Reza Shah, 14, 35, 135-36
riots, 9, 38-39; bus fare subsidies
and, 98; demolitions and, 106-8;
satellite communities and, 81; in
Tehran, 49-50
rituals, in shantytowns, 41
romance of resistance, 161
royal leadership, 40
rural/backward (dihaati), 30
rural migrants, 3, 8-9
rural parochialism and traditional-
ism, urban poor and, 10
rural-urban migration, 81, 95, 136;
in Iran, 24; in Iranian cities, 13;
pull and push factors and, 19;
Tehran and, 26; unemployment
and, 19-10, 141; urban unem-
ployment and, 19-10
saboteurs versus community solidar-
ity, 55-56
Sa'edi, Gholam Hussein, 31






Scott, James, 4, 5-6
sectarianism, Neighborhood
Councils and, 93-95
Security Organizations, 55, 189«! i s
Seifian, Engineer, 146
self-regulation and autonomy, 1i,
15, r 58
self-reliance, r 60
Sendero I.uminoso (Peru), 41
sermons. See ethnic sermons; reli-
gious sermons
servants, 30
servants of the dispossessed, 67
sewage ditch (/owy), 91
sexual modesty (haya), 13
shacks (alounaks), 4, 64
Shadshahr. See Islamshahr
shah as patron, 39-40
Shah of Iran: coup (1953), 37; dicta-
torship of, 41; downfall of, 40;
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Shahrestam (mayor of Tehran), 49
Shahriar, squatter settlements in, 30
shanty settlements (zagheh), 77, 87
shantytowns, 4, 11 ; in Tehran, 41 ;
violent eradication of, 46-48
Shanati, Ali, 43
Sharif-Imami, Ja'far (prime minis-
ter), 49
Shiraz: communal differentiation in,
Z4; squatter settlements in, z6;
street vendors in, 140, 146-49;
violent eradication in, 46
shuraism, 90-91, i 54; see also
Neighborhood Councils
silent revolution, 60; see also quiet
encroachment
Siraz riots, 106-8
sit-ins (tahassun), no, 12.7-18,
149
slum dwellers, 3, 11, 2.4; income lev-
els of, 3 i
slum dwellings, described, 2.6-2.7
slums, in Tehran, 2.5-33
social change, 157, 160; in Iran,
2.4-2.5; political movements and,
5; significance of the local and, 5;
squatters' movements and, 60;
universal image ot, i
social forces, 8, 12., 36
social identity, 2.3, 2.4
Socialism, 2,0, 1 1 9
social movements, 6-7,
i69«Hz6-Z7; and social change,




solidarity, 55-56, 135, 159-60; in
occupied buildings, 66
South Africa: crisis of legitimacy in,




Sl'WA. See Syndicate of
Project/Seasonal Workers of
Abadan
squatters, z, 8, 15, 16, 24; employ-
ment of, 41; evictions of, 68;
home invasions and, 64; occupa-
tions of, 31; street vending and,
140
squatter settlements: recognition of,
49; in Tehran, Z5~33, 28, I74«z6
squatting (tshghal) versus sit-ins, izo
stabilization programs, in Third
World countries, zo
stall-holding (basaatt), 134, 140
stalls, 136, 158
statistics: rural-urban migration,
8z-83; squatter community sizes,
27, 29, }/; squatter occupations,
} j; street event deaths in Tehran,
39; Tehran populations, 77-79;
unemployment, 1 10; unemploy-
ment in Tehran, 133; unemploy-
ment in Third World countries,





street demonstrations, 9, 38-39; net-
works and, 17
street fountain (fishaaris), 9Z
street gangs, Z7
street hawkers, 143
street politics: described, 15-19;
government control of, 19; legit-
INDEX 231
imization of, 50; sidewalk ven-
dors and, 3
street subsistence activities, 3, n,
'5 i 13, 134
street subsistence workers, 157
street thugs (hizbullahi), 114, 117,
146, 147
street vending, 134




structure of opportunities (Tarrow), 8
student activism, 37; see also young
activists






Supreme Council of the Gowds
(Shura-ye Aali-e Gowd), 92
SUI'WA. See Syndicate of the
Unemployed Project Workers of
Abadan
Suq El-Gom'a in Imbaba, 3
survival strategies, 5, 6, 72, 160
Syndicate of Project/Seasonal
Worker of Abadan (SPWA),
123-24
Syndicate of the Unemployed Project
Workers of Abadan (SUPWA),
I M , 116
Tabriz: communal differentiation in,
24; demonstrations in, 37; satel-
lite communities and, 81; squat-
ter settlements in, 26, 31; unem-
ployment in, 117
tahassun, 1927145
Tanzania, urban migration and, 20
Tarrow, Sidney, 8
Tavassoli, Muhammad, 92, 99, 144
Tawfiqian, Naser, 117
tax collections, street vendors and, 4
Tehran: bus services in, 112; com-
munal differentiation in, 24;
demolitions squads in, 46-48;
demonstrations in, 39; described,
25; housing rebels in, 59; migra-
tion to, 136; new poor in, 23;
shuraism and, 91; squatter settle-
ments in, 25-26, 45; squatters in,
106-7; temporary communities
in, 2; unemployment in, 122; vil-
lages surrounding, 76-77, 78, So
Tehran University, 147-48, 151
Teleghani, Ayatollah, 90-91
theoretical groups (Bourdieu), 17
third-class people (tabaqeh-ye
se'iiha), 39
Third World countries: squatter set-
tlements in, 26; urban disenfran-
chised in, 5
Third World poor, i 57
Tilly, Charles, 16
trade unions: infiltration of, 37; in
Iran, 41-42; see also labor strikes;
sit-ins; union organization
travel-peddling (dast-foroushi), 140
Tunis, informal communities in, 29
tyranny of modernity, 7
UKHIÏT. Sec Union of the Kiosk
Holders and Ice Traders of
Tehran
ulama (Shi'i clergy), 37
underground economy, in Tehran, 45
underground water reservoir (aab-
anbaar), 84
"Under the Javadiyeh Bridge"
(Golesorkhi), 32
underworld members, 15
Unemployed Workers of Ahwaz and
the Vicinity, i 16
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unemployment, i, 15, 16, 19-2.0,
141; post-revolutionary, 9,






Union of the Kiosk Holders and Ice
Traders of Tehran (UKHIÏT), 153
Union of the Kiosk \ lolders of
Mosaddeq Avenue, i 50
Union of the Street Book-Sellers, 150
Union of the Unemployed Workers
of Isfahan and Vicinity (UUI-
WIV), 117-18, in
Union of Unemployed People of
Kermanshah, 125
Union of Workers and High-School
Graduates, 116
union organization, 9, 37, 41-42,
122-25; in Iran, 41-42; see also
labor strikes; sit-ins; trade unions
University Councils (Shura-ye
Daneshgah), 89
urban disenfranchised people, 5
urban employment, 143
urban growth, in Iran, 24
urban land, 2, 163
urban marginals (koukhmshman), 99
urban migration. See rural-urban
migration
urban physical space, 143
urban planning, 83, 173113
urban politics, moral language of, i 3
urban poor, 10, 24, 17314; food dis-
tribution and, 51; in Iran, 157;
struggles of, 38; see also disen-
franchised people
urban security forces, 54
urban social movements, 6-7
urban social space, 143
Urumiyeh, satellite communities
and, 8 i
U.S. Embassy seizure, in Tehran, 73,
i 26-27, KH
UUIW1V. See Union of the
Unemployed Workers of Isfahan
and Vicinity
van Naerssen, Ton, 7




violent eradication, 46-48, 161-62
vulnerability of urban poor, 3 i
Ward, Peter, 12
war of attrition, and violent eradica-
tion, 48
water supplies, in satellite communi-
ties, 83-84; see also ilk-gal water
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